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Luther on Reason: What Makes a Whore 
a Whore
Jeffrey K. Mann
At first glance, Martin Luther’s attitude toward human reason seems … well 
… un easonable. He did, after all, repeatedly refer to it as a “whore.”1 He
also, quite famously, derided this human capacity by speaking facetiously 
of “O domina Ratio” (“Madam Reason”) in his polemics against Erasmus.2 
Fortunately, academic treatments of the subject usually begin by pointing 
out that Dr. Luther was no enemy of reason. He was not an uncritical fun-
damentalist who blindly accepted the biblical text without rational thought, 
even if he sounds to us a bit like that from time to time. To imagine him 
as such is to place him in a category that did not even exist in the sixteenth 
century. 
More recent scholarship has focused on the philosophical sophistication 
of the Father of the Reformation. To refute the “irrational Luther” argu-
ment, one need only look at the collection of essays by leading scholars in 
The Devil’s Whore: Reason and Philosophy in the Lutheran Tradition,3 with its 
three sections addressing Luther’s own philosophical education, his impact 
on continental philosophy, and his influence on philosophy still today. 
Luther was a rational thinker par excellence.4  
As is generally pointed out, Luther held natural reason in very high 
regard, describing it in The Disputation Concerning Man [1536] as “that 
most beautiful and most excellent of all things.”5 It is capable of remarkable 
achievement in worldly matters, from economics to industry and music. In 
the realm of theology, it certainly has an important role to play as well. It 
must, however, remember its limitations – most often discussed as its inad-
equacy and pride. Human reason is incapable of deducing the Trinity from 
nature, even if it can reason about this divine self-revelation. And its pride 
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often leads it to take the place of the Word of God, creating and insisting on 
new works or doctrine.
But a “whore?!” That seems a bit much. What is it that made Luther 
consider reason a “whore?” He clearly appreciated hyperbole and crass 
invective, but he did not throw out this particular slur as a general insult 
for things and people he did not like. His choice of words here was quite 
deliberate. For Luther, there is indeed something problematic about reason 
beyond its inadequacy and pride. There is an adulterous disloyalty in human 
reason that Luther identified, and that we must recognize if we are to under-
stand Luther correctly. 
This article will consider why Luther used the specific word “whore” for 
human reason. In doing so, we will correct the inadequate notion of Luther 
as an enemy of reason, but more importantly, we need to recognize that 
Luther’s difficulties with reason extended beyond its natural limitations and 
hubris. We will then conclude with a brief consideration of why this matters 
still today, and what Christians should be taking away from this admittedly 
odd denunciation.
Human Reason: The Good
When it comes to matters of governance and the management of this world, 
there is nothing greater than human reason. In fact, there is no tool other 
than reason to determine matters of politics, economics, science, indus-
try, and education. For Luther, proper conduct of such disciplines is not 
prescribed in the scriptures; fortunately, we are graced with the benefits of 
natural reason. 
[I]t is certainly true that reason is the most important and the highest 
in rank among all things and, in comparison with other things of this 
life, the best and something divine. It is the inventor and mentor of all 
the arts, medicine, laws, and of whatever wisdom, power, virtue, and 
glory men possess in this life…. It is a sun and a kind of god appoint-
ed to administer these things in this life.”6
Paul Althaus explains in the chapter on “Reason” in his Theology of  
Martin Luther: 
Within this realm, however, that is, within ‘earthly government’ in 
the broadest sense in which Luther can use that term, reason alone is 
the final authority; it contains within itself the basis for judging and 
deciding about the proper regulation and administration of earthly 
matters …. In these matters the Bible, Christian preaching, and theol-
ogy have nothing to say. Holy Scripture and the gospel do not teach 
us how to make right laws or administer the affairs of state. This is all 
a matter of human reason which as such was originally given to men 
by the Creator.7
It is for this reason that Luther could recognize that, without the Chris-
tian scriptures, other civilizations could manage their affairs quite well. 
“And, to tell the truth, [the heathen] are far more skillful in such matters 
than the Christians.”8 He believed the articulation of virtues and the con-
duct of civil righteousness are not the purview alone of those who possess 
Holy Writ, but were found in great abundance among the Greeks. 
This is not to say that Jews and Christians have no advantages that stem 
from their knowledge of scripture, and Luther himself preferred to live in 
a Christian nation. Luther extolled the Golden Rule and believed it must 
be applied in economic matters,9 which led to his rejection of usury and 
price-gouging. Gen 1:28 is an important reminder to be good stewards of 
the earth, even if it does not tell us how to vote on cap-and-trade. The Bible 
provides general ethical obligations, but reason is the tool we have to deter-
mine the best public policies.
In the realm of theology, Luther also recognized the place and impor-
tance of reason. Human beings have been provided with natural reason, 
with which we can determine right from wrong. He believed us capable 
of determining the omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence of 
God.10 While this rational capacity is compromised by original sin, it retains 
sufficient integrity to lead us to fundamental truths about the nature of the 
divine. The capacity of the human mind for logical reason is handicapped 
but not left impotent. Indeed, logical argumentation played a tremendous 
role in the theology of Luther – not just for faith seeking understanding, 
but to lead one from truth to truth – from revelation to orthodox theology. 
The most well-known case of Luther castigating Madam Reason is 
found in The Bondage of the Will [1525]. He condemned Erasmus in no 
uncertain terms for relying on natural reason in his insistence that humans 
have free will. And while Luther demanded that we accept the Word of God 
as revealed in Holy Scripture, rather than trust our own intellect and phi-
losophy, he was not simply covering his ears and quoting the Bible. Luther 
responded to his opponent’s arguments with both scripture and logic. Eras-
mus had insisted that a moral command, which teaches that one ought to do 
something, implies that one can do what is commanded. Luther responded 
with counter-factuals. “How often do parents have a game with their chil-
dren by telling them to come to them, or to do this or that, simply for the 
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sake of showing them how unable they are, and compelling them to call for 
the help of the parents’ hand!”11 Luther did not simply flee to biblicism, but 
used logic to show Madam Reason how foolish she really is. Reason, who 
frequently “jumps to conclusions” and makes “a universal out of a particu-
lar,”12 is in violation of her own precepts, not just the teachings of scripture. 
Besides, “If anything is really contrary to reason, it is certainly very much 
more against God also. For how can anything not be in conflict with heav-
enly truth when it is in conflict with earthly truth?”13
We should be clear, however, that reason did not stand next to scripture 
with equal authority for Luther. During his famous declaration at Worms, 
he proclaimed that he would not recant unless “convinced by the testimony 
of scripture or clear reason.”14 This should not be understood as reason 
being coequal to scripture on matters of doctrine. In Grace and Reason, B.A. 
Gerrish explains, “[H]e certainly did not mean to set up an independent 
authority by the side of the Scripture. He meant: ‘unless convinced either 
by direct citations of Scripture or by reasonable inference from such cita-
tions.’”15
Luther himself was extremely gifted with a tremendous intellect and 
capacity for reason. Gerrish reminds us, “If ‘reason’ be taken to include, as 
surely it must, the skills of the scholar no less than the speculations of the 
philosopher, then Luther was pre-eminently a ‘reasonable’ man.”16 Thus, 
Luther’s critiques of reason were a product of his own rationality; a highly 
critical mind is most able to perceive its own limitations. Luther was as wary 
and suspicious of his own reason as that of others. His warnings about rea-
son were not a critique of Aristotelians, Scholastics, or puffed-up sophists, 
but for all humanity.
… The Bad
Luther’s denigrations of reason are well known, but too often misun-
derstood. His rhetoric lends itself to the misperception that he was 
anti-intellectual and an uncritical literalist when it comes to scripture. 
Richard Dawkins fell victim to this in The God Delusion,17 as did German 
philosopher Kurt Wuchterl, who wrote, “[For] Luther, logic was a work 
of the devil. We are called to pray and worship, not to argue or think logi-
cally.”18 Of course, anyone who does more than read snippets of Luther will 
understand the absurdity of such a claim.
While Luther insisted that we favor the literal reading of the scriptures, 
unless doing so is clearly absurd,19 his exegesis and theology display sig-
nificant philosophical erudition. While dealing with divine paradoxes like 
the Trinity, incarnation, bound human will, or the Eucharist, he did so as 
one firmly grounded in the philosophical school of nominalism.20 Even his 
famous (mis)conduct at Marburg, insisting on the literal understanding of 
Christ’s words, “This is my body,” was grounded in a systematic Christol-
ogy of great consistency and sophistication. (It is unfortunate that so many 
Lutherans fail to appreciate his sacramentology, thinking him a slave to lit-
eralism.)
The problem is not that reason is unreliable, but that it has serious flaws 
and limitations that we must appreciate. Difficulties arise when our reason 
is permitted to take on a life of its own and become the ultimate arbiter of 
truth. Paul Hinlicky clarifies, “Luther’s warnings against (speculative) rea-
son in theology are fundamentally misunderstood, however, when we take 
‘reason’ to mean logic, rather than the metaphysical tradition of natural 
theology which he knows in classical form from Aristotle and Cicero.”21 
Rationality and logic are unquestionably good; it is our use of them, and 
our philosophical traditions, that are flawed. We should not think, how-
ever, that Luther’s problem with reason was the worldview of one particular 
philosopher, that “rascally heathen” Aristotle.22 In his Disputation against 
Scholastic Theology [1517], for example, his primary target was Gabriel Biel, 
who shared Luther’s philosophical orientation in Nominalism and the via 
moderna.23 The problem is human beings attempting to offer a worldview 
without acknowledging the inadequacy, pride, and duplicitous nature of 
reason.
First, Luther demanded that human reason know its limits – it is sim-
ply inadequate with regard to the spiritual realm. The human mind cannot 
know the ways of God on its own. Natural reason can never conceive of the 
gospel of Jesus Christ, the Son of God incarnate, or sacrificial atonement 
for the sins of humanity on its own. Rather, we are by nature theologians of 
glory, looking for God in majesty and splendor; we seek to approach God 
through our own virtues and merit. Instead, Luther taught, God comes to 
us in weakness, suffering, and death and proclaims that we must become 
sinners in order to be reconciled with God. The righteous are barred and the 
reprobate welcomed. 
The righteousness of God is not what we expect. “This is a righteous-
ness hidden in a mystery, which the world does not understand. In fact, 
Christians themselves do not adequately understand it or grasp it in the 
midst of their temptations. Therefore it must always be taught and continu-
ally exercised.”24 Human reason, however, cannot countenance this. Althaus 
explained, “What the word preaches and faith confesses to be reality, reason 
holds to be unrealistic nonsense. Reason must contradict both the word 
and the faith which accepts the word. Reason cannot of itself produce faith. 
Only God can give faith, and that in opposition to reason and nature.”25
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Human reason, on its own, is unable to appreciate its state of depravity, 
its absolute dependence on God. It maintains a trust in its own abilities. In 
The Disputation Concerning Justification [1536], Luther wrote, “For human 
nature, corrupt and blinded by the blemish of original sin, is not able to 
imagine or conceive of any justification above and beyond works.”26
It is not that the gospel is irrational or illogical, but that human reason 
is incapable on its own of recognizing and appreciating God’s claim in the 
gospel. We are inherently theologians of glory; we do not grasp the theology 
of the cross on our own. Reason is insufficient for us to experience our sin, 
which is communicated through the law via the Holy Spirit. Consequently, 
the gospel makes no sense. Only the ill perceive the value of the physician, 
and without God granting the experience of sickness unto death, the gospel 
cannot be properly perceived, understood, and believed.27
Natural reason teaches that greater adherence to God’s law creates more 
righteousness. For Luther, greater moral effort leads to greater sin. This is 
how the law works; God’s commands are given, not to bring us life, but 
to kill us. It is for this reason that Luther believed cold hard reason alone, 
without faith, could not even understand the Holy Scriptures. In a letter to 
George Spalatin, dated January 18, 1518, he wrote:
To begin with, it is absolutely certain that one cannot enter into the 
[meaning of ] Scripture by study or innate intelligence. Therefore your 
first task is to begin with prayer. You must ask that the Lord in his 
great mercy grant you a true understanding of his words, should it 
please him to accomplish anything through you for his glory and not 
for your glory or that of any other man…. You must therefore com-
pletely despair of your own diligence and intelligence and rely solely 
on the infusion of the Spirit. Believe me, for I have had experience in 
this matter.28
The inadequacy of reason extends beyond our inability to understand 
the words of law and gospel; it also fails to perceive that they are true pro me 
(“for me”). It is not sufficient to have cerebral understanding of God’s law. 
We must make that second movement of subjective appropriation, and this 
is possible only by the grace of God. After all, “God saves real, not imagi-
nary, sinners, and he teaches us to mortify real rather than imaginary sin.”29
Likewise, the gospel is only good news when it exists for me. This is 
something that reason alone cannot grasp. Steven Paulson puts it succinctly, 
“First, reason knows that God is able to help and that God is essentially 
kind, but its knowledge lacks the true thing: it knows God’s omnipotence 
in general, but does not know if God ‘is willing to do this also for us.’ It 
cannot apply the pronoun ‘for you’ to itself.”30 Our reason is insufficient 
to bring us to the joyous reception of God’s gracious words of forgiveness. 
“Accordingly, that ‘for me’ or ‘for us,’ if it is believed, creates that true faith 
and distinguishes it from all other faith, which merely hears the things 
done.”31
The second defect in our reason is its pride. Reason is not just insuf-
ficient, its fallen nature has placed it in perpetual conflict with the will of 
God. “For whatever worldly order and reason disclose is very far below 
divine law. Indeed, Scripture forbids one to follow reason. Deut 12 [:8]: 
‘You shall not do what is right in your own eyes.’ Reason always resists 
God’s laws, according to Gen 6[:5], ‘All of the human heart and mind 
always desire the greatest evil.’”32 The hubris of reason begins with its failure 
to admit its own inadequacy and rises to the level of wanting to take the 
place of God. We see this manifesting itself in three ways: contradicting 
scripture, creating new works, and insisting it play a role in its own salva-
tion.
What are Christians to do when the Word of God appears in conflict 
with human reason? This perennial problem is obviously far more complex 
than picking one over the other. Luther lived and worked within a theologi-
cal context that accepted the original writings of the prophets and apostles 
as inerrant, divinely inspired truth. Holy Scripture trumped philosophy 
when the two clashed. As a follower of the via moderna, this was further 
enforced; human reason may reign supreme in the “realm of nature,” but 
theology operates in a different realm, under divinely revealed truth.33  
Scripture leads us to numerous paradoxes and mysteries: the three-
in-one Trinity, the two-natures-one-person Christ, the mystery of Christ 
present in the sacraments. Other paradoxes, like Luther’s simul iustus et  
peccator, also make no sense from a worldly viewpoint; yet he was confident 
that they are taught in the Holy Bible. Thus, when the Trinity was denied, 
the real presence rejected, or Aristotelian virtue ethics smuggled into the 
church, Luther believed it his responsibility to condemn such worldly intru-
sions of “reason” into the gospel message. 
For Luther, this had happened time and again throughout the his-
tory of the church. The papists not only insisted on the “monstrous” idea 
of transubstantiation in the Eucharist, but also changed the practice of the 
sacrament itself. They relied on human wisdom to explain a miracle and 
change Christ’s command, providing bread only to the laity.34 In discussing 
transubstantiation, Luther reminded his readers, “[T]he authority of God’s 
Word is greater than the capacity of our intellect to grasp it.”35 Throughout 
the history of Christendom, there has always been too much compromising 
behavior from theologians. Luther saw this in that “whore,” the Paris faculty 
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(after his disputation with Johann Eck) who “has recently been bold enough 
to open her legs and uncover her nakedness for the whole world.”36 She 
proves her whorish nature by substituting human reason for the commands 
of God. It is the arrogance of our fallen nature that leads us to prefer our 
own thoughts to divine revelation. 
This is also the case when we create new works and insist that others 
follow our own moral constructs of right and wrong. From fast days to 
clerical celibacy, the Roman Church had usurped God’s role by demanding 
adherence to its own ethical principles. “For the papal ass is such a great 
ass that it cannot and will not distinguish between God’s word and human 
teaching, but holds them both as the same.”37 It is through this prideful 
trust in one’s own ethical reasoning that others’ consciences are weighed 
down, and human precepts take the place of the commands of God.
Finally, as we saw with the theologians of glory, human reason expresses 
its pride – indeed its desire to be equal with God – through its efforts to 
achieve its own righteousness. This, for Luther, was the one great heresy and 
temptation common to all theologies outside of the true gospel message of 
Christ. “Thus human reason cannot refrain from looking at active righteous-
ness, that is, its own righteousness; nor can it shift its gaze to passive, that 
is Christian righteousness, but it simply rests in the active righteousness. 
So deeply is this evil rooted in us, and so completely have we acquired this 
unhappy habit!”38 In Luther’s mind, the Jews, Papists, and Anabaptists all 
commit the same (semi-) Pelagian error of trusting in their own obedience 
to God’s law as the way to salvation. They attempt to please and appease 
God with active righteousness, rather than being passive recipients of God’s 
all-sufficient grace.
The problem with this is not simply that they are working too hard, 
or failing to trust completely in the atoning work of Christ. There is herein 
something far more serious for Luther: they are attempting to usurp God’s 
role in human salvation, placing themselves on par with God. Christian 
faith requires the acceptance of God’s word of unconditional forgiveness 
and adoption as children. Human reason rejects this gospel message and 
insists on justifying itself, effectively calling God a liar. Moreover, this “taking 
credit” in part for one’s own salvation is not only presumptuous, it undercuts 
the life of faith which is expressed in gratitude to God. Althaus did an excel-
lent job of explicating the implications in his chapter “God is God,” writing:
The desire to bring ‘works’ as achievements before God is the equiva-
lent of a lie that dishonors God as the giver and creator…. Such a life 
would be an attack on God as God…. Bringing achievements before 
the creator of all gifts and of all powers in this way is an insult to 
God. There can be only one thing before God, the giving of thanks, 
and whatever we bring him can only be understood as an expression 
of thanks…. If a man, however, tries to bring his own achievements 
before God the element of thanksgiving is lost.39  
… and the Ugly
This brings us to the third of Luther’s problems with “reason.” Luther did 
not call reason “die höchste Hure [the foremost whore]40 as a generic insult. 
His choice of words was specific and intentional, as the word “whore” had 
a definite meaning for Luther. Luther did not refer to natural reason in this 
way simply because of its inadequacies or pride. He chose this description 
because of what the word “whore” implied: faithlessness, disloyalty, duplici-
tousness, and a cheating nature.
Throughout the 54 volumes of Luther’s Works in English, Luther used 
the word “whore” nearly 250 times. More than half of these are literal –
referring to women who sold sex, or men who spent time “whoring.” If we 
consider his use of the word in its metaphorical sense – whether applied 
to the Hebrew people, Pope Clement VII, the faculty at Paris, the Radical 
Reformers, Herodias, or “Madam Reason,” there is the common thread that 
runs throughout: he was castigating their utter lack of loyalty and faith-
fulness. They had betrayed the ones to whom they had been called to be 
faithful. This is why he often used the word to describe those committing 
adultery. For the same reason, in his Table Talk, he could speak of a woman 
who killed her infant child as a “whore,” as she had betrayed the one to 
whom she was morally bound to be faithful.41
Luther echoed the Old Testament’s condemnation of the people Israel 
for seeking other gods, comparing them to prostitutes, as they had neglected 
to be faithful to the one who had delivered them from bondage.42 The 
prophet Hosea’s marriage was, of course, a representation of how Yahweh 
had wed himself to a faithless bride. This particular metaphor was chosen, 
not because prostitutes are really bad people, or receive money for services 
rendered. Rather, the point of comparison between Hosea’s wife and the 
people of God was their faithlessness.
Luther picked up this focus of the metaphor and used it throughout 
his theological career. It is for this reason that he could refer to Delilah43 
and Herodias44 as “whores,” not because they exchanged sex for money, but 
because of the betrayal of their husbands.45
We find the same use of the metaphor when Luther accused his 
theological opponents of being “whores” and the like. He made use of Rev-
elation’s image of the “Babylonian whore” to describe the Papists.46 Indeed, 
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he believed that St. John had the papacy in mind when he wrote of the 
“scarlet whore [dw Rote hur] of Babylon” (Rev 17:4).47 Here also the reason 
for the comparison was the perceived adulterousness of his opponents to 
Christ, their bridegroom.  
Thus Luther did not perceive himself to be introducing any new lan-
guage through his repeated condemnations of those “whores” who are 
disloyal to God or their God-given obligations. “Scripture consistently calls 
idolatry and unbelief adultery and whoring, that is, if the soul clings to the 
teachings of men and thus surrenders faith and Christ.”48  
At times, Luther attacked the perfidiousness of his opponents for their 
lack of faith or moral character, but more often than not it was their use of 
reason, which Luther anthropomorphized. His opponents preferred their 
own thoughts to the Word of God, he insisted, and betrayed the latter in 
favor of “reason,” who is “by nature a harmful whore … [who] is so comely 
and glittering.”49 This was true of Rome as well as the Anabaptists. With 
regard to the latter, he wrote, “Go, trot to the privy with your conceit, your 
reason! Shut up, you cursed whore, do you think you are master over faith, 
which declares that the true body and the true blood is in the Lord’s Supper, 
and that Baptism is not merely water, but the water of the Father, the Son, 
and the Holy Spirit?”50
Thus both the individuals who prefer reason to revelation, and reason 
herself, are spoken of as whores for their lack of faithfulness. The ques-
tion may arise, however, “To whom is reason being unfaithful?” It is easy 
to understand how it is whorish to betray one’s spouse in literal fashion for 
another, to choose Baal over Yahweh, or pick natural reason over the Word 
of God. How, though, is reason being a “whore?” 
As discussed above, the problem is more than reason’s inability to 
grasp heavenly things or its arrogance. It becomes a whore when it betrays 
its essential obligation … which is to gain knowledge, specifically moral 
and theological knowledge. Reason’s problem is more than getting too big 
for its britches; it betrays truth for personal gain. It is here that Luther’s 
anthropology, with its understanding of fallen humanity, prefigures some 
of postmodernism’s critique of philosophy, albeit in theological language. 
Moreover, the working of the human mind is not simply limited by culture, 
context, power, and language. It is morally corrupted so that it will sell its 
soul for personal gain. Reason will invariably compromise its integrity, and 
betray its pursuit of the truth, when doing so brings benefit to the individ-
ual. This is why Luther speaks of reason as a whore.
When it comes to the scriptures, reason shows the same lack of integ-
rity and trustworthiness, twisting the Word of God to make it say what the 
individual desires. In his battle with Erasmus over the question of free will, 
Luther insisted, “Reason interprets the Scriptures of God by her own infer-
ences and syllogisms, and turns them in any direction she pleases.”51 While 
Luther failed to appreciate honest disagreement with regard to the mean-
ing of texts, there is no denying that whorish reason has often done exactly 
what he describes here. From biblical arguments for American slavery to the 
theology of the Westboro Baptist Church, human reason has little problem 
bending and contorting itself, violating its own integrity, in order to reach 
the end it selfishly desires.
If we consider, then, the issues that spurred Luther to action throughout 
his career, we see the role that he believed whorish reason to be playing. We 
may also understand why he believed this to be the work of Satan, hence all 
the references to “the Devil’s whore.” Reason’s misconduct was about more 
than its self-serving nature and arrogance. The abuse of God’s word placed 
salvation at risk. And when carried out by those in authority, Luther was 
convinced the church itself was becoming a vehicle for damnation.
If we start with the law, humanity has consistently convinced itself of 
its own virtue, its own ability to achieve an active righteousness. Our reason 
does not want to face up to our own moral corruption and impotence. It 
convinces itself of its moral worth and progress, certain that it can fulfill 
God’s commands. Despite evidence and experience to the contrary, it insists 
that if God commanded it, we can do it. However, it thereby never makes 
itself open to God’s offer of unconditional grace. Reason persuades itself of 
its own virtue, and subsequently turns a deaf ear to the gospel.
When presented with the gospel of Jesus Christ, human reason denies 
the simple message of forgiveness and freedom. It flatters itself and creates 
works righteousness, placing itself in the driver’s seat (or at least as the co-
pilot) of its salvation. Just as in the Garden, it ignores the divine warning 
and promise in favor of wanting to be like God. We want to be the author 
of our destinies, and so corrupt the gospel until we are the ones who are in 
control. Reason consistently works itself toward a theology of glory where it 
stands alongside its Maker in salvation history.
Likewise, natural reason does not content itself with the ethical precepts 
of scripture, but convinces itself that it is worthy to judge alongside God, 
determining and handing out moral commands for others to follow. Scrip-
ture is incomplete or too vague, and so our reason leads us to believe that we 
are able to share in the divine work of providing commandments. The abil-
ity to control others and insist that the world be structured according to our 
own designs leads us to claim divine sanction for the rules and regulations 
that we create.
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Lastly, Luther was frustrated with how reason cannot and will not 
accept its inability to understand the workings of the divine. The teachings 
of the church must make logical sense to the individual if they are to be 
accepted. If Christ’s real presence in the Eucharist seems beyond compre-
hension, reason must provide the explanation, as in transubstantiation, or 
explain it away à la Ulrich Zwingli. If the revealed will of God with regard 
to the election of the saints does not make sense to us, we will restructure 
the theology of the Church until it does. Reason will tie itself in knots 
rather than accept a word from God that is beyond its ken. And in its 
hubris, it will abandon the proclamation of truth in favor of elevating itself 
to divine status.
Contemporary Relevance
Clarification of Luther’s view of natural reason has more to offer than his-
toric trivia. It offers a profound corrective to the arrogance and divisiveness 
which too often typify Christian work and relationships. His castigation of 
natural reason falls under the category of law; it points to our fallen condi-
tion and need for God’s grace. Moreover, the recognition of the duplicitous 
nature of Madam Reason should allow us to recognize our own shortcom-
ings, not just those of others. The mirror of the law is to be faced directly, 
not angled so we can spend our time observing others’ faults. Karl Barth 
famously wrote, “The crooked man thinks crookedly and speaks crook-
edly even about his own crookedness.”52 It is easy to look around for that 
crooked person – and often claim to find him or her. Luther’s universal 
denunciation of whorish reason is most valuable when it points to our own 
crookedness. After all, it is not just the gospel that exists pro me.
The honest recognition of humanity’s adulterous nature demands hard 
work. It requires us to be self-critical, humble, and more charitable to the 
views of others. It forces us to ask whether our own thoughts, theology, poli-
tics, and ethics are as faithful to the will of God as our reason tells us they 
are. Early in his career, in his commentary on Psalm 119, Luther wrote: 
Therefore, wanting to remain always in the course and desire of 
making progress, this is true humility, which truly says, “My soul has 
coveted to desire Thy ordinances at all times.” The proud and sloth-
ful, who seek to be holy or at ease, covet a quick end to work and an 
arrival at the top.53  
Luther’s hamartiology demands that his theological progeny perpetually 
regard their logical conclusions with a critical eye, recognizing that reason 
often persuades us of what we wanted all along. All of our convictions 
require a hermeneutic of suspicion.
Today, for better or worse, theology is deeply tied up with politics. It 
is terribly easy to see whorish reason at work here, and also to fall prey to 
its charms. One need only turn on cable news to see this playing itself out. 
Bright, informed, passionate people who genuinely care about others look at 
the same facts and reach vastly different conclusions:  We should raise taxes; 
we should lower taxes.  This bill will lower medical costs; this bill will raise 
medical costs. My candidate is a saint; your candidate is a scoundrel.
Consider the U.S. Supreme Court case of Bush v. Gore in 2000. Unlike 
questions of constitutional law, where different philosophies lead to dif-
ferent judgments, there was nothing “conservative” or “liberal” about the 
questions before the court. Whether or not to allow alternative methods of 
vote-counting to be introduced during the review process is not something 
dictated by political philosophy. And yet we saw a 5-4 vote that reflected 
perfectly whether the justices had been appointed by Republicans or Demo-
crats. While all nine justices had rational and well-articulated arguments for 
their decisions, it is difficult to believe that no partisanship was involved, 
subtly corrupting the objectivity we want to see from the Court.
Upon sharing this observation with a friend and colleague – a very 
bright, logical, and politically astute individual – he agreed that certain 
justices had indeed allowed their personal desires to corrupt their natural 
reason – specifically, those justices who supported the other guy. He was cer-
tain that his own reasoning on the subject, in agreement with the remaining 
justices, was sound. If we are to “put the best construction on everything,” 
this must be applied to political friend and foe alike – not to the level of 
naiveté, but with charitable willingness to grant the benefit of the doubt.
Too often, charitable assessments of the motivations of others, along 
with critical analysis of our own reasoning, are in short supply. It is much 
easier to be convinced that the “other” is stupid or depraved. As long as I 
am not wicked or irrational, then my views should be trusted. The problem 
may be that when we recognize that others’ natural reason is untrustworthy, 
this demands that ours is probably just as bad. We are far more comfortable 
with a self-image that is good, wise, and true. And yet the constant recog-
nition of our own moral depravity is essential for living the Christian life. 
In his Lectures on Romans [ca 1515], Luther wrote, “The saints are always 
sinners in their own sight, and therefore always justified outwardly. But the 
hypocrites are always righteous in their own sight, and thus always sinners 
outwardly.”54
As mentioned above, Luther did not appropriate this message to his own 
life very well. While he did struggle with the question, “Am I alone wise?” 
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for a good part of his life, he was far from charitable with the motives of oth-
ers who reached conclusions with which he disagreed. In the eleventh and 
final chapter of Heiko Oberman’s Luther: Man between God and the Devil, 
this significant shortcoming (matched by too many of his progeny) is dis-
cussed. Luther’s anthropology should have shielded him from such conceit, 
“But once he had discovered the Gospel and recognized the targets of the 
Devil’s attacks, Luther became less and less capable of distinguishing between 
adversaries and people who simply did not agree with him, between diaboli-
cal temptations and divergent opinions.… [H]e could no longer distinguish 
between a man and his opinion, or between error and lie.”55
While there still remain many Lutheran theologians and clergy who 
share this uncharitable view of others’ theology, there are an increasing 
number who adopt this conceit with regard to politics. We place a great 
deal of confidence in our own abilities to reason objectively and fairly on 
the subjects of fracking, the minimum wage, or immigration, and thereby 
assume that others’ conclusions are grounded in ignorance or wickedness. 
With this established, our God-pleasing politics can take their rightful place 
in the pulpit, or be given the imprimatur of being considered “the prophetic 
voice”. Even without the benefit of divinely revealed answers to such com-
plex problems, confidence in our own politics is unwavering. To signal our 
pious, uncorrupted viewpoints to others, we broadcast our religious creden-
tials or clerical status to all, perhaps believing our callings exempt us from 
the limited, prideful, and whorish nature of human reason that we all share.
Recognizing human reason as a whore requires humility with regard 
to our own conclusions, charity toward others’, and the repetition of our 
efforts – critically and penitently – to examine our rational deductions in all 
things. It is not Christianity alone that teaches, “To admit fault is the begin-
ning of righteousness.”56 But Christians should be sure that this applies in 
their life, not just their theology.
[E]very righteousness for the present moment is sin with regard to 
that which must be added in the next moment…. Hence he who 
in the present moment trusts that he is righteous and stands in that 
opinion has already lost righteousness, as is clear likewise in motion: 
That which is the goal in the present moment is the starting point in 
the next moment. But the starting point is sin, from which we must 
always be going; and the goal is righteousness, to which we must 
always be going.”57
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The Significance of Saint Elizabeth Ann 
Seton for Lutherans on the Eve of 2017
David von Schlichten
“Elizabeth Ann Seton lived many important lives …”     
– Maya Angelou1 
As an ELCA pastor who is an assistant professor of religious studies at Seton 
Hill University, a Roman Catholic university named after Saint Elizabeth 
Ann Seton, I found it amusing when we elected a new Presiding Bishop 
named Elizabeth Eaton. Of course, more profoundly, I have been turn-
ing over in my mind what the first American-born Roman Catholic saint 
has to teach us Lutherans in the twenty-first century. In this essay, I will 
provide an overview of Seton’s life and then consider what she has to teach 
us Americans in general and us ELCA Lutherans in particular. Given her 
extraordinary reverence for the eucharist, I will focus on what she wrote 
about the sacrament and show the implications that her eucharistic theology 
has for us in the ELCA, especially as we prepare to commemorate with the 
Roman Catholic Church the 500th anniversary of the start of the Reforma-
tion.
My reasons for focusing on Seton go well beyond the fact that I teach 
at a university named after her or that I belong to a denomination whose 
Presiding Bishop has a name similar to hers. Seton is particularly notewor-
thy in part because she was the first American-born saint and, despite her 
European influence, had a decidedly American quality to her life and work. 
In addition, as the foundress of Catholic parochial education in America, 
she has much in common with other pioneering Lutheran educators, such 
as Samuel Simon Schmucker. As the foundress of the American Sisters of 
Charity, who have worked indefatigably to help the needy and whose work 
spread well beyond their base in Emmitsburg, Maryland, to other cities, 
she has some notable similarities with William Passavant. She was also a 
Protestant, albeit an Episcopalian, for most of her life, not having converted 
to Roman Catholicism until sixteen years before her death at 46. Finally, 
her shrine and the former site of her school in Emmitsburg, Maryland, are 
located only about a dozen miles from Gettysburg Seminary and were con-
structed a mere sixteen years before Schmucker founded the seminary. 
There are also notable similarities between Mother Seton and Pope 
Francis. Both came from an outsider status, Francis as a Jesuit from South 
America and Seton as a poverty-stricken widowed mother of five and a 
Protestant facing harsh criticism for her conversion to Roman Catholicism. 
Both emphasize reaching to the marginalized and getting their hands dirty 
helping the poor. Both are disarmingly down-to-earth. Perhaps, then, it is 
not a coincidence that, just last year, as we were getting to know this pope, a 
new biography about Seton, the first in decades, was published by Joan Bar-
thel, American Saint: The Life of Elizabeth Seton.2 
But perhaps Seton’s most significant point of contact with us members 
of the ELCA is one that she has with many twenty-first-century Americans 
in general: her approachable personality, including her struggles with reli-
gion and every day life. Her diary entries and letters reveal that this tiny 
woman with a capacious mind and vast spirit could likely adapt readily to 
twenty-first-century America and would quickly have much of value to say 
about it, both positive and negative. In several ways, she embodies American 
ideals and struggles. Seton and Eaton could have quite the conversation!
Seton Embodying American Ideals
Seton Hill University’s motto is “Hazard Yet Forward” (which we faculty 
and staff often quote to each other, especially near the end of the semester). 
It is derived from the Seton family motto from their twelfth-century coat of 
arms, “At whatever risk, yet go forward,3 and it encapsulates well how Seton 
lived, which was, in several ways, quintessentially American. 
Seton’s early life contained notable hardships but also featured much 
good fortune. She was born as Elizabeth Ann Bayley on August 28, 1774 
in New York City. At that time, Catholic worship was illegal in most of 
the colonies,4 but Elizabeth was raised Episcopalian. Her father was Dr. 
Richard Bayley, a successful physician, and her mother was Catherine 
Charlton Bayley. Elizabeth was the second of three daughters. On May 8, 
1777, Elizabeth’s mother died when she was just shy of turning three. Her 
father remarried and had six children with Charlotte Amelia Barclay, his 
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second wife. Those next eight years were sometimes difficult for Elizabeth,5 
in part because she and Charlotte had a chilly relationship, and in part 
because Elizabeth’s father was often away for long periods because of work. 
Charlotte and Richard had a troubled marriage; in fact, the two eventu-
ally separated, at which point Richard forbade Elizabeth from ever seeking 
reconciliation with her stepmother.6 While growing up, Elizabeth received 
typical schooling for a girl that included learning the piano and French, a 
language in which she became fluent. She would repeatedly turn to music 
throughout her life.7
On January 25, 1794, at the age of nineteen, she married her life-love, 
a prosperous businessman named William Seton. The two had five children. 
Those years were happy for the Seton’s. They were fashionable members of 
upper class New York society. Mrs. Seton enjoyed dancing at balls, attend-
ing parties, and taking care of her children. Even in those early years, Seton 
loved attending worship (much more so than her husband, who was not 
religious) and, on Sacrament Sundays, would rush from church to church 
to receive the eucharist as much as possible.8 Her religiosity grew especially 
under the guidance of a newly arrived Episcopal priest, John Henry Hobart. 
Later, he would try to talk her out of converting to Roman Catholicism.
In these early years of her adulthood, we see her living the American 
Dream. She had a husband, children, a house, and plenty of money. She was 
also a devout Christian in a nation that at least claimed to be Christian. 
Those enjoyable years were fleeting, though, for soon William’s ship-
ping business started to collapse. She thus deviated from the traditional 
rags-to-riches American trajectory, moving instead sharply in the opposite 
direction, thereby epitomizing another American archetype, the stalwart 
Christian who overcomes the odds to help others. William had great 
integrity but was not a smart businessman.9 Although having no busi-
ness training, Seton would sometimes stay up with her husband until two 
o’clock in the morning to help him figure out how to salvage the busi-
ness.10 By 1800, the Seton’s had lost their home, and the family business 
had to file for bankruptcy.11 
Then William’s health began to deteriorate, thanks to tuberculosis, 
which would also eventually kill Seton herself. Hopeful that a warmer, 
milder climate would be salubrious for William, in 1803, Seton, her 
husband, and their oldest child Anna Maria sailed for Leghorn, Italy. 
However, since they were coming from New York City, where there had 
been reports of yellow fever, when they arrived in Italy they were forced to 
stay in a lazaretto several miles from the city in quarantine for a month. 
During this time, Seton wrote poignantly about sitting by her husband’s 
bedside while his health deteriorated. When they were finally released, 
it was too late. William died on December 27, 1803.12 At 29, Seton was 
a poverty-stricken widow and mother of five children at a time when 
women had second-class status.
In part because of logistics and in part because Anna Maria had caught 
scarlet fever, Seton and her daughter were forced to remain in Italy another 
four months, not arriving back in New York until June 4, 1804. During 
that period, Seton and Anna Maria came under the care of the Filicchi’s, 
who had been amiable business associates of William.13 The Filicchi’s would 
remain lifelong friends with the Seton’s. In fact, as Barthel points out, it 
is clear from their letters that Antonio Filicchi and Seton had a romantic 
interest in each other that would never be fully realized due in part to Anto-
nio being married.14 It is the Filicchi’s who introduced Seton to Roman 
Catholicism. Although wary at first and full of questions – for instance, she 
questioned the doctrine of the real presence in the eucharist and feared that 
such an understanding was idolatrous – Seton soon found herself drawn to 
the denomination. 
When she returned to New York, she grappled with the possibility of 
converting. Father Hobart tried to talk her out of it. Several family mem-
bers criticized her, thought she had gone crazy, and pulled away from her, 
although most eventually reconciled with her.15 In addition, discrimination 
against Roman Catholics was pervasive in the heavily Protestant United 
States. Nevertheless, on March 14, 1805, Seton became a Roman Catholic, 
with Antonio Filicchi in attendance at the ceremony.16 
Now a widow and mother of five children with little money and the 
target of religious discrimination, Seton had many challenges before her. 
Before returning to Italy, Antonio tried to secure financial support for her 
and her children, but that support failed to materialize. Seton endeavored 
to secure an income by teaching and taking on boarders, but her Catholi-
cism was often an obstacle; Protestant parents did not want to risk a Roman 
Catholic teacher corrupting their children.17 In 1806, William Valentine 
DuBourg, the president of a Catholic college in Baltimore, suggested that 
Seton try opening a Catholic school for girls in that city, Maryland being 
more open to Roman Catholics than New York. 
In 1808, then, Seton moved her family to Maryland, where she would 
spend the rest of her life and where she is buried. Her opening of a Catholic 
school for girls in Baltimore marked the birth of Catholic parochial educa-
tion in the United States. On March 25, 1809, she took her vows to become 
a Sister of Charity. In the summer of 1809, she moved her school and new 
community of sisters to Emmitsburg, Maryland, where she remained for 
the rest of her life and where her shrine is located. There, Seton, now called 
Mother Seton, opened a day school and sent sisters to Philadelphia and New 
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York to do charitable work.18 Seton would spend the remainder of her years 
putting in long days as a teacher, caretaker of the poor, and head mother of 
the Sisters of Charity, while also negotiating with, and sometimes wrangling 
with, the male clergy who oversaw her and sometimes posed obstacles to her 
efforts. She also continued to take care of her children, including struggling 
to find work for her sons Richard and William and coping with the deaths 
of her daughters Rebecca and Anna Maria. In addition, Seton struggled 
with her own health and finally died from tuberculosis on January 4, 1821, 
when she was 46.19 On September 14, 1975, she was canonized. 
It is in this second half of her life as a struggling widow and mother and 
then as a Sister striving in poverty to educate girls and care for the needy 
that Seton embodies the American archetype of the person who overcomes 
the odds, pulling herself up, with the grace of God, by her bootstraps, to 
stand up for her beliefs (Roman Catholicism) and make the world a bet-
ter place by helping the less fortunate. Thus, while she loses the American 
Dream of having a husband, children, a house, and material comfort, she 
realizes the American ideal of this tough, faith-guided individual who helps 
the underdog and shows that there are more important things than mate-
rial comforts. Seton would spend the rest of her life materially poor but rich 
in her acts of kindness toward others. She embodies, in a sense, the kind 
of person many of us Americans think we should be: not concerned about 
material prosperity, committed to God, helping the less fortunate. How-
ever, most of us Americans are more content with the American Dream of 
a spouse, children, house, and material prosperity. Seton could have striven 
to regain that material prosperity. There were certainly men who fancied 
her, such as Samuel Cooper; she could have married one of them and per-
haps have regained her life of comfort, but she chose not to. Because she so 
clearly represents such important American principles, an examination of 
her life could be especially fruitful in the classroom, congregation, or both. 
Seton’s Devotion to the Eucharist20 
When Antonio Filicchi was trying to convert Seton to Roman Catholicism, 
he gave her books that led her to believe that “the Protestant Episcopal 
Church was founded only on the principles and passions of Luther, and 
consequently that it was separated from the Church founded by Our Lord 
and his Apostles.”21 Her historical inaccuracy regarding the Reformation 
in England aside, this statement of Seton’s in 1804 to Bishop John Carroll, 
the first Roman Catholic bishop of the United States, reveals her wariness 
of Luther, although, for the most part, she says little about him one way or 
the other in her writings. Nevertheless, despite her skepticism toward Prot-
estantism once she converted to Roman Catholicism, there is much that she 
and Luther would agree on regarding the eucharist, as I will show.
Seton’s devotion to the eucharist was evident well before she converted 
to Roman Catholicism, and not just in her running from church to church 
on Sacrament Sundays to receive the body and blood as much as possible. 
In her “Dear Remembrances,” she regrets having to miss a Sacrament 
Sunday in her preparations for traveling to Leghorn. As an alternative, she 
drinks on her knees in private “the little cup of wine and tears to represent 
what I so much desired.”22 While quarantined in the Italian lazaretto with 
her dying husband, she again created a substitute for the eucharist, as she 
indicates to her sister-in-law Rebecca Seton:
Though communion with those my Soul loves is not within my reach 
in one sense, in the other what can deprive me of it, “still in spirit we 
may meet” – at 5 oclock here, it will be 12 there – at 5, then in some 
quiet corner on my Knees I may spend the time they are at the altar, 
and if the “cup of Salvation” cannot be received in the strange land 
evidently, virtually it may, with the blessing of Christ and the “cup of 
Thanksgiving” supply in a degree, That, which if I could obtain would 
be my strongest desire.23  
Her longing for the eucharist was so fervent, that she was willing to 
receive it virtually (since she cannot literally) by kneeling and thinking 
about the sacrament at the time when she knew loved ones back home were 
receiving it. On Christmas Day, two days before her husband’s death, she 
took a small glass of wine and read portions of the Psalms and prayers as an 
alternative to the eucharist. For Seton, any connection to the eucharist was 
better than nothing.24 
Despite this devotion, however, Seton was quite hesitant about accept-
ing the doctrine of real presence. Although Henry VIII, the founder of 
Seton’s denomination, believed in transubstantiation, the Book of Com-
mon Prayer of 1559 indicated a shift to an understanding that the bread 
and wine were “spiritually taken and received.”25 This was the theology that 
Seton had grown up with and had great difficulty replacing with the belief 
in the real presence. On February 2, 1804, Candlemas, Amabilia Filicchi 
(Antonio’s wife) took her to mass. Seton writes, “Mrs. F[ilicchi] took me 
with her to Mass as she calls it, and we say to church – I dont [sic] know 
how to say the awful effect at being where they told me God was present in 
the blessed Sacrament.”26 She goes on to write of a “tall pale meek heavenly 
looking man,” perhaps the priest, and of how the experience overwhelmed 
her to the point of her covering her face and crying. She was intrigued by 
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the mystery and power of the mass, but she was not ready to accept the 
doctrine of real presence. She later writes of an Englishman saying in her ear 
during mass, “this is what they call their real PRESENCE” and how appalled 
she was that he would disrupt such a sacred moment by speaking. Then she 
recalls pondering 1 Cor 11:29-30, in which Paul writes, “They discern not 
the Lord’s body” and thinking that “they eat and drink for not discerning it, 
if indeed it is not there – yet how should it be there, and how did he breath 
my Soul into me, and how and how a hundred other things I know nothing 
about.”27 She turned over in her mind the possibility of Christ truly being 
present in the bread and the wine, fearing that one’s salvation was at stake 
when it comes to determining the correct understanding of the eucharist. 
On February 24, 1804, Seton wrote to Rebecca,
My Sister dear how happy would we be if we believed what these dear 
Souls believe, that they possess God in the Sacrament [the eucharist] 
and that he remains in their churches and is carried to them when 
they are sick, oh my – when they carry the B[lesse]d Sacrament under 
my Window while I feel the full loneliness and sadness of my case I 
cannot stop the tears at the thought my God how happy would I be 
even so far away from all so dear, if I could find you in the church as 
they do … how many things I would say to you of the sorrows of my 
heart and the sins of my life – the other day in a moment of excessive 
distress I fell on my knees without thinking when the Blessed Sacra-
ment passed by and cried in an agony to God to bless me if he was 
there, that my whole Soul desired only him.28
Her ache to believe in the real presence borders on heartbreaking, but 
she was repeatedly wary of the belief. It would be another year before she 
would convert to Roman Catholicism, and one area where Protestants chal-
lenged her was over the nature of the eucharist. Her Episcopalian pastor and 
mentor Henry Hobart asked her, “How can you believe there are as many 
gods as there are millions of altars and tens of millions of blessed hosts all 
over the world?”29 Much to Father Hobart’s dismay, Seton was indeed even-
tually able to enjoy “the heavenly consolations attached to the belief of the 
presence of God in the Blessed Sacrament to be the food of the poor wan-
derers in the desert of this world as well as the manna that was the support 
of the Israelites through the wilderness to their Canaan.”30
While they would disagree over the particulars of how Christ is present 
in the eucharist, Luther and Seton would both agree that Christ is truly and 
bodily present. Luther’s insistence on the real presence is well-documented, 
as is his lack of concern about how precisely that real presence is achieved. 
Luther was no systematic theologian, and neither was Seton. As he states 
in The Babylonian Captivity of the Church regarding the real presence, 
expressing his exasperation with philosophical arguments pertaining to tran-
substantiation: “Even though philosophy cannot grasp this, faith grasps it 
nonetheless. And the authority of God’s Word is greater than the capacity of 
our intellect to grasp it.”31 Similarly, throughout her writings, Seton is little 
concerned with how Christ manages to be present. She simply trusts that he 
is there and craves continually to receive the benefits of consuming the body 
and blood.
The benefits of receiving the eucharist were indeed Seton’s primary con-
cern. “Of all the Sacraments,” she writes, “none other can produce the same 
effects as the Holy Eucharist…. [T]he other Sacraments operate by virtue of 
an emanation from Jesus Christ, but in the Holy Eucharist we receive Jesus 
Christ himself.”32 That intimacy with Christ was of the highest importance 
to her. She valued having God so close to her, and she valued having God as 
food and drink. In the journal she kept for her sister-in-law, Cecelia Seton, 
are some of Seton’s loveliest and most profound reflections on the eucharist. 
She expresses sadness that so many people fail to understand that Christ is 
present in the bread and wine. It is obvious to her that
Jesus then is there we can go, receive Him, he is our own – were we to 
pause and think of this thro’ Eternity … that he is There (oh heavenly 
theme!) is as certainly true as that Bread naturally taken removes my 
hunger – so this Bread of Angels removes my pain, my cares, warms, 
cheers, sooths, contents and renews my whole being.33
She found the presence of God in bread and wine to be such a comfort 
and so nourishing that she thought “with sorrow and anguish of heart of 
the naked unsubstantial comfortless worship they partake who know not 
the treasure of our Faith.”34 That intimacy of eating and drinking Christ’s 
body and blood “fills the Soul with a powerful grace, which enables it to 
triumph over all the perverse inclinations of our nature.”35 Thus, our sins are 
forgiven, and, in fact, we become more like Christ through the eucharist. 
She explains that “other nourishment we make use of, is changed into our 
substance—but this of the Body our Lord changes us into itself.”36 
Seton’s understanding of the benefits of the eucharist is squarely in 
accord with Roman Catholic theology and also resonates well with Luther’s 
eucharistic theology. In The Large Catechism, for instance, Luther calls 
the eucharist “food of the soul, for it nourishes and strengthens the new 
creature.”37 The body and blood are a “treasure and a gift”38 and a “pure, 
wholesome, soothing medicine that aids you and gives life in both soul and 
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body.39 And, as he declares famously in The Small Catechism, the eucharist 
affords us “forgiveness of sin, life, and salvation.”40 Seton would agree. Of 
course, there are points of disagreement between Luther and Seton, such 
as regarding the idea that the eucharist is a propitiatory sacrifice that made 
present Christ’s sacrifice on the cross, a teaching of the Roman Catholic 
Church that Seton agreed with41  and Luther disagreed with.42 Nevertheless, 
the similarities outweigh the differences.  
Perceiving Seton’s passion for the eucharist, Father Matthew O’Brien, 
a mentor to the newly converted Roman Catholic, recommended that she 
become associated with the Society of the Holy Sacrament to assist with 
her spiritual growth.43 She was now receiving the eucharist every Sunday 
at a time when such frequent communing was uncommon even for most 
Catholics, who were only required to receive the sacrament once a year, the 
so-called “Easter duty.”44 The following summer and fall she was heartsick 
over having to live with her sister, who resided too far from a Catholic 
church for Seton to receive the sacrament weekly.45 She was ecstatic when 
she once again lived close enough to a Catholic church that she could 
receive the eucharist as often as possible, sometimes daily during a time 
when even men and women religious generally did not receive the sacra-
ment with such frequency. In fact, later, when Seton was Mother Seton, 
her first Sulpician superior, William DuBourg, actually warned her against 
receiving the eucharist too frequently. Unconvinced of the danger, Seton 
attended as frequently as she was allowed, sometimes as often as daily for 
two weeks.46 
Her hunger to receive the eucharist as often as possible calls to mind 
Luther’s exhortation for Christians to receive the body and blood frequently. 
Indeed, in The Large Catechism, he waxes critical of those who are lax about 
the eucharist. He writes that “Christians should prepare themselves to 
receive this blessed sacrament frequently. For we see that people are becom-
ing lax and lazy about its observance.”47 He complains that some people see 
themselves as such strong Christians that they do not think that they need 
to receive the eucharist frequently.48 Others, he contends, stay away unless 
they feel “a hunger and thirst impelling them to it.”49 Still others believe 
that receiving the eucharist is a matter of choice and not a necessity and that 
believing alone is sufficient (a position all too common in twenty-first-cen-
tury America regarding the eucharist in particular and attending worship in 
general). Luther responds to these arguments by insisting that the eucharist 
is indeed a necessity, going so far as to declare that “such people who abstain 
and absent themselves from the sacrament over a long period of time are not 
to be considered Christians.”50 Like Seton, Luther regarded regular recep-
tion of the eucharist as essential to the Christian life. 
Because the eucharist was so precious, she stressed the sacrament of rec-
onciliation as proper preparation for receiving the real presence. She insisted 
that the heart ready for the eucharist should be “like a crystal vase filled with 
the purest and most limpid water” and that “we should not allow the slightest 
impure atom to make its appearance.”51 She wrote extensive instructions for 
those preparing to receive their first eucharist.52 She urged people not to stay 
away from the eucharist because they saw themselves as too impure, remind-
ing her readers that “we must remember that Christ came not to call the 
righteous, but sinners to repentance, that he did not make man for the Sacra-
ments but the Sacraments for the man.”53 Her words here are reminiscent of 
Luther’s in The Large Catechism: “But suppose you say, ‘What if I feel I am 
unfit?’ Answer: This is my struggle as well…. If you choose to fix your eye 
on how good and pure you are, to wait until nothing torments you, you will 
never go.”54 Likewise, in The Small Catechism he teaches that while “[f ]ast-
ing and bodily preparation are in fact a fine external discipline,” the one who 
really receives the eucharist worthily is the one who has faith in the words 
“given for you” and “shed for you for the forgiveness of sins.”55 Luther, of 
course, still valued confession as preparation for receiving the eucharist, but, 
in typical Lutheran fashion, he emphasizes it less than the Roman Catholic 
Seton does. However, both stress the importance of going often to the eucha-
rist and for a person not to stay away simply because he or she is not morally 
perfect. In fact, Luther goes so far as to say that “[i]f you are burdened and 
feel your weakness, go joyfully to the sacrament and let yourself be refreshed, 
comforted, and strengthened,”56 and Seton avers that “[w]hatever purity of 
life our lord requires of us … as a preparation for receiving the Holy Eucha-
rist, it can never be in itself an excuse for not receiving it frequently.”57
However, Seton herself struggled with her sense of unworthiness regard-
ing receiving the eucharist, and that perception of unworthiness increased 
with age. As she struggled with the tuberculosis that would eventually kill 
her, insomnia haunted her, and during those sleepless nights she longed for 
the eucharist on the other side of the partition that separated her room from 
the chapel.58 After a difficult night, she writes, “Sunday – Good Shepherd – 
Watching night and cramp made heavy breast for Communion,”59 but then 
she fixates on her unworthiness by writing, “The bread should not be given 
to a dog, Lord,” meaning herself. But she goes on to recall seeing
[i]mmediately as the eyes closed, a white, old shepherd dog feeding 
from the shepherd hand in the midst of the flock, as I have seen in the 
fields between Pisa and Florence, came before me…. Yes, my Saviour, 
you feed your dog, who at the fist sight can hardly be distinguished 
from the sheep – but the canine qualities you see.60
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Even though she remains unworthy, Christ remains generous. Such 
words call to mind Luther’s own repeated self-deprecation and reliance on 
God’s grace. 
As her health declined, her zeal for the eucharist grew. Her dear friend 
Father Simon Gabriel Brute Remur describes her intense emotion during 
one of her communions shortly before her death:
Her joy was so uncommon that when I approached, and as I placed 
the ciborium upon the little table, she burst into tears and sobbing 
aloud covered her face with her two hands. I thought first it was some 
fear of sin, and approaching her, I asked … “Have you any pain? Do 
you wish to confess?” “No, only give him to me.”61
Brute added in a letter to Antonio Filicchi that, in her last days, “Com-
munion was all to her.”62
The last time Seton received the eucharist was on January 1, 1821, three 
days before her death. The night before, a Sister watching over her urged 
her to take medicine to ease her pain, but Seton refused to break her pre-
eucharistic fast. She said, “Never mind the drink. One Communion more 
and then Eternity.”63
Benefit for Lutherans of Reading Seton’s Eucharistic Writings
Through this comparison of Seton’s understanding of the eucharist to 
Luther’s, I am not minimizing the differences in eucharistic theology 
between Roman Catholics and Lutherans. As we approach 2017, it is clear 
that Lutherans and Roman Catholics still have significant points of differ-
ence regarding the eucharist, most notably: the concept of the sacrifice of 
the mass, the concept of the adoration of the consecrated elements, and 
issues pertaining to ordained clergy who preside over the eucharist. Of 
course, some issues that once were divisive, such as transubstantiation and 
whether to administer both the bread and wine to the laity, no longer are. 
The day will come when these other issues will be divisive no more, as well.
In the meantime, Seton’s writings on the eucharist can be of benefit 
to us Lutherans in several ways, and it would be especially timely for us to 
highlight the works of this pioneering Roman Catholic as part of our com-
memoration of the start of the Reformation in 2017. Two features of Seton’s 
writings are especially noteworthy. One is her extraordinary passion for the 
eucharist that borders on ecstasy. While Luther writes of great devotion to 
the body and blood, we do not see this intense emotional zeal that we find 
in the writings of Seton. From her running from church to church to receive 
the body and blood as often as possible, to her weeping over the real pres-
ence and her unworthiness, to her sobbing for receiving the eucharist as she 
nears the end of her life, Seton longs for the sacrament like two lovers for 
each other. It could be of great value and inspiration for us Lutherans to 
mediate upon that intense, poetic piety. Such meditation could help parish-
ioners to embrace the eucharist with greater devotion (and maybe then be 
more inclined to want to attend worship) and could inject sermons with 
much needed vivid language about the body and blood. 
A second notable feature of Seton’s writing on the eucharist is its invit-
ing nature. Luther’s writings are often accessible and wonderfully rich, but 
even his best work is full of condemnation of the Pope and the Roman 
Catholic Church. Indeed, much of Luther’s writing has a sharp, polemical 
edge. By contrast, Seton’s eucharistic writings are not polemical. They are 
not about the condemnation of theological opponents but chiefly about 
adoration for the eucharist. Moreover, Seton was not the scholar Luther was. 
She was not a professor with a doctorate, and she did not live in the heavily 
divisive, tumultuous sixteenth century. She was an “ordinary” woman of the 
nineteenth century. She did not possess exceptional formal education, and 
her writings read that way. She reads like what she was foremost and first of 
all, a woman who loved God and loved the Church and loved the eucharist. 
Granted, she is not without her flaws, such as her sometimes bewildering 
punctuation and phrasing. But her writings on the eucharist can inspire 
many in the pew and pulpit to think about and speak about the body and 
blood with renewed enthusiasm as well as renewed appreciation for Roman 
Catholic eucharistic theology, at least as Seton articulates it. 
At Gettysburg Seminary, this celebration of Seton would be especially 
germane given Gettysburg’s close proximity to Emmitsburg, Maryland, and 
to Seton Hill University. Perhaps a joint service between Lutherans and 
Setonians or a joint publication or colloquy that celebrates both Luther and 
Seton would be mutually edifying and convivial. 
Seton and the Five Ecumenical Imperatives for 2017
As preparation for the commemoration in 2017 of the 500th anniversary 
of the start of the Reformation, the Lutheran World Federation and the 
Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity published in 2013, From 
Conflict to Communion: Lutheran-Catholic Common Commemoration of the 
Reformation in 2017, in which the two churches articulate the points of 
commonality and difference between the two, emphasizing the dramatically 
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improved relations between them and looking ahead to a mutual, joyful 
observance of this momentous anniversary. The document ends with five 
ecumenical imperatives that the two churches agreed on:
The first imperative: Catholics and Lutherans should always begin 
from the perspective of unity and not from the point of view of divi-
sion in order to strengthen what is held in common even though the 
differences are more easily seen and experienced.
The second imperative: Lutherans and Catholics must let themselves 
continuously be transformed by the encounter with the other and by 
the mutual witness of faith. 
The third imperative: Catholics and Lutherans should again commit 
themselves to seek visible unity, to elaborate together what this means 
in concrete steps, and to strive repeatedly toward this goal.
The fourth imperative: Lutherans and Catholics should jointly redis-
cover the power of the gospel of Jesus Christ for our time.
The fifth imperative: Catholics and Lutherans should witness together 
to the mercy of God in proclamation and service to the world.64
Studying the works of Saint Elizabeth Ann Seton, especially her life as 
well as her writings on the eucharist, are certainly not the only way to be 
faithful to these imperatives, but her life and work are particularly relevant 
and valuable. The similarities between her eucharistic writings and those 
of Luther, as well as the similarities between her life and those of pioneer-
ing Lutherans such as Schmucker and Passavant, can help Lutherans and 
Catholics live out the first, second, and third imperatives. Regarding the 
second imperative further, we Lutherans can find particularly illuminating 
her passionate and poetic yet down-to-earth writings on the eucharist as we 
continue to strive to guide one another toward a greater appreciation of the 
sacrament. Seton’s intense piety regarding the eucharist can also facilitate 
following the fourth imperative by underscoring the power of the body 
and blood for twenty-first-century Americans, who are clearly searching for 
greater union with the divine through meaningful, personal experiences. 
Moreover, the quintessentially American nature of Seton’s life will resonate 
readily with many Americans, be they Lutheran, Catholic, or otherwise. 
Finally, with her dedication to educating girls and caring for the poor, Seton 
exemplifies living out the fifth imperative’s call to service to the world.
On the other hand, Luther has much to say to Seton. In his eucharistic 
writings, Luther emphasizes the importance of the faith of the individual for 
receiving the eucharist, “the faith on which everything depends.”65 That is, 
it is not enough that the eucharist be completed but that it be used in faith, 
a point that Seton does not highlight. Luther also stresses that the eucharist 
arises from and reinforces fellowship between Christ and the church as well 
as among fellow Christians. This focus on the fellowship among Christians 
that the eucharist fortifies, which Luther addresses extensively in The Sacra-
ment of the Body and Blood of Christ, is not as prevalent in Seton’s writings 
on the sacrament. 
As 2017 approaches, Eaton and Seton have much to talk about. Indeed, 
Lutherans and Catholics can learn great wisdom together from the interac-
tion between Luther and Seton.
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Hospice Chaplains: Presence and  
Listening at the End of Life
Charles J. Lopez, Jr.
Hospice chaplains see their share of death and dying. Even though the cul-
ture still seems to deny death, many dying individuals and their families 
request the presence of a chaplain at the end of life.1 Martha Jacobs agrees 
that Ernest Becker thought “that one of the most basic functions of culture 
is to help us avoid awareness of our mortality.”2
We will all die … some day. It therefore comes as no surprise that dying 
individuals and their families have either connected with God or they seem 
to be searching for the “right moment” to be in God’s presence. Hospice 
chaplains are aware that an individual’s spiritual formation and develop-
ment has many forms and shapes.3 Hospice chaplains serve individuals from 
a variety of religious and faith traditions, as well as atheists and agnostics, 
and therefore need to begin where the individual is. In their interactions 
with individuals and families, Hospice chaplains strive to meet the challenge 
posed by Edwin DuBose in his end of life study: “meet me where I am.”4
From the beginning of life to the end of life, “the Spirit blows where it 
wills” (see Acts 2). The emphasis on spiritual care at the end of life may gen-
erate significant interest in going deeper into one’s relationship with God/
Holy One.5 Hospice chaplains are able to be of benefit to the dying indi-
viduals and their family members by providing them presence and listening 
(the necessary foundations for all hospice chaplains). 
Hospice Background
The necessary foundations for all hospice chaplains are presence and listen-
ing. In order to practice presence and listening for the hospice chaplain, it 
is important to underscore some basics for hospice. What is hospice? The 
Latin word hospes meaning host and guest, forms the root for the words hos-
pitality, hostess, hospital, hotel, and hospice.6 They all include the ideas of 
kindness and generosity to strangers, or caring for our fellow human beings 
and offering them nourishment and refreshment. Hospice first applied to 
the care of dying patients by Jeanne Garnier who founded the Dames de 
Calaire in Lyon, France in 1842. The modern usage of the word began 
in Britain in the mid-nineteenth century when “Sister Mary Aikenhead 
founded the Irish Sisters of Charity in Dublin in 1815 which ultimately 
led to the establishment of Our Lady’s Hospice in Dublin in 1879 and St. 
Joseph’s Hospice in Hackney, London in 1905.”7
Florence Wald, the “mother of the American hospice,” organized an 
interdisciplinary team of Yale University doctors, clergy, and nurses to study 
the needs of dying patients, which led to the first United States hospice in 
1974.8 Connecticut Hospice, as it was called, initially provided only in-
home care. In 1980, an inpatient facility opened. By 2008, there were 4,700 
hospices in the United States.9
Connecticut Hospice was part of a demonstration project supported 
by the National Cancer Institute.10 In addition, the Connecticut Hospice 
served as a springboard for the formation of a National Hospice Organiza-
tion (NHO) founded in 1978.11 Another important hospice organization 
is the National Hospice & Palliative Care Organization (NHPCO).12 Both 
NHO/NHPCO are non-profit and incorporated with headquarters near 
Washington, DC.13
Originally, a hospice was a stopping place for weary travelers. During 
the Crusades, hospices were like Holiday Inns for devout and dedicated, 
but tired pilgrims. Hospice today is a way of caring for the terminally ill, 
those weary travelers who are nearing the end of their earthly pilgrimage.14 
Coincidentally, Callanan and Kelley (1992) write that “the dying often use 
the metaphor of travel to alert those around them that it is time for them to 
die.”15 For example, by looking for his passport and papers, George is reveal-
ing that he is dying and is beginning his final journey.16
The pioneer institution in the care of the terminally ill is appropriately 
named for St. Christopher, the patron saint of travelers. On April 10, 1967, 
St. Christopher’s Hospice, located in the Sydenham section of London, 
opened its doors. The medical director was Dr. Cicely Saunders, who served 
St. Christopher’s until her death in July 2005.17 Dr. Saunders introduced the 
idea of pain relief on demand and used the phrase, “to live until you die.”
Hospice care is for comfort, including pain and symptom manage-
ment.18 The usual place for hospice is in an individual’s own home, 
although hospice care does have connections and contracts with skilled 
nursing facilities, hospital transitional and palliative care units, as well as 
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board and care group homes.19 Hospice is interdisciplinary. The hospice 
team consists of  physicians, nurses, social workers, chaplains, volunteers, 
dietitians, and home health aides, all assigned by a clinical manager, who 
is usually a registered nurse.20 There is a written plan (now part of the elec-
tronic record of care) of care for each patient, and the hospice team meets 
weekly to develop, review, maintain, collaborate, and implement the indi-
vidual’s plan of care.21
As hospice has evolved, it is often spoken of as a program providing 
palliative and supportive care for terminally ill diagnosed patients and their 
families. This care takes place either directly or on a consulting basis with 
the patient’s primary physician or community public health or visiting 
nurse.22 Palliative care focuses on physical, emotional, and spiritual com-
fort for the patient when treatments aimed at cure are no longer realistic or 
appropriate. In practice, however, this distinction between palliative hospice 
care and curative treatment may not always be clear and easy to define.23 
Palliative hospice care programs have been introduced throughout the coun-
try and are on the increase throughout the USA. The goal of palliative care 
is to help the patient live life to the fullest with quality and dignity. We turn 
now to presence for the hospice chaplain. 
Presence
Presence is … being with a person. Healthcare professionals are experts at 
solving problems, identifying goals, measuring outcomes, which ultimately 
means “fixing it.” The heart of spiritual care for the hospice chaplain is 
presence; some say, empathetic presence, the exact opposite of “fixing it.” 
Empathetic presence helps people feel heard and not alone. When patients 
and families are experiencing losses, despair, questions about the meaning 
of suffering, or a sense of abandonment by the divine, more than anything 
else they need to be heard and know that they are not alone. Hence, it is 
essential to create an environment in which the person feels free to explore 
their concerns and openly express their feelings without feeling rejected or 
judged. The hospice chaplain is trained to be present and listen for clues to 
engage the individual and family as they face end of life issues.24
The clinical training in Clinical Pastoral Education (CPE) informs hos-
pice chaplains to be present and provide listening to the patients they meet. 
Another way to say presence is as Jane Brody writes: “Your mere presence 
lets those who are dying know they are not alone.”25 In addition, Brody says, 
“people who are dying often face questions about the meaning of life. Your 
job is not necessarily to provide answers or solutions but to listen, to let 
them speak freely and openly without advice or contradiction.”26
The foundation of hospice is interdisciplinary, focusing on the physi-
cal, emotional, and spiritual needs of the individual and their families at 
the end of life.27 It should be noted that spiritual needs are more global 
and go beyond particular religious beliefs to the consideration of personal 
beliefs and meanings. Some patients say they are “more spiritual than 
religious.” As a hospice chaplain, my role is to provide spiritual care with 
families and individuals as they are dying and to be sensitive to religious 
and spiritual connections.28
According to James Kok, presence is “turning feelings into concrete, 
observable, practical expressions of love.”29 These may be in the form of 
prayer, an understanding word, a personal visit, a phone call, or a handwrit-
ten card. The hospice chaplain does all of these, but most important for the 
dying person and their family is the personal visit. 
Lani Leary in No One Has to Die Alone clearly indicates that “when we 
are truly present with the personal, spiritual experience of the dying … the 
transition from living to dying can become as sacred … as being born into 
this world.” She also says that “practicing unconditional love is the most 
important work during our lifetime.”30
Dr. Elisabeth Kubler-Ross and Dr. Cicely Saunders were instrumen-
tal in the development of care for the dying and the early beginnings of 
hospice care, which included both presence and listening with dying indi-
viduals. While at the University of Chicago, Kubler-Ross provided presence 
and listening to the dying patients she interviewed as she researched and 
identified the so-called five stages of dying – denial, anger, bargaining, 
depression, and acceptance.31 Dr. Saunders laid the foundation for hospice 
care at St. Christopher’s by practicing her presence and listening skills with 
the patients she visited. 
Henri Nouwen introduced the concept of the “ministry of absence” 
when in the presence of an individual.32 Nouwen realized that it is impossi-
ble to be with a person every second of the day. Hence, rather than building 
one’s anxiety level, Nouwen allows for one’s presence to be felt while absent. 
Of course, Nouwen was referring to God’s presence when the spiritual care 
provider was absent. God’s presence is always there, said Nouwen, it is after 
all, “God’s work and not ours.”33 Nouwen realized that God’s Spirit is always 
there, and so should the hospice chaplain. The person is in the presence of 
the Spirit. We now turn to the role of listening in hospice chaplaincy. 
Listening
As Thomas Hart indicates, “listening is not always easy. It takes time, 
and the time might be inconvenient besides. It demands really being for 
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the other during that period, fully present and attentive, one’s own needs 
and concerns set aside”… “To listen attentively to another and to go with 
another in companionship are expressions of love.”34 The hospice chaplain 
listens for the hopes, joys, despairs, and other spiritual and emotional  
challenges with the individual and family members who are facing end of 
life issues. 
As the hospice chaplain listens, Ira Byock and Margaret Guenther offer 
some guidance to hear. Byock writes that the four things that matter most 
to the dying patient are for the dying patient to say: “please forgive me; I 
forgive you; thank you; and I love you.”35 Forgiveness, gratitude, and affec-
tion form the foundation for Byock’s writings.36
For the hospice chaplain the skill of listening is demonstrated by two 
basic foundations: 1] when the patient has demonstrated that they have a 
relationship with God; 2] when the patient shares a willingness to go deeper 
and talk about their relationship in the Spirit.37 When a hospice chaplain 
listens and hears that a person has a relationship with God and wants to go 
deeper, then that is the appropriate time to move along with the person to 
discover more about their spiritual connections. 
While exploring my role as hospice chaplain with the dying, Margaret 
Guenther’s observations are both instructive and insightful. She tells the 
story of the woman at the well (John 4:13-15) where Jesus helps the woman 
to look deeply into herself to discover her thirst for God. Guenther shares 
that “in the ministry of spiritual direction, there are no right answers, only 
clearer visions and ever deeper questions.”38 In addition, Guenther states 
that providing spiritual care is about “holy listening,” waiting, attentiveness, 
and presence. As a hospice chaplain the skill of listening is essential. As one 
never knows when the Spirit will break in, listening is vital and foundational 
for the hospice chaplain. In the second half of life, Guenther encourages 
chaplains “to sit with patients and listen to their stories … for they are rare 
parchment waiting to be read.”39 The hospice chaplain should get too far 
ahead of the individual; staying close and listening intently are essential.
“The true director is the Holy Spirit.”40 Guenther reflects the words of 
Thomas Merton who writes, “spiritual directon is, in reality, nothing more 
than a way of leading us to see and obey the real director – the Holy Spirit 
hidden in the depths of our soul.”41
Furthermore, hospice chaplains learn that spiritual growth can be 
gradual and often hidden at the end of life. Waiting can be burdensome. 
Guenther uses the image of midwifery as a way to encourage the indi-
vidual to move ahead by giving birth to something that is new and not yet 
known.42 We recognize that even in the birth of the world God brought 
order out of chaos. As an individual passes from this world to the next, they, 
too, are experiencing a new birth. As Paul writes, “So if anyone is in Christ, 
there is a new creation: everything old has passed away; see, everything 
has become new” (2 Cor 5:17 NRSV). The hospice chaplain provides the 
patient and their families with presence, listening, patience, a limited time-
frame, and a ministry of absence.
Argument: Presence and Listening are Important  
Brother Lawrence would agree that presence and listening are important for 
the hospice chaplain. He states that it is the art of “practicing the presence 
of God in one single act that does not end.” Furthermore, he encourages 
“everyone to be aware of God’s constant presence, if for no other reason 
than because God’s presence is a delight to our souls and spirits.”43 
Nouwen also recognized the importance of the presence of a spiritual 
care provider when being with the dying.44 As indicated above, Nouwen 
realized that a spiritual care provider/chaplain cannot be present with the 
dying person every minute. That’s why “…there is a ministry in which our 
leaving creates space for God’s spirit, and in which, by our absence, God 
can become present in a new way”… “We have to learn to leave so that 
the Spirit can come.”45 What a concept. The Spirit is present when we are 
absent! St. Paul said something similar: “We do not live to ourselves, and we 
do not die to ourselves. If we live, we live to the Lord, and if we die, we die 
to the Lord, so then, whether we live or whether we die, we are the Lord’s” 
(Rom 14:7-8 NRSV).
Nouwen states that a ministry of absence is important because it under-
scores who the real director is in spiritual care – the Spirit. In the absence 
there is a presence. As a hospice chaplain, I am aware of being “the symbolic 
presence of God” with the dying, but I also realize that God is with the 
dying whether or not I am present. It is a grace-filled moment. The words 
of Jesus serve as a reminder:  “it is to your advantage that I go away, for 
if I do not go away, the Advocate will not come to you; but if I go, I will 
send him to you…. When the Spirit of truth comes, he will guide you into 
all the truth; for he will not speak on his own, but will speak whatever he 
hears, and he will declare to you the things that are to come” (John 16:7, 13 
NRSV). For Nouwen, the constant interplay between presence and absence 
is sustaining and allows for an “ever growing intimacy with God  
in prayer.”46
Kenneth Doka writes that beyond the medical, social, and psychological 
needs of dying individuals, there are spiritual needs as well.47 Humans are 
aware of their finitude and yet have a sense of transcendence.48 It has been 
my experience as a hospice chaplain that both individuals and families know 
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when a loved one is dying, and yet families sometimes forbid the hospice 
team from using the dreaded “D” word in front of the dying patient. 
No one knows when a person will die.49 However, there are signs that 
serve as a trigger to indicate that the end may be near. Callanan and Kel-
ley point to the following signs: “difficulty swallowing … rattling noise … 
breathing patterns may change … irregular body temperature … involun-
tary movements, and communication may be more subtle.”50 Some of these 
signs may occur hours, weeks, or months before the person dies. Each per-
son is unique, hence, these signs may not always be present. 
Doka indicates that there are three spiritual needs for the dying person:  
1] to search for meaning of life; 2] to die appropriately; and 3] to find hope 
that extends beyond the grave.51 As a hospice chaplain, I agree with Doka 
that a chaplain will “provide individuals with opportunities to explore their 
concerns in a non-threatening and non-judgmental atmosphere; that it is 
useful to explore faith stories with dying individuals; and that rituals such as 
confession or communion can provide a visible sign of forgiveness.”52
As hospice chaplains we connect with local parishes, synagogues, 
temples, mosques, and various houses of worship for those individuals and 
families who request it. Edwin DuBose has pointed to a Gallup survey rein-
forcing what dying patients seem to want most, “including death at home 
among close family and friends, recognition of and support for the deeper 
spiritual and meaning dimensions of dying and death, and assurance that 
their families will not be overburdened with their care or neglected in their 
loss.”53 He also discovered that among the qualities mentioned by patients 
as important in their spiritual care providers are: genuineness, humor, flex-
ibility, attentiveness, empathy, and a listening presence.54 Patients rank 
empathy, warmth, sense of humor, and flexibility as central features of spiri-
tual care.55
As one who provides spiritual care at the end of life, I have assisted indi-
viduals and their families by reexamining their beliefs, exploring their beliefs 
about an afterlife, reconciling their life choices, exploring their lifetime 
contributions, examining their loving relationships, and discovering their 
personal meaning. Discovering personal meaning is perhaps the most essen-
tial and valuable part of our individual humanness.56 Hospice chaplains are 
witnesses to these discoveries and experience the virtue of character in dying 
individuals. The more the hospice chaplain listens the more the individual 
and family members become open sharing their stories. 
As a hospice chaplain, it becomes more apparent that some dying indi-
viduals want a deeper spiritual connection with God. Patients have said 
that God seems closer to them, especially in their prayer lives. They seem to 
pay closer attention to God.57 In Ignatian spirituality it is understood that 
“God can be found in all things” and especially in prayer.58 It was Thomas 
Merton, the contemplative Trappist monk, who defined prayer as “paying 
attention.”59 And Martin Marty has stated:
Being a presence does not mean they will never have anything to say. 
But their narratives and their verbal counsel will more likely come 
in the context of urgings, as in wisdom attributed to Saint Fran-
cis: “Preach the Gospel. Use words if necessary.” Being a presence 
may mean that silence rules. But Pierre Teilhard de Chardin was on 
to something when he reminded readers that “a presence is never 
mute.”60
The following two cases, Lillie and Aaron (not their real names), will 
highlight both presence and listening for the hospice chaplain.
Lillie
Lillie is at a Board & Care. Her husband of sixty years died two years ago 
while they were living in Kansas. Lillie is African-American and in her 90’s. 
Her niece brought Lillie to Los Angeles to live with her. Lillie’s diagnosis is 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) along with some dementia. 
She uses oxygen to ease her breathing. She is a strong Christian with a Bap-
tist background. Her niece said, “My aunt loves the Lord.”
[P = Patient] 
[C = Chaplain]
P1:   My niece said that you would be stopping by today. I am so glad to 
meet you.
C1:  It’s good to meet you. I see that you are watching TBN (Christian 
Network). 
P2: Yes, I keep the Lord close to me. 
C2: You have a close connection to the Lord … this is very special to you?
P3:  Yes, it is. My parents were a strong influence with my faith. My father 
went to church and so did my mother. We loved the Lord and I even 
taught Sunday School for many years. Why there’s even a church 
building with my parents’ name on it in Kansas. 
C3: You have some good roots and a strong Christian foundation. 
P4:  Yes, I do … my husband also loved the Lord and together we would 
spread the Word to our neighbors.
C4: Do you still have that connection with Jesus?
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P5:  Yes, I do … I love Jesus and I’m thankful for what he has done in my 
life. I couldn’t make it without Jesus…
C5: You seem well grounded in your faith journey. 
P6:  Yes I am … I know that I may not have much longer here (tearful) 
… but I know where I’m going. There’s an old song that I remember. 
I don’t remember the music, but the words are: “when he was on the 
cross, I was on his mind…”
C6:  Good words, especially since we just celebrated Easter. God is with us 
right now. Do you feel God’s love and presence?
P7:  Yes, I do … God is here … always has been, always will be. Yes, I 
know God is keeping me in mind … like the words of the song.
C7: Do you sense God’s presence here with us now?
P8:  Yes, I do … I know I may not have much longer and I want to thank 
Him for all that He has done for me. I am thankful that you are here 
to share Jesus with me. I love being with God … and some day soon 
… I’ll be there with God.
C8:  Jesus loves you very much. God is with you and will take you home 
… to be with him. 
P9:  Yes, I know … I’m going to be with my Savior. Oh how he loves me 
… thank you for helping me praise my Savior today. 
C9: I sense God’s love is surrounding us right now. 
P10:  Yes, indeed, God is here … loving us … thank you Jesus … thank 
you Jesus … (tearful)
Lillie is well connected to the Spirit. She sensed the presence of God in her 
life and during this visit. The hospice chaplain listened and provided open-
ings for her to stay close to her feelings of God’s presence. Without Lillie’s 
willingness to want God in her life and to do deeper, this chaplain may 
not have been helpful. Practicing the skills of presence and listening have 
allowed her to move forward. 
Aaron
Aaron is a retired Los Angeles superior court judge. He and his wife, Carol, 
have been married for more than fifty years. They are both Jewish and in 
their 80’s. Aaron has been the caregiver for Carol for the past five years. 
She has been on hospice and in a coma with a feeding tube for the past two 
years. 
[P = Patient] 
[C = Chaplain]
P1: I spoke with the Rabbi the other day … I’m not sure he was listening. 
C1: What did you hear him say to you?
P2: Oh, he said something like “you need to slow down …”
C2: … and have you been able to slow down?
P3:  Not really … I wish he would have said more about what Moses or 
the prophets have to say about my dilemma. Maybe something more 
religious … I mean after all he is a Rabbi. 
C3: Sounds frustrating…
P4:  Sure is … you know I’ve been wondering where God has been all 
these years. Now I’ve come to realize that God has been here all 
along. 
C4:  Sounds like God is walking with you right now. How has God been 
with you?
P5:  Yes, God is with me, at least I think so … it’s just been very difficult 
for me. I sometimes have my doubts as to what I’m doing … I want 
to do the right thing for my wife.
C5:  Yes, you are in a difficult spot and you are doing what you need to do. 
Have you felt God’s presence before as you have been caring for your 
wife?
P6: Yes, I suppose so … I know I have asked God for a sign. 
C6: What sort of sign?
P7:  A sign to know that I’m doing the right thing. I know during World 
War II when I was flying those bombing missions … the plane we 
were in got pretty shot up sometimes … but each time we were able 
to return to our base. That was a sign for me. 
C7:  Perhaps the sign that you are looking for is that you are providing 
good care for your wife and asking tough questions. 
P8: Maybe so …
C8: Are you aware of God’s presence right now?
P9: Yes…
C9: God is with you in your struggles for understanding and peacefulness. 
P10:  Yes … God gives me what peace I have been feeling recently. Thanks 
for walking with me today …
Aaron realized that God was with him from the very beginning. By provid-
ing presence and listening, Aaron was able to move forward in his life even 
as his wife was dying. 
Presence and listening are relevant in these two cases by opening each 
person up to the presence and the listening they already demonstrated. The 
hospice chaplain provided the space for the person to go deeper into their 
own soul. As a hospice chaplain, I, too, was able to witness their connec-
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tions and affirm their search to go deeper. The Spirit was present in our 
visits. Both were comfortable and peaceful. They were thankful to be able 
to search for deeper spiritual connections and meanings in their lives. As a 
hospice chaplain both presence and listening were provided. 
Conclusion
Dying is a process involving the body, mind, and spirit.61 The primary 
distinction for a hospice chaplain with the dying is related to time. Not 
everyone on hospice wants to meet the chaplain. The luxury of on-going 
visits are reduced to months, weeks, days – and sometimes only hours. This 
means that an individual must be a willing participant in exploring their 
deeper connections with the Holy One.
Hospice chaplains have specific responsibilities like documentation 
(now done electronically), interdisciplinary collaboration, and the endless 
hours of driving to and from appointments. As a hospice chaplain with the 
dying, chaplains must be willing to meet at the patient’s place of residence, 
be it a home, a skilled nursing facility, a hospital room, or even a board and 
care group home. 
The hospice chaplain is “the symbolic presence of God” by providing 
listening and presence, in addition to building trust in order for patients to 
share their stories, dreams, and memories. Being a hospice chaplain with the 
dying is a work in progress. My sense is that a hospice chaplain stands on 
the banks of a river getting ready to step into the flow of the river. The sto-
ries, dreams, and memories of the patients are always flowing. The chaplain 
must be grounded and open to the work of the Spirit in that individual’s life 
as the stories, dreams, and memories reach the surface. Dame Cicely Saun-
ders was right, “we live until we die.”
The hospice chaplain is in the presence of the Holy as the individual 
slips from this world to the next. Just as the river continues to flow, so do 
the spiritual connections with the dying individual. Those connections 
continue until the last breath. As the dying individual transitions from this 
world to the next, there are times when one foot remains in this realm and 
the other foot is in the next realm. It has been my deepest experience to be 
in the presence of the Holy One and experience the mystery of the Holy 
as the individual is ushered into the arms of a loving God (1 John 4:7-21 
“God is love”).
Even though the framework for a hospice chaplain with the dying may 
be fuzzy or the water too deep, the clarity comes in what the Spirit gives. 
The dying individual is validated in their quest for a closer connection with 
God. There is an art to providing spiritual care with the dying. The hospice 
chaplain who provides spiritual care with the dying is seen as the connector, 
the messenger, the listener, the “presence of God” for the dying individual 
and for their family. 
Finally, Sogyal Rinpoche writes:  “Don’t try to be too wise; don’t always 
try to search for something profound to say. You don’t have to do or say 
anything to make things better. Just be there as fully as you can.”62
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Paul R. Hinlicky’s Transubstantiation of 
Christian Doctrine and Glorification of 
Christian Philosophy
Charles W. Peterson
There is widespread agreement that the Lutheranism in North America and 
Europe and in particular the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America are 
facing trying times as we strive to proclaim Christ and to live as the Body 
of Christ in postmodern environments.1 Some lament the arrival of post-
modernity as a real threat to the church’s existence. Paul R. Hinlicky on the 
contrary believes this moment presents the church in Europe and North 
America with a real opportunity to reclaim its identity.
In the three works to be reviewed here, The Substance of the Faith: 
Luther’s Doctrinal Theology for Today,2 Paths not Taken: Fates of Theology From 
Luther Through Leibniz,3 and Luther and the Beloved Community: A Path for 
Christian Theology after Christendom4 Hinlicky presents the waning influ-
ence of the church in Europe and North America, “the loss of its public,”5 as 
a problem of the church’s own making, the result of our failure to keep the 
faith in an admittedly troubled and difficult historical and cultural situation. 
Hinlicky is the Tise Professor of Lutheran Studies at Roanoke College in 
Salem Virginia, and is an instructor in the Institute of Lutheran Theology, 
an unaffiliated institution for training pastors and educators. In his contri-
butions to journals such as Lutheran Forum and Pro Ecclesia, he has shown 
himself a brilliant theologian and at times a passionate and harsh critic of 
the ELCA. In these books Hinlicky offers a diagnosis of this fundamental ill 
afflicting North American and European Protestantism, in particular “theol-
ogy in the tradition of Luther,”6 delves into the causes and manifestations of 
this disease, proposes a cure, and begins to administer it. 
The present essay will examine and critique the diagnosis, etiology, 
prescription, and administration of the cure Hinlicky offers. In short, I will 
claim that while Hinlicky has identified a very important problem which 
poses a real threat to Lutheran theology (and/or what Hinlicky consistently 
refers to throughout all of these books as “theology in the tradition of 
Luther”), the solution he offers is not available to Lutherans and his pre-
scription would only bring more harm to the church. Yet in identifying and 
exploring the problem, Hinlicky has opened the way to see a better solution, 
the solution which Luther and Melanchthon began to pursue.
In these works Hinlicky presents similar or perhaps complimentary 
diagnoses of an important problem for the churches in North America and 
Europe, especially those of Lutheran heritage. As he explains in Substance, 
since the nineteenth century Protestant Christianity in Europe and North 
America has progressively lost its place and voice in society as theology has 
lost its place within the life of the Protestant churches, and as doctrine has 
lost its place within Protestant theology. As Reinhard Hütter assessed the 
situation at the turn of the twenty-first century:
Today … theology amounts to private opinionating, so called con-
structive theology, freewheeling metaphysical speculation without the 
rigor or restraint that would be required in academic philosophy…. 
Modern Protestantism hitches its wagon to collective nationalisms, or, 
alternatively, to radical individualisms…. Church and theology be-
come a helping profession in a secularized society…. [W]hat is left of 
the church disintegrates under these pressures, since it cannot sustain 
even minimal unity when expressive-individualistic religiosity runs 
awry or peace and justice goals lead to contradictory strategies.7 
It is on account of this failure of theology, according to Hinlicky, that 
we thus have an “exhausted Euro-American Christianity that has lost its 
way.”8 As he points out, Gerhard Ebeling had already “sketched the sad pic-
ture of ‘modern Protestantism’” resulting from this failure:
countless splits in all directions, progressive dissolution not only from 
its unity but also of its dogmatic substance, such infection by modern 
thought as apparently leads to internal sepsis, and where the attempt 
is made to defend or revitalize the old, the unseasonable, the distinc-
tive and indispensable, there we find a defensive attitude toward the 
outside opponent that savors of anxiety, grimness, or despair.9 
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Similarly, Hinlicky explains that his intention in writing Paths is to 
address “The sad and perplexing fate of Christian theology in contemporary 
Euro-American culture: Its loss of public and loss of theme.”10 
The cause of this problem, as Hinlicky writes in Paths, is that since the 
eighteenth century Protestantism has been troubled by the Kantian critiques 
of speculative reasoning, and has in response since the nineteenth century, 
in the words of Jeffrey Stout, veered toward “disguised versions of Liberal-
ism,” which strives to found Christian theology upon concepts available to 
reason alone apart from revelation.11 Using a term from Luther’s 1540 Dis-
putation Concerning the Divinity and Humanity of Christ,12 Hinlicky claims 
Protestant theology has thus become progressively weaker under the sway of 
the “old language” of philosophical theology based in 
a master conception of deity as timeless impassibility [which] is inde-
pendently established (by “philosophy,” by “natural” human “reason”) 
as an epistemic fundament over against the knowledge of God given 
by the Father in the gospel procession/missions of the Word and the 
Spirit.13 
As modern understandings of the world and of human nature have 
progressed, theology has found itself faced with the unenviable choice of 
continually giving more ground to worldviews based in modern science and 
philosophy, thus “giving the atheist less and less in which to disbelieve” or, 
rejecting the good as well as the bad of modern thought by issuing “a direct 
(non-apologetic) appeal to the authority of revelation.”14 That is, Protestant-
ism has been faced with the choice between theological anti-realism and 
anti-intellectualism.
Hinlicky’s Solution
The two-fold problem of loss of theme and audience, of loss of identity and 
relevance, is not a chicken and egg conundrum for Hinlicky. As he sees it, it 
is the abandonment of our theme, our willingness to let Christian doctrine 
take a back seat to the “old language” of philosophy, allowing our theology 
to be limited by the claims of reason alone, which is the root cause of the 
waning of the church, our “loss of public.”  The solution Hinlicky proposes 
is, straightforwardly enough, a return to “doctrinal theology.” As he expli-
cates his understanding of doctrinal theology in Beloved: 
By doctrine I designate historically those teachings of the Christian 
faith which the ecumenical church has decided on as essential to its 
fidelity to the gospel and which are thus meant to function as regula 
fidei, essentially: the canonical narrative of Old and New Testaments; 
the Holy Trinity; the Personal Union of divine and human natures in 
Christ; and the doctrine of grace as salvation from sin and death. By 
doctrinal theology, I mean the contemporary endeavor to understand 
critically and articulate publicly such doctrinal decisions for the pur-
pose of probing Christian belief today.15
It is only through commitment to doctrinal theology, Hinlicky suggests, 
that the church can reclaim its theme, its identity, and only by reclaiming 
our identity that we can possibly have something worth listening to.
And as he writes in Beloved, this return to doctrinal theology must be 
engaged in “the hard work of critical dogmatics in testing of the church’s 
practice in light of the aforementioned doctrinal norms freshly grasped and 
interpreted in every new generation.”16 That is, doctrinal theology or dog-
matics must be occupied with 
the act of critically differentiating itself from what is old (i.e., from 
that which philosophy can provide)…. [I]t requires that dogmatics 
set aside radical dualism of spheres that characterizes Cartesian and 
Kantian secularity…. The task here is the extension of the biblical 
“world absorbing narrative” (George Lindbeck), the “thick redescrip-
tion of secular reality (Ronald Thiemann) under the conviction of the 
“unrestricted epistemic primacy” of the Church’s faith in the “man 
Jesus, who created the heavens and the earth,” as Luther put it in the 
1540 disputation.17
Thus, according to Hinlicky, critical dogmatics should attempt to 
capture the best of human reasoning for Christian theology rather than 
allowing human reasoning to captivate Christian theology, as in Protestant 
Liberalism. 
In short, one could regard Hinlicky as proposing that critical dogmatics 
is the life-giving activity of the church in its healthy state and Luther’s New 
Language of the Spirit as the medicine which can help cure our “exhausted 
Euro-American Christianity” of the diseases associated with theology based 
in “old language” of merely human reasoning. To present the conceptions of 
the New Language and of Critical Dogmatics is Hinlicky’s undertaking in 
Substance. Paths can then be seen as an etiological study in which Hinlicky 
attempts to explain how our expressions of Christianity became so sick, with 
Beloved providing a few examples of how a healthy church might go about 
its life.
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Substance of the Faith and Luther’s New Language of the Spirit 
In his essay “New Language of the Spirit” in Substance, Hinlicky writes that 
he and his co-authors Mattox and Bielfeldt began to address the contempo-
rary problem of relating theology to philosophy, catholic doctrine to human 
reasoning, through their common interest in Luther’s work. Thus in this 
book they ask together, 
How by the lights of the old Martin Luther can we today understand 
critically, affirm joyfully, and confirm publicly the substance of the 
Christian faith – res scripturae, doctrina evangelii? Can we do so in 
tandem with reverence for today’s acknowledged plurality of human 
experience, religious and secular? How do we judge between deviation 
from the gospel ruinous of the church and destructive of salvation in 
Christ, on the one side, and the proper diversity that the Creator wills 
and pronounces very good, on the other?18
And as he explains in the introduction to this volume, the co-authors 
came to be “united in thinking that the late Luther’s logically rigorous turn 
in method to trinitarianism is something significant for the troubled and 
confused Christianity of today’s Euro-American world.”19   
That something significant is the call to reject the notion that the doctrines 
of the church are themselves merely the product of human ingenuity, sim-
ply another species of the “old language” of philosophy. Following Christine 
Helmer,20 as well as Robert Jenson,21 Hinlicky finds Luther calling the church 
to conceive of Christian theology rather as the New Language of the Holy 
Spirit. As he explains: “The thesis formulated here is that the later Luther’s 
notion of theology as ‘new language’ given by the Spirit contributes to the 
contemporary task both by accounting for the disciplinary autonomy of theol-
ogy and by specifying broadly its relation to other forms of human reason.”22 
Luther’s notion of theology as a “new language of the Spirit” would thus begin 
with and require a radical change of perspective on Christian theology; one 
might call it, in defiance of Kant, a Copernican revolution in theology. 
Hinlicky thus calls for the Christian church to regard its theology, with 
Luther, as arising causally from the Holy Spirit as it calls forth first-order 
confessional claims from the scriptures, second order doctrine from first 
order claims, and theology from doctrine.23 To do this one must regard 
Christian theology ad intra from the perspective of faith, and if from faith, 
then as the very speech of the Holy Spirit. He explains:
So the new language of theology, I am arguing, is the Spirit’s own 
hearing, confessing, rejoicing in us of the infinite inner-trinitarian love 
of the Father for the Son and of the Son for the Father. In the Spirit, 
the Son hears the Father: ‘You are My beloved.’ In the Spirit, the 
Father hears the Son: ‘Your will be done.’ In the Spirit, this discourse 
is heard – in us, by the new state of faith with its new language that 
speaks after (confession) and thinks after (nachdenken). Our personal 
inclusion in the divine life of these divine persons becomes effective 
as we entrust ourselves to it – not some wordless emotion – but in the 
act of faithfully speaking this very language, that is, by the ‘authority 
of instituted liturgy.’24
Such a view of theology as the Spirit’s own speech would certainly in 
Luther’s setting have constituted a radical departure from medieval Scho-
lasticism’s attempts to found theology upon, and to interpret it, by way of 
philosophy. It could therefore account for Luther’s vehement rejection of 
Scholastic theology. Indeed, according to Hinlicky, “mastery of (the new 
language) distinguishes believers from nonbelievers, theologians from phi-
losophers.”25 And since the most pressing task for the twenty-first century 
church is to let theology be theology and not merely philosophy, recaptur-
ing this concept of the new language of the Spirit is key to Hinlicky’s  
project here. 
Paths Not Taken and the Fides et Ratio Question
It must be stressed however that Hinlicky’s conception of Christian theology 
as the new language of the Spirit by no means entails the rejection of human 
reasoning in theology. It rather entails re-envisioning and re-establishing the 
relationship of faith and reason, fides et ratio, theology and philosophy. But 
doing this, Hinlicky believes, requires understanding where Protestant and 
Lutheran theology historically went gone wrong in its understanding of, 
regard for, and use of philosophy. Thus, as Hinlicky explains in Paths, “tell-
ing the tale of the fate of theology in early modernity from Luther’s great 
endeavor on behalf of the autonomy of revealed theology as a discipline 
through Melanchthon to Leibniz and on to Barth is the task of this book.”26 
In short, the tale as Hinlicky tells it goes like this: Martin Luther rejected 
the attempts of his nominalist predecessors to found theology upon the old 
language of philosophy, insisting rather that theology is the new language 
of the Spirit, an autonomous discipline not founded on the revealed Christ 
rather than on human reason.27 In the sixteenth century, Melanchthon’s 
furtive and unsuccessful attempts to produce a Christian philosophy upon 
which a Christian society (i.e., Christendom) could be founded already 
began to depart subtly from Luther’s position.28 
54   CHARLES W. PETERSON SRR AUTUMN 2015   55
In the seventeenth century, Leibniz attempted to complete Melanch-
thon’s project with his own rationalistic philosophy according to which 
there is a harmonious coherence of philosophy and theology. Leibniz failed, 
not because he did not complete Melanchthon’s project, and not because 
the project was misbegotten, but because Leibniz did not understand his 
own achievement. Rather than discovering through reason alone a philosophy 
consistent with Christian faith, as Leibniz thought he had done, or at least 
as he claimed to have done, Leibniz’s “Christian philosophy” was actually, 
though covertly, perhaps unbeknownst even to Leibniz himself, founded 
upon revelation-based Christian doctrine.29 
Tragically, Hinlicky reports, Leibniz’s failure to reconcile theology and 
philosophy through the work of reason alone, along with his failure to 
appreciate the true relationship of faith and philosophy in his own system 
prepared the way for Kant, in the eighteenth century, to propose a very dif-
ferent philosophical system in which faith must be subject to reason, and in 
which theology was (returning to the status quo ante Luther!) subject to the 
“old language” of philosophy. From within the Kantian framework, which 
held sway over academic theology through the nineteenth century until the 
recent collapse of modernity at the end of the twentieth century, the only 
possible ways of relating philosophy to theology appeared to be either those 
of Liberalism or of misological Biblicism.30 
But now, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, postmodernism 
has been ushered in with the ushering out of Kant’s system. Finally, accord-
ing to Hinlicky, in our post-Kantian era, theology has the opportunity to 
return to the state of philosophy before the emergence of the critical phi-
losophy. As he writes:
[W]ith our current loss of confidence in Kantian epistemology as a 
foundational discourse, ‘postmodern’ thought represents an argumen-
tative return to the status quo ante. The issues today are in fact prefig-
ured in the alternatives represented by Hobbes, Leibniz, and Spinoza, 
whom for ease of understanding we may take roughly as the Epicu-
rean, the Augustinian, and the Stoic, respectively.31
That is, as in the seventeenth century, we are faced in the twenty-first 
century with the fundamental choice between an Epicurean worldview in 
which all reality consists of atoms colliding in the void and in which there 
is neither need for nor room for God, an Augustinian worldview which 
recognizes that some faith is foundational for any claim to knowledge and 
which founds knowledge and understanding for Christians upon faith in 
the God revealed in scripture, and a pantheistic view according to which 
speaking of God is just a (perhaps oblique) way of speaking of nature and 
vice versa. 
Hinlicky’s proposal in Paths is that, picking up where Leibniz left off, 
we start over from an Augustinian point of departure. But he suggests that 
we should be, to alter an Erasmian turn of phrase, “more Leibnizian than 
Leibniz himself,” walking the path Leibniz had actually prepared but not 
travelled, rather than the path Leibniz strove to travel, though he had left it 
unprepared.32  
Critical Dogmatics and Beloved
Beloved is written as an exercise or series of exercises in critical dogmatics.33 
Having explained the need for and the basic contours of theology as the 
new language of the Spirit in Substance and having attempted to show where 
Lutherans have gone wrong in their approach to philosophy in Paths, one 
of the foundations of Beloved is the claims that biblical, historical, and con-
structive theology have taken correlative wrong turns. Thus, as he writes:
Today biblical scholars routinely dismantle the text’s claim as canoni-
cal and then proceed as experts to opinionate on traditional dogmatic 
questions without method or rigor. Constructive theologians, so-
called, build the kinds of metaphysical systems that Kant long ago 
demolished for philosophers with a conscience – or with great flour-
ish and fanfare deconstruct systems long since fallen from power – in 
discourses that few outside of their shrinking guilds read or under-
stand. Historical theologians jealously guard the historical particularity 
of what once was, anointing themselves gatekeepers who effectively 
block the process of critical appropriation in traditional discourses like 
doctrinal theology.34
Because of this, he explains, the present project cannot proceed “with-
out a certain measure of violence against the past.”35 Or rather, he might 
better have said, “against the present state of academic theology.” 
Since Luther is a primary source and dialogue partner throughout 
the essays in Beloved, Hinlicky is especially concerned “to acknowledge at 
the outset that the Luther who appears in the pages to follow will by ‘my’ 
Luther as I appropriate him, for which I, not Luther, am responsible.”36 
But this may be because, as Mickey Mattox puts it in the foreword, citing 
Bernard Lohse, academic historians have insisted that their task is to “find 
Luther in the sixteenth century and then leave him there.”37 Such histori-
cism is evident in academic biblical studies as well, and these “gatekeepers,” 
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Hinlicky suggests, generally reflect the “purpose of neutralizing the prima 
facie claim of the text as transmitted by the tradition.”38 
But since Hinlicky’s purpose is to be in dialogue with Luther so that 
the church today may find “help moving forward in our pilgrim way,”39 
Hinlicky is not particularly concerned whether his critical-dogmatic appro-
priation of Luther is found “unfashionable” by academic church historians. 
“How can Luther be re-appropriated today without needing either to rein-
force Protestant-Catholic or Catholic-Protestant schisms or to shore up an 
ever shrinking cultural heritage?”40 is then the question from which Beloved 
begins. 
Hinlicky organizes Beloved in three sections. In Part One he explores 
issues in “Luther’s Creedal Theology: The problem of faith in the tradition 
of Luther today, Luther’s Christology, and Trinitarian thought as funda-
mental to Luther’s theology. In Part Two he considers two anthropological 
questions: one chapter deals with the relation between the self, the will, 
and human freedom; another promotes Luther’s biblically-based account of 
sexuality and marriage for the church today. “Part Three: Some Objections 
Regarding Justification, the Church, and Political Theology” is something of 
a mixed bag, including chapters on a Lutheran and Augustinian apprehen-
sion of Paul, Luther’s ecclesiology, Luther’s Political Theology, and Luther’s 
theology of the cross. He concludes with a short treatment of the problem 
of Luther’s demonization of his theological opponents.
All of the essays in Beloved are rooted in Hinlicky’s critical dogmatics, 
which in turn is founded upon his account of the fides-ratio relationship. 
Because the way he deals with this relationship largely determines every-
thing he does in Beloved, I will focus on a critique of the former rather than 
on the specific claims and conclusions he draws and makes in Beloved. To do 
otherwise would be tantamount to straining gnats and swallowing a camel. 
But before critiquing Hinlicky’s overall project as presented in these 
works, a few laudatory ad hominem remarks must be made. First, one can-
not read these texts without feeling the author’s deep passion for the church. 
His desire to make a positive difference in the life of the church is manifest 
on almost every page. His piety and love for “the beloved community” are 
palpable to the reader. Nor can one fail to be impressed by Hinlicky’s erudi-
tion. It seems impossible to name a Lutheran theologian of more extensive 
mastery of historical theological sources. In these pages he engages and 
challenges philosophers and theologians from almost every era of Western 
thought. In Substance these include Christine Helmer and Robert Jenson, 
George Lindbeck, Heiko Oberman, John Milbank, Brian Gerrish, Oswald 
Bayer, Reinhard Hütter, and of course his co-athors; in Paths he engages 
with Kant, Leibniz, Spinoza, and Melanchthon, and Schleiermacher, with 
Barth serving as a travelling companion throughout, and with nods to Plato, 
Aristotle, and Hobbes; in Beloved he converses as well with William James 
and Josiah Royce, Adolf von Harnack, Friedrich Nietzsche, Patristic sources, 
Anselm, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Hans Urs von Balthasar, Wolfhart Pannen-
berg, Jacques Derrida, Rene Girard, Huldreich Zwingli, Krister Stendahl, 
Ernst Käseman, and N.T. Wright. Throughout these books he is in con-
tinual conversation with Luther. 
Most important of all is Hinlicky’s acuity; it seems that, as Luther said 
of Erasmus, Hinlicky alone has “seen through to the hinge upon which the 
whole matter turns.”41 That is, throughout the works here under review 
Hinlicky has thematized a crucial issue in the history of Lutheran thought, 
perhaps the question which will be of the utmost importance as we strive to 
find our way in a post-Christendom, postmodern environment. That ques-
tion is of course of the relationship between theology and philosophy, faith 
and reason. 
How and Where to Start Over?
There are, however, real problems with the way Hinlicky deals with the 
question of the relation of faith and reason and other related issues. It may 
be best to begin with Hinlicky’s own starting point, or rather the point 
from which he proposes we begin again. If, as he quite plausibly claims, a 
characteristic of postmodernism is a rejection of epistemological founda-
tionalism,42 it seems odd that Hinlicky would call theology in the Lutheran 
tradition to return only so far as to the status quo ante Kant, to Leibniz’s 
seventeenth-century rationalism as a re-starting point for relating philoso-
phy and theology. For if postmodernity has rejected the Kantian framework 
within which theological Liberalism operates, surely it also rejects or at least 
calls into question the rationalist foundationalism of a figure like Leibniz. 
One wonders why Hinlicky has not taken this moment as an opportunity to 
return to the status quo ante Descartes to the status quaestionis of fides et ratio 
in the Reformation. 
To be sure, any attempt to recapture the contours of any Reformation 
understanding of this relationship will be fraught with difficulties. The most 
straightforward and helpful way of looking into the problem would be, one 
might suppose, to consider how Philip Melanchthon, the first Lutheran 
philosopher, dealt with it. Unfortunately, as Hinlicky himself and others 
have pointed out, since the sixteenth century Melanchthon has been a pro-
tean figure.43 As Timothy Wengert has written, the praeceptor Germaniae 
has been portrayed variously as a Platonist, an Aristotelian, a nominalist, 
an adherent of the via antiqua, a Ciceronian humanist, an eclectic thinker, 
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and/or some combination of several of the above.44 Given the wide range of 
portrayals of Melanchthon in the secondary literature and given Hinlicky’s 
often exhausting erudition, it is odd to see the latter rely almost exclusively 
on one specific account of the philosophy of the praeceptor Germania, that 
of Günter Frank.
There can be little doubt that Frank is the world’s best known living 
authority on Melanchthon as a philosopher.45 But one wonders whether 
Frank’s image of Melanchthon as a Theo-rationalist is itself an anachronistic 
fiction made in the image of Kantianism or Leibnizian rationalism.46 In any 
case, merely having Frank’s works at hand does not excuse Hinlicky the task 
of testing Frank’s claims against those of at least a few other scholars as well 
as against the praeceptor’s own writings. As things stand in Paths, Hinlicky’s 
claim that Melanchthon was the founding father of Leibniz’s Theo-ratio-
nalism is based on the recognition that the latter was trained in schools that 
Melanchthon had reformed a century prior (“it is a matter of historical fact 
that a path exists here,” Hinlicky writes),47 and on an uncritical reliance on 
the claims of one well known scholar. In effect this amounts to an appeal to 
authority and a post hoc ergo propter hoc argument. 
Alas, the five hundred year desire and need for Lutherans better to 
understand “The Unknown Melanchthon”48 continues. Perhaps then still 
at the beginning of the twenty-first century Melanchthon remains too 
shadowy a figure upon whom to base an understanding of options available 
in the Reformation for relating fides et ratio. In that case perhaps Hinlicky 
could have presented an full account of Luther’s own understanding of phi-
losophy and its relation to theology, or at least as much of one as is possible. 
But while he sets out on this task in all three works here considered, Hin-
licky’s treatment of it seems curiously incomplete or one-sided. 
Contra Voluntarism
Hinlicky starts out well on this task in Substance, following Helmer and 
Graham White49 in recognizing that Luther skillfully and enthusiastically 
used the tools of logical analysis in his later disputations. But he merely 
shrugs off without demonstration or discussion White’s claim that Luther’s 
commitment to or method of logical analysis indicates a lingering identifica-
tion with nominalism on the reformer’s part.50  
Hinlicky is especially concerned to reject, and to distance Luther from, 
the nominalist claim that the will is the fundamental or supreme power in 
God and in humans, with intellect or reason being secondary and subject 
to the power of the will. Hinlicky identifies this doctrine, voluntarism, in 
its theological application with “the prototypical metaphysics of secularism 
with its dark vision of deity as potentia absoluta: willful, essentially incom-
municable omnipotence whose relation to the world is arbitrary, whose 
potential ordinate in covenants could therefore at any moment be revoked, 
all earnestly pastoral assurances to the contrary.”51 Of course, according to 
Hinlicky, such a doctrine about God could only have come about by way 
of “a process of reasoning based on the light of natural reason,”52 that is, the 
“old language” of philosophy.
Hinlicky’s rejection of psychological voluntarism is even more clear and 
vehement in his treatment of the question of the power of the human will 
in relation to divine determination. As he writes in Paths, this issue is central 
to the larger task at hand: “This difficulty represents an aporia at the fonts, 
which, I believe must be resolved for this tradition (i.e.., ‘theology in the tra-
dition of Luther’) to go forward.”53 Hinlicky’s way of dealing with the issue 
therefore provides a very important window into the fundaments of his own 
thought.
But Hinlicky begins here on shaky ground. For in presenting the very 
concept of the will, he writes, “As long as they live, in order to live, creatures 
must desire what appears good to them and avert the evil; the will spontane-
ously desires its perceived good.”54 The voluntarist must in response claim 
that this is a question-begging starting point. The voluntarist would have to 
claim that Hinlicky has at the outset misstated (or at least has tendentiously 
stated) the relationship between that which the human desires and the good. 
Rather than agreeing that the will desires what it recognizes as good, the vol-
untarist insists, to put it in Hobbesian fashion, that ‘“good” is a word which 
simply means “that which is desired.” That is, things are not desired because 
the intellect recognizes them as good, according to the voluntarist; they are 
called “good” because they are desired. 
But what, Hinlicky might demand, could be the cause of such a desire 
or affectus, if not that it is recognized as good? What else could explain a 
choice? The voluntarist would answer that there can be no explanation for 
why a particular free choice is made, because there is no knowable cause for 
such a desire. The voluntarist conceives of the will as a mysterious, uncaused 
cause of human action and thinking. As the voluntarist might put it, to 
demand an explanation for why one desires one thing and not another is to 
search for a reason for a choice made in freedom, and to identify a reason 
for a choice requires attributing that choice to a cause. But to attribute a 
cause to some action or decision is to deny that it is freely made.
Now, the present purpose is not to convince the reader to accept 
psychological voluntarism as true, but rather to note that an important 
starting point for Hinlicky is his insistence that voluntarism is false. For 
him there must be an explanation for all desires as well as for all choices. 
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Recognizing Hinlicky’s starting point, one can see why he has such dif-
ficulty with Melanchthon’s account of the role of human freedom in faith, 
as when writes:
The model Melanchthon erected to protect justification from being 
based on human renewal is unable finally to account for the initial act 
of faith – the turning of the terrified conscience to the offered grace – 
except as a cooperating will, a natural human “cause” alongside God’s, 
which then separates the Christian from the heathen, even though, 
soli deo gloria, the merit of this human movement is ascribed to God’s 
prevenient grace.55
Hinlicky recognizes Melanchthon’s conception of the will as bound 
to unfaith prior to grace, but, as freed by grace, free to make the choice 
for or against God as between two “logically noncontradictory alterna-
tive goods,”56 But then Hinlicky demands an explanation for why, on this 
scheme, “‘If man cannot make the decision to be a believer unless somehow 
through the grace of God this happens, why does one man have faith and 
another not?’ Where does the nonresistance to offered grace in the Word 
come from, if not from the Spirit’s prevenient grace?”57
While for the voluntarist freedom and free choices are anomalous, 
Hinlicky does not, or perhaps will not, entertain the notion that the will is, 
with respect to any choices for which it is free, an “uncaused cause.” Rather, 
in proper Leibnizian fashion, he seems in effect to rely upon a principle of 
sufficient reason to explain all action on the part of the will. And since, with 
Leibniz, Hinlicky requires explanations for the actions of the will in terms 
of rational causes, it seems he believes that reason or intellect is superior to 
will. That is, it seems that Hinlicky is an intellectualist or a rationalist in the 
medieval sense.58
Intellectualism?
Intellectualism, the notion that intellect or reason is superior to will in the 
human soul or mind, is a respectable philosophical position. Much more 
problematic, for Lutherans especially, is the claim that God is somehow 
constrained in God’s own choices by antecedently existing reason or good-
ness; most problematic of all is the proposal that humans have access to 
knowledge of any such alleged constraints on God’s choices apart from 
what is explicitly revealed in scripture. Hinlicky seems to at least come close 
to making all three claims, however. For in responding to Robert Jenson’s 
refusal to speculate about divine perfections,59 he writes:
If [Jensen’s] notion of [God as] persistence in anticipation is to be 
sustained … it seems that some account of divine nature must help us 
see what choices God made in the act of origin. That is simply to ask: 
What were the divine possibilities? … With Leibniz, then, we who un-
derstand ourselves as the created images of this God have the right, the 
access, and the duty to ask this question about the divine nature, in 
order that we may know the mind of our God in His original decision 
and so to cooperate intelligently with His aims for the earth.60
Hinlicky admits that the enquirer such as himself who is willing to 
entertain the question of why is there something rather than nothing? “is prej-
udiced toward an ontology of persistence rather than of anticipation.” “But 
surely,” he writes, “the theological task here is not to jettison ‘metaphysics’ 
but to revise.”61 What does seem sure is that not all striving to do theology 
in the tradition of Luther would agree with Hinlicky here.
The questions of whether God has reasons for God’s choices and if so 
whether humans can understand them is as old as Plato’s Euthyphro.62 The 
answers Hinlicky offers to these questions have a certain affinity with the 
theology of Aristotle’s metaphysics, the opening line of which is “All by 
nature want to know”,63 and which culminates in an image of God as an 
unmoved mover, thought thinking thought.64 Hinlicky furthermore seems 
to reflect Aquinas’s notion that since we have a desire to know about God’s 
essence and since “no natural desire is vain,”65 we should expect to find 
humans somehow capable of gaining some such knowledge.66   It is not 
surprising then that he is enthusiastic to think that in Leibniz we have a 
“Lutheran Thomist” to provide us with a point from which to restart our 
postmodern contemplations about freedom and determinism – in God as 
well as for humans.67
But Hinlicky is not a Thomist in any straightforward sense, and if he 
is an intellectualist, he is an unusual one. He denies Aquinas’s claim that 
philosophy is in principle on its own able to provide truths about God’s 
essence, and the Kantian claim that theology must be founded upon phi-
losophy. He rather claims (and he believes that he is here following Leibniz 
in a certain way), both philosophy and theology must be founded upon 
scriptural revelation of God as well as upon doctrines which the Spirit has 
raised up from the seedbed of scripture.68  
Still, even Hinlicky’s claim that the theologian basing her speculation 
on revelation has “the right, the access, and the duty”69 to speculate beyond 
scripture into God’s essence or for the causes of God’s choices is, to say the 
least, problematic from a Lutheran perspective. As Hinlicky acknowledges 
in his treatment of Bondage of the Will in Beloved, quoting Luther:
62   CHARLES W. PETERSON SRR AUTUMN 2015   63
[I]t is question begging to set up another authority (such as self-serv-
ing human ideas of justice) over God. “God is he for Whose will no 
cause or ground may be laid down as a rule or standard. Causes and 
grounds are laid down for the will of the creature, but not for the will 
of the Creator – unless you set another Creator over him!”70
According to Luther then, it is wise and good to flee in the opposite 
direction of such speculation!71
Another Way Forward?
Hinlicky brings forth no real evidence that Luther was an intellectualist. 
But the significance of Hinlicky’s own inclination toward theological intel-
lectualism seems to be that he associates it with theological realism, the 
claim that “God does not exist on account of our language,”72 contra what 
he takes to be the voluntarist and nominalist “prototypical metaphysics of 
secularism.”73 Hinlicky seems moreover to regard these two, realism and 
nominalism, as the only two fundamental philosophical options available –  
to Luther and to us. But is this the case? And if there is at least one other 
option, what would the implications for such a view be for theology in post-
modern, post-Christendom environments?
Hinlicky is glad to find support for his claim that Luther was no nomi-
nalist in the now classic work of Brian Gerrish, Grace and Reason: A Study 
in the Theology of Luther.74 But Hinlicky only provides one side of Gerrish’s 
account. For in describing Luther’s difference from Ockhamistic nominal-
ism, Gerrish writes:
Occamism manifested two fundamental characteristics: concerning 
intelligence, it was pessimistic, skeptical, destructive; concerning all 
that is related to the will, it was optimistic and semi-rationalistic. 
Very roughly, it was the former characteristic which influenced Luther 
positively; against the latter he reacted violently, as the theses Against 
Scholastic Theology (1517) and the Heidelberg Disputation (1518) 
make particularly obvious.75
At least according to Gerrish then, if Luther was pessimistic and skepti-
cal about the power of the will, he was equally skeptical and pessimistic of 
the power of the intellect; if he was no voluntarist, he was not an intellectu-
alist or realist in the medieval sense, either. 
In fact, Gerrish points toward another foundational view of philosophy. 
This way requires in the first place a rather modest conception, from the 
perspective of either of the medieval viae, of philosophy’s goals and scope. 
As Gerrish writes: 
[Luther’s] sharp division between the areas of philosophy and theol-
ogy is clearly stressed in the Postils, wherever occasion presents itself. 
Philosophy is concerned with the objects of sensory perception, things 
which can be experienced and conceptualized; whereas a Christian’s 
concern is with invisible things, ‘things which are not,’ that is, things 
whose existence men question because they cannot see them.76
As Gerrish further notes, “The natural reason which deals with mun-
dane affairs is, as Luther’s language often seems to suggest, a ‘practical 
reason,’ approaching at times our notion of ‘common sense.’”77 
Note here that this view of a pragmatic philosophy concerned with 
sensible objects and conditions would either deny humans the ability fruit-
fully to engage in metaphysics, and is thus in this regard especially at odds 
with Platonism or Aristotelian intellectualism. To the question of whether in 
sensing ordinary objects we have insight into reality as it exists (or whether 
it exists) beyond our understanding of practical affairs and sensible objects, 
a philosopher with this conception would neither say ‘yea’ nor ‘nay,’ but 
merely shrug her shoulders. Gerrish summarizes how Luther related his the-
ology to philosophy so conceived:
If then we are to do justice to the complexity of Luther’s thought, we 
must carefully distinguish: (1) natural reason, ruling within its proper 
domain (the Earthly Kingdom); (2) arrogant reason, trespassing upon 
the domain of faith (the Heavenly Kingdom); (3) regenerate reason, 
serving humbly in the household of faith, but always subject to the 
Word of God. Within the first context, reason is an excellent gift of 
God; within the second, it is Frau Hulda, the Devil’s Whore; within 
the third, it is the handmaiden of faith.78
As noted above, Hinlicky proposed that theology at the outset of the 
twenty-first century is presented with alternative ways of relating itself to 
philosophy 1) the way of materialistic, theology-denying Hobbesian epi-
cureanism, or 2) the way of faith-based Augustinianism, or 3) the way of 
Spinozistic panenthieism. But Luther’s conception as Gerrish presents it 
suggests a fourth alternative: this approach would allow, contra Spinoza, for 
a real distinction between the subject matters of philosophy and theology. 
It would insist with Augustine (and Leibniz, as Hinlicky reads him) that 
theology is based upon scripture and so fundamentally free from the claims 
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of natural and moral philosophy. But this view would also, here in accord 
with Epicureanism, insist on that philosophy must focus on the empirically 
observable and be free of control by theology. 
At the same time, the theologian with this view might well invite – 
indeed, it might actively seek out – dialogue with philosophy. Theology 
would have the task of interpreting the findings of philosophy: integrat-
ing understandings of the world as presented by natural philosophy (or, as 
we typically call it, ‘natural science’) into Christian theology, teaching the 
faithful to think of and speak of the world science discovers as the world 
created by God through the eternal Logos by the working of the Spirit. 
Christian theology would also desire to work with other religious and secu-
lar ethicists to discover forms of society and life together which produce the 
greatest utility, as understood from a Christian perspective.79 In providing 
some knowledge of morals and nature for theology, philosophy would thus 
provide theology with new knowledge of the law of God, but never of the 
gospel.80 To the extent that theologians believed that living out the gospel 
in the Spirit requires understanding the law of God revealed in nature, they 
would eagerly seek this dialogue.81
The approach Gerrish describes is consistent with the much more prac-
tical, humble view of philosophy one actually finds in Melanchthon82 and 
some other Renaissance humanists.83 However, there is evidence that for 
both Luther and Melanchthon the relationship between philosophy and 
theology was rather more intimate than Gerrish described it. Melanchthon 
referred to his own version of the above view of philosophy as the Causa 
Romana, after his – and Luther’s – favorite philosopher: the Roman orator 
Cicero.84 According to this Causa Romana, rhetoric, the art of persuasion, is 
the first part of philosophy. Since persuasion often involves giving speeches, 
and giving persuasive speeches requires understanding persuasive speech, 
rhetoric is also the art of interpreting texts.85 
Now, as Luther pointed out, one must know grammar (which, along 
with dialectics was regarded as one of the two parts of rhetoric) before 
one can understand the scriptures. The biblical languages were for Luther 
“the sheath in which the sword of the Spirit is encased.”86 But then, 
because Christian theology begins with the interpretation of the bibli-
cal texts written in their languages, and rhetoric is the (philosophical!) art 
of interpretation, there is a sense that for the reformers rhetoric, the first 
part of philosophy, was a prelude to Christian theology, and that theology 
depended in an important sense upon this first part of philosophy. 
Such a view would call for the recognition that, whatever else it is, 
biblical interpretation is in an important sense a philosophical activity (as 
it is for secular biblical scholars). On the other hand, this view need not be 
regarded as denying that the scriptures or doctrines of the church are bearers 
of the Word of God. Surely Luther made no such denial. Nor need this view 
be regarded as affirming (with Liberalism as Hinlicky describes it) that scrip-
ture and theology are simply human words. 
This approach would, however, seem to entail denial of the unqualified 
claim that doctrine and scripture are simply and absolutely “the language 
of the Spirit.” Much more would it deny the unqualified claim that “the 
dogmatic decisions are the work of the Spirit.”87 Luther’s view of the rela-
tionship of theology with philosophy (especially rhetoric) as portrayed by 
Gerrish suggests that while the Spirit may speak “in, with, and under” the 
scriptures, these documents may still be regarded as human in some impor-
tant sense. While the view of scripture and doctrine presented by Gerrish 
suggests a “real presence” of the Spirit in them, Hinlicky almost seems to 
want to effect a transubstantiation of doctrine according to which, as the 
Spirit’s speech, it is infallible. 
Theological Pragmatism?
To be sure, as Hinlicky concedes, “Luther thinks that dogmatic beliefs can 
be true or false.”88  But how can Hinlicky consistently hold his very high 
view of the reliability of doctrine and be faithful to Luther’s critical spirit? 
Hinlicky believes the answer lies in what he calls “theological pragmatics.”89 
The central claim of Hinlicky’s theological pragmatics is that theology 
is not to provide scientia about God, as in Aristotelian Thomism, but to 
bring about “a churchly and pragmatic credamus ut confiteamur in spiritual 
battle with a world that refuses the promise of God’s reign.”90 Thus Hinlicky 
writes, “Luther does not think of knowledge of God in theology as ‘theory,’ 
as intellectual gaze upon a perfect, simply self-identical substance,”91 but 
rather as “‘notitia,’ based upon direct access of faith to the object of knowl-
edge, which is named but not (ever, in all eternity) comprehended.”92 
Hinlicky claims a real affinity here in Luther’s thought with philosophical 
pragmatism, which “regards beliefs as rules for action.”93
Up to this point Hinlicky is on well-travelled ground. It has long been 
claimed that for Luther the test of authenticity of a word claiming to be of 
God is, to use Gerhard Forde’s phrase, whether or not it “does God” to the 
hearer or reader. “That is,” as Timothy Wengert has more recently put it, 
such a word must “put the old creature to death and then bring the new to 
life. Or, to put it another way, God’s Word makes believers in Christ out 
of us.”94 Thus Luther’s well-known phrase for judging the apostolicity of 
scriptural texts, “Was Christum treibet,”95 may be said to be Luther’s theolog-
ical-utilitarian criterion for the truthfulness of doctrine. 
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Hinlicky’s own pragmatic conception of theological truth adds an 
important qualifier to Luther’s Was Christum treibet, however. As Hinlicky 
writes: “The truth of doctrinal statements resides in their regulative service 
as attesting this saving person of Christ, the person who unites God and 
humanity in a new covenant of mercy, against the deceptions of Satan, who 
would tear asunder this saving unity of God and humanity by attacking 
Christ’s person through deviant teaching.”96 Thus, according to Hinlicky, 
that which conveys Christ also at the same time must be that which rejects 
“deviant teaching.” And so he claims the criterion for truthfulness is duplex 
rather than simple: “In the interim, the truthfulness of our beliefs is criti-
cally tested by the double criterion of utility in experience and coherence 
with other beliefs we hold true … putting us to work on the coherence of 
these beliefs, both internally in the body of church doctrine and externally 
with respect to all creation.”97 Luther did not seem to have the sort of theo-
logical-truth-criterion of coherence with church dogma that Hinlicky calls 
for, and the consequences of Hinlicky’s amendment are profound. 
To be sure, at Worms Luther as much as stated a criterion of coherence 
with the Word of God when he famously declared: “Unless I am convinced 
by the testimony of the Scriptures or by clear reason (for I do not trust 
either in the pope or in councils alone, since it is well known that they have 
often erred and contradicted themselves), I am bound by the Scriptures I 
have quoted and my conscience is captive to the Word of God.”98 But of 
course correlative to this scriptural criterion was the presumption that much 
church doctrine, many traditional teachings, and even dogmatic decisions 
may not be the work of the Spirit. They were to be tested against scripture 
and reason.
Even more striking was Luther’s treatment of the apostolicity of 
scriptural texts. For Luther, was Christum treibet was the final word on apos-
tolicity, and he was willing to disregard even books of scripture that did not 
usefully “do God” to the sinner. As he perhaps infamously claimed: “All the 
genuine books agree in this, that all of them preach and inculcate Christ…. 
Whatever does not teach Christ is not apostolic, even though St. Peter or St. 
Paul does the teaching. Again, whatever preaches Christ would be apostolic, 
even if Judas, Annas, Pilate, and Herod were doing it.99 Hinlicky is right 
to point out that Luther plumbed the depths of the catholic tradition for 
theological insights which would continue to aid the church in proclaim-
ing Christ, and he is right to call the church today to do the same. But 
Hinlicky does not highlight Luther’s boldness in disregard and disdain for 
texts or teachings that do not proclaim Christ, and Hinlicky’s “theological 
pragmatics” would seem to prevent the faithful from seeking reform. To be 
sure, Luther believed that the church must make assertions, but he did not 
believe or suggest that the church was infallible in making such assertions. 
Thus while Luther upbraided Erasmus with “Spiritus Sanctus non est scepti-
cus” he was also clear at Worms and elsewhere that neither the voice of the 
theologian, nor of the magisterium, nor of the council, nor even of John of 
Patmos is purely and without qualification the voice of the Holy Spirit. 
Hinlicky’s insertion of the coherence-with-other-doctrines principle 
thus signals a radical departure from Luther’s criterion for doctrine. While 
for Luther nothing could be considered apostolic if it does not convey 
Christ, for Hinlicky it seems that nothing can be said to convey Christ if it 
does not cohere with the whole body of Christian doctrine. While Luther’s 
principle helped him search out where reformation is needed, Hinlicky’s 
principles would prevent it. Hinlicky thus seems to seek not the teaching (or 
reformation of teaching) most conducive to full human flourishing under 
Christ, but the most comforting and pastoral way of teaching the traditional 
Christian doctrines. 
One sees this failure of Hinlicky’s pragmatics in the way he treats two 
issues of great concern to him in Beloved: Luther’s rhetoric of demonization 
used against those he saw as theological opponents, in particular the Jews,100 
and the question of the church’s condemnation of homosexuality.101 Now, it 
is clear that Hinlicky is appalled at some of Luther’s anti-Semitic invective. 
He declares it sinful.102 He asserts the importance for the church to make 
space to dialogue in charitable disagreement with others.103  
Moreover, Hinlicky notes that Luther was wrong to understand himself 
as God’s apocalyptic prophet,104 and he asserts that Lutherans have been 
wrong in not allowing Luther to be wrong. He blames confessionalism 
for upholding Luther as a hero rather than as a fallible theologian,105 and 
Nazism for using this hero of the German people to support its own horrific 
version of anti-Semitism.106 But in the end Hinlicky cannot explain why 
Luther was wrong here theologically. 
Most of Hinlicky’s treatment of Luther’s demonizing rhetoric is dedi-
cated to demonstrating that Christian faith must continue to maintain a 
teaching about the devil and then to consider how the church can go about 
“refiguring the Evil One.”107 The devil for him, as stated in his pragmatic 
criteriology, is the one who purveys false teachings contrary to Christ. But 
if we are to maintain such a teaching, how, on Hinlicky’s criteria, can one 
avoid identifying traditions which teach non-Christian faith or unfaith as 
demonic? Again, that Hinlicky wants to reject Luther’s invective is clear. 
How or whether his duplex criterion for theological truthfulness is of any 
help to him – or the reader! – in doing so is not clear. 
Likewise, when Hinlicky turns in Beloved to the question of “whether a 
homosexual orientation is ever God’s good creation, or always an evidence 
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of the ‘fall’ as a rejection of one’s good creation,”108 his compassion is clear. 
He promotes same-sex civil unions and he praises pastors for upholding 
private same-sex unions over many generations. But he will not, he cannot, 
promote a change in the church’s teaching about the matter.
For Hinlicky, that the church has a tradition of interpreting Genesis 1-3 
as promoting heterosexual marriage with children as the godly expression 
of human sexual expression seems to settle the issue as soon as it is raised. 
Other forms of expression and family life must be considered ‘”disordered.” 
“Nor is there any other ‘blessing’ from the Word of God for the church to 
pronounce over a (homosexual) marriage.”109 There is and can be nothing 
else, in Hinlicky’s scheme, that can be faithful to the Spirit of Christ. No 
amount of data, no expression of collective experience can alter the fact that 
the church has a traditional teaching on the matter, and in this doctrine, 
according to Hinlicky, the Spirit has spoken, and since the Spirit will not 
contradict itself, the matter is settled.
The real difficulty with Hinlicky here is not that he has drawn this 
or that conclusion about homosexuality, but rather in the way Hinlicky 
uses his criteria for determining how to draw these conclusions. Again, his 
duplex pragmatic criterion for theological faithfulness considers a) what 
conduces to the greater utility and b) what conforms to traditional teaching. 
Luther may well have had similar criteria, but his utilitarian principle, “what 
conveys Christ”, was primary for him, and any criterion of conservation of 
doctrine was secondary and subject to it. This allowed or rather compelled 
Luther to seek reforms in teaching when those teachings stood in the way of 
experiencing God as gracious, and to maintain traditions, rules, and teach-
ings which were found to “do God.” 
For Hinlicky it seems to be the other way around. For him, the con-
servation of tradition is primary. It is not that Hinlicky believes one should 
preserve doctrine even when it does not convey Christ. Rather, the duplex 
criterion of truthfulness of his theological pragmatics leads him to hold 
that in principle only that which conforms to standing doctrine can actu-
ally convey Christ. Or rather, since the doctrinal decisions of the church are 
the work of the Spirit, and the Spirit always conveys Christ, the church’s 
doctrinal decisions always must be those which convey Christ. Again, while 
Luther’s approach sought to conserve the most doctrine given the need to 
proclaim the gospel, Hinlicky’s approach seems to seek out the most pas-
toral way of bringing people in line with doctrine, which, being the Spirit’s 
own speech in principle, is infallible and must not be reformed. 
Rather, Hinlicky begins to suggest, it is our natural philosophy that 
must be reformed to conform to the church’s doctrine. Hinlicky calls for 
‘better science” about homosexuality. “If one maintains theologically that 
homophile desire is disordered,” he writes, “I do not see how one can avoid 
difficult explorations into the sexual abuse or emotional neglect of chil-
dren by parents and other adult figures that positively correlates with adult 
homosexual identity.”110 And here we see the real danger (to philosophy and 
to theology) in Hinlicky’s proposal to base philosophy (such as natural phi-
losophy, that is, natural science) on faith.
Surely one should be concerned about the effects of sexual abuse on 
children regardless of one’s theology. Surely one’s theology should not deter-
mine the outcome of scientific research. Surely rather, contra Hinlicky, 
scientific research can help the church understand human nature. In the 
case at hand, surely it is a biological question, not a theological one, whether 
homosexuality is a condition occurring naturally, and it is a sociological 
question whether legal recognition and protection of homosexual marriage 
and family life would conduce to better, more stable communities and 
greater overall flourishing or not. And surely the theologian should base her 
own consideration of what is ‘natural’ in part on such data. And surely the 
church’s teaching about marriage and family life should reflect our changing 
understanding of what is ‘natural.’
 
Summary and Conclusion
Hinlicky is right to point out that the fides et ratio problem has always been 
vexing for Lutherans, and that the need to answer questions posed by our 
setting is more urgent than ever in a post-Kantian, postmodern, post-Chris-
tendom era. Unfortunately, Hinlicky moves toward a divinated theology 
and a view of philosophy as glorified by its subjection to this theology. Hin-
licky’s understanding of theology and philosophy would prevent the church 
from reforming its doctrine in conformity with Christ as it did with Luther, 
it would prevent the church from putting the best products of natural and 
moral philosophy to work in the service of doctrine as it did with Mel-
anchthon, and it claims that the theologian has the right, the duty, and the 
ability to delve beyond scripture into the mysteries of God’s will, as well as 
into the very mysteries of human nature, contrary to Luther. It is hard to see 
how one wishing to remain “in the tradition of Luther” could walk down 
such a road, or how it could be regarded as anything but a theology of glory. 
In the works under review here, Hinlicky falls prey to the very danger 
he seeks to save “theology in the tradition of Luther” from. To use a term 
from Richard Rorty, the danger is that of Philosophy overcoming and con-
suming Christian theology. Rorty distinguished Philosophy (with a “P”) from 
philosophy (with a “p”) by suggesting that whereas the former, Philosophy in 
the Platonic tradition, claims in effect to have “the right, duty, and access” 
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to metaphysical truth by way of human faculty capable of attaining it, the 
latter is merely the pragmatic, fallible pursuit of beliefs about the world and 
human life in it, which beliefs are justified by their ability to help humans 
navigate the world in ways conducive to human flourishing, and which are 
always revisable in the face of evidence that there are better ways available of 
conceiving of things.111    
If Gerrish and others are right, the reformers said ‘No!’ to Philosophy, 
‘Yes!’ to philosophy, and they did theology in accord with this ‘no’ and ‘yes.’ 
Hinlicky on the other hand seems to regard Philosophy, with its bedazzling 
claims to be able to penetrate the mysteries of reality, as a powerful and 
frightening beast which must be captured and domesticated in service to 
theology. In Heidelberg, Luther in effect proclaimed that the Scholastics had 
failed to tame this beast and that instead their theology had been consumed 
by it. As Hinlicky himself points out throughout Paths, Lutherans since the 
Reformation have suffered the same fate. And yet in Substance, Paths, and 
Beloved one sees in Hinlicky yet another brilliant theologian on the verge 
of being consumed in the process of striving to tie a bell around the beast’s 
neck. 
Luther himself appears to have related fides et ratio in a different way. 
The starting point along his road was to acknowledge that like a fire-breath-
ing dragon (big “P”) Philosophy is a scary beast, but also to acknowledge 
that, like such a dragon, Philosophy is a beast of fiction. But could Luther’s 
and Melanchthon’s rhetorically-based, philosophically skeptical, humanistic, 
utilitarian small “p” view of philosophy and its relation to theology provide 
contemporary Christianity – Lutheranism in particular – a way through the 
wilderness of our post-Christian, postmodern environments? We may have 
no other choice but to find out. But we cannot say for certain as long as it 
remains a path not taken.
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Heritage and Hate: Definitions of 
Nostalgia and the Confederate Flag at 
Gettysburg Seminary
Martin Otto Zimmann
For every Southern boy fourteen years old, not once but whenever he 
wants it, there is the instant when it’s still not yet two o’clock on that 
July afternoon in 1863, the brigades are in position behind the rail 
fence, the guns are laid and ready in the woods and the furled flags are 
already loosened to break out and Pickett himself with his long oiled 
ringlets and his hat in one hand probably and his sword in the other 
looking up the hill waiting for Longstreet to give the word and it’s all 
in the balance, it hasn’t happened yet, it hasn’t even begun yet, it not 
only hasn’t begun yet but there is still time for it not to begin against 
that position and those circumstances which made more men than 
Garnett and Kemper and Armistead and Wilcox look grave yet it’s 
going to begin, we all know that, we have come too far with too much 
at stake and that moment doesn’t need even a fourteen-year-old boy 
to think This time. Maybe this time with all this much to lose than 
all this much to gain: Pennsylvania, Maryland, the world, the golden 
dome of Washington itself to crown with desperate and unbelievable 
victory the desperate gamble, the cast made two years ago. (William 
Faulkner)1
By the time I visited those battlefields, I knew that they had been 
retrofitted as the staging ground for a great deception, and this was my 
only security, because they could no longer insult me by lying to me. 
I knew – and the most important thing I knew was that, somewhere 
deep within them, they knew it too. (Ta-Nehisi Coates)2
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Such is the power of nostalgia to realign memory and historical narrative for 
commodification purposes.
Nostalgia’s ability to keep Gettysburg among the top tourist des-
tinations in the world deserves a nuanced reading, as it helps us better 
understand how it came to be that the Seminary administration ended up 
banning the presence of the Confederate flag on campus. I contend that 
there are four forms of nostalgia in tension with one another in this place: 
restorative, imperial, solas-, and reflective. Together they forge a bricolage of 
memories that compete to control the historical narrative not only on the 
Seminary campus but the narrative of the Civil War itself. 
Harvard professor Svetlana Boym carefully parses the contrasts between 
restorative and reflective nostalgia in her germinal work The Future of 
Nostalgia. This article will later deal at length with the notion of reflective 
nostalgia as a means for placing the Confederate flag in a proper historical 
context (i.e.: a museum). What follows in this section is a contextual defi-
nition of solastalgia, restorative nostalgia, and imperialist nostalgia which 
helps us better understand why the meaning of the flag is still contested in 
this postmodern era.
Restorative nostalgia is the realm of the seemingly victimized; those 
who feel they have wrongfully suffered at the hands of convoluted and 
tyrannical plots to destroy the fabric of their social order. Boym cites The 
Protocols of the Elders of Zion, that late nineteenth-century forgery of a Zion-
ist plot to control global finances, as the perfect example of the fruit that 
restorative nostalgia bears.3 
As it relates to the Gettysburg historical narrative and the Civil War 
memory in general, one must recognize that historical revisionists have 
actively employed restorative nostalgia as the means by which they exonerate 
and sanctify CSA icons such as Robert E. Lee, Jefferson Davis, or Stonewall 
Jackson, despite their treasonous actions toward these United States. Fur-
thermore, restorative nostalgics wrench the underlying cause of secession 
and rebellion from its properly understood place of white supremacy and 
the right to enslave blacks to the notion of state sovereignty over federal 
rule. This, coupled with the indignities that defeated Southerners suffered 
during the turbulent years of Reconstruction and the establishment of citi-
zenship for four million freed people of color, gave birth to the Lost Cause 
mythology that is so pervasive in the popular memory of the Civil War 
today. Like Lee and Jackson, the Lost Cause rhetoric has (over time) ele-
vated the place of the Confederate flag to iconic status, making it a talisman 
for all that the mythology of antebellum civility entails. There was a time 
immediately following the war that the presence of a CSA flag of any stripe 
The intersection of ecclesia and history once again arrives at the back 
door of the Old Dorm on Seminary Ridge. The recent racially-charged 
events, culminating in the horrific attack on a Bible Study group at Mother 
Emmanuel Church in Charleston in June of this past Summer urgently 
reminds those who wrestle with conscience to revisit the unfinished work 
of healing and reconciliation between black and white folks in this nation. 
Systemic racism and white privilege enable people who self-identify as white 
to opt out of confronting the unfinished business of the Civil War, but 
because conversations about gun control are frustrating and polarizing, the 
social advocacy networks focused on the removal of the Confederate flag 
from public lands as a cause célèbre around which to rally. Reactions from 
the defenders of the flag were predictable; echoes of “heritage, not hate” still 
resound in the public forum. 
It would have been easy for President Cooper-White and the admin-
istration to write off the presence of the Confederate flag on the Seminary 
campus as a historical chestnut adding to the charm and lore of Gettysburg 
as a national shrine, but instead they decided to ban public display of the 
flag despite the possible repercussions against the institution and the Semi-
nary Ridge Museum which resides in Old Dorm.
That the administration of the ELCA’s oldest seminary had to make 
this decision at all raises serious questions about the historiography of the 
Civil War narrative, the Lost Cause, and the re-enactors whose tents cluster 
around campus buildings from time to time. How did we get here? Why is 
banning the flag from this campus an appropriate (if not entirely propor-
tional) response to the racial terrorism in Charleston and elsewhere? What 
other measures must we as a campus and a church take to prevent more vio-
lence under the banner of racism? The re-intersection of ecclesia and history 
at the threshold of Old Dorm provides an opportunity for dialogue and, 
hopefully, for progress in our common discourse.
The Power of Nostalgia and Identity
To say that nostalgia is a commodity in Gettysburg would be an egregious 
understatement. Entrepreneurs use every possible means to extract revenue 
from this physical and rhetorical landscape. “Pickett’s Buffet,” a local restau-
rant at the end of Steinwehr Avenue is perhaps the most tactless example, 
having been built adjacent to the left flank of that disastrous charge by 
11,000 CSA troops in 1863. Now, busloads of tourists dine in air-condi-
tioned comfort from an array of comfort foods that would make Paula Deen 
blush, ironically oblivious of the blood-rusted soil beneath the building. 
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sentimentality, but that is not a rationale for the heinous practices their 
ancestors defended.
It is this restorative nostalgic’s rationale of victimization and conspiracy 
that gives voice to those who speak in opposition to the Seminary’s decision 
to ban the presence of the flag on campus. This same distrustful thinking 
was the raison d’être uttered by Dylann Roof before he opened fire: “I have 
to do it. You rape our women and you’re taking over our country. And you 
have to go.”6 
In an oddly similar vein, those Civil War buffs who align themselves 
with the Northern memory or historical discourse often unwittingly aid 
and abet the politics of Southern restorative nostalgia through their sense 
of imperialist nostalgia, a term coined by American cultural anthropologist, 
Renato Rosaldo. In their narrative of the war, Union re-enactors long for 
the romanticized tableaus of the battlefield and the ennobled enemy whose 
cause was obliterated by the sheer numbers and strength of the industrial-
ized North. Rosaldo illustrates how this wishful thinking belies the horror of 
war: “The peculiarity of their yearning, of course, is that agents of colonial-
ism long for the very forms of life they intentionally altered or destroyed…. 
When the so-called civilizing process destabilizes forms of life, the agents of 
change experience transformations of other cultures as if they were personal 
losses.”7 Anyone who has any sense of sorrow regarding the end of the ante-
bellum mythos which is inclusive of this nation’s history of exploiting and 
subjugating bodies of color for the good of the white patriarchal ideal is an 
unwitting adherent of imperialist nostalgia. As historian David Blight con-
tends in the April 8 edition of The Atlantic, the military occupation of the 
south following the war fits well with the parameters of colonial thinking 
and acting.8 The Union destroyed the Southern rebellion, but they quickly 
elevated their defeated enemy to legendary status even as they colonized  
the South through the military occupation that enforced the tenets  
of Reconstruction.
Recently, the property north of the Seminary campus, commonly 
known as Larson’s Quality Inn, was sold to the Civil War Trust, a non-profit 
organization that works to recover and restore Civil War battlefields to their 
war-time appearance. Their intentions are to raze the hotel surrounding the 
Thompson house (the site of General Lee’s field headquarters subsequent 
to the CSA occupation of the town in the late afternoon of July 1, 1863). 
The CWT contends that the site of Lee’s headquarters on the battlefield is 
despoiled by virtue of the surrounding hotel and adjacent restaurant facili-
ties. Their desire is to remove all the post-war edifications in order to restore 
the land to its pristine condition circa 1863. As of this writing, the CWT’s 
efforts are being hamstrung by Gettysburg Borough government officials 
would have been forbidden in Gettysburg. Agents of restorative nostalgia 
have successfully re-introduced the flag as a battlefield totem, regardless of 
how its presence dishonors the sacrifice of Union soldiers buried here. 
Restorative nostalgia is the impetus by which men and women rec-
reationally don woolen clothing of the Civil War era to encamp in the 
Gettysburg summer heat and humidity, ostensibly  in order to reclaim and 
honor their heritage. They trumpet the notion of re-creating an antebellum 
atmosphere in their encampments, yearning for a gentility and Dixie civility 
that no longer exists, belying the painful truth that this aura was only possi-
ble as the result of the repeated rape, torture, and murder perpetrated upon 
millions of black bodies in the vast agricultural complex that was the sugar-
cane and cotton trade of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It bears 
repeating that Northern industrialists also benefitted economically from this 
structure of brutalization and subjugation, as is thoroughly documented in 
Edward Baptist’s The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the Making of 
American Capitalism. To wit, the strength of our current economic status in 
the world had its nascent ascendency in the exploitation of black bodies on 
lands stolen from red bodies.
Restorative nostalgia is the modus operandi by which a small yet vocal 
group of Dixie apologists seek to divert the common discourse away from 
the collective sin of slavery and into the realm of their own victimization. 
The Confederate flag, for them, becomes a symbol of the Lost Cause, not 
a symbol of white supremacy and hatred. Their mental gymnastics make it 
possible to distill the essence of the flag qua flag into a perfect icon of Mar-
garet Mitchell-esque sentimentality (many slaves enjoyed being slaves, they 
earnestly claim).4 
Boym contends that this destructive and misleading form of nostalgia 
provides fuel for conspiracy and the desire to return to a “lost home”:
Ambivalence, the complexity of history and the specificity of modern 
circumstances is thus erased, and modern history is seen as a fulfillment 
of ancient prophecy. “Home”, imagine extremist conspiracy theory 
adherents, is forever under siege, requiring defense against the plotting 
enemy…. Conspiracy is used pejoratively, to designate a subversive kin-
ship of others, an imagined community based on exclusion more than 
affection, a union of those who are not with us, but against us.5
Yes, the Union soldiers fought a long a bloody war which decimated 
Southern resources and destroyed millions of improved acres. Gen-
eral Sherman’s march to the sea is a wound yet visible on the landscape 
between Atlanta and Savannah. One can understand a sense of Southern 
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Reflective Nostalgia and the Seminary Policy on the  
Confederate Flag
Reflective nostalgia does not stand in opposition to, but rather envelopes 
the other forms of nostalgia that shape historical narrative relative to the 
Seminary campus. Beloved of postmodern thought, it recognizes the danger 
of dichotomies and absolutes. It cautions against the adoption of a particu-
lar narrative. It encourages critical thinking at a personal and collective level. 
It recognizes the seeming paradox of being simultaneously homesick and 
sick of home. “Cultural myths then,” Boym asserts, “are not lies but rather 
shared assumptions that help to naturalize history and makes it livable, pro-
viding the daily glue of common intelligibility.”12 It is this “daily glue” that 
recognizes the validity of the “heritage not hate” claim being made by those 
who wish to display the flag, but also concludes that the need for solidarity 
with the suffering and disenfranchised members of society takes precedent 
over other forms of memory. The flag is not simply heritage nor is it simply 
hate. It is both. Reflective nostalgia places it properly in a multi-faceted 
symbolic context. Reflective nostalgia was the arena in which seminary  
officials decided to act against the display of this symbol for the best  
possible reasons.
The horrific act of domestic terror in Charleston perpetrated against 
members of Mother Emanuel Church constituted a tipping point for the 
Seminary administration in terms of being public and vocal about its policy. 
President Cooper-White, in a July 3 Op-Ed column sharing the rationale 
for banning the public display of the flag, refers to Bishop Helmut Frenz, 
recipient of the 1975 United Nations Nansen award for his work among 
persecuted Chileans under Pinochet. He quotes Frenz as saying, “I try to 
identify myself with those who are suffering in our world for I find that in 
giving myself to them I encounter Christ the Lord.”13 Cooper-White lifts 
up this example as the framework through which he and members of the 
administration arrived at the decision to ban the presence of the Confed-
erate flag, noting that regardless of the intentions of those who engage in 
living history, the optics of the flag’s presence on the Seminary campus cause 
further pain to those who need our compassion and solidarity. 
It should be noted that the policy to ban the display of the flag was not 
a knee-jerk response to the events of Charleston. In 2011, the Seminary 
reversed a policy that had previously banned historical encampments on the 
campus. This was done in anticipation of the large numbers of visitors that 
were expected in the area during the 2013 anniversary of the battle. Some 
of the ensuing encampments of re-enactors displayed the Confederate flag; 
seminary students and administrators took notice and concern. In 2014, 
people who self-identified as members of the Ku Klux Klan applied for and 
and the Gettysburg Historic Architectural Review Board who are concerned 
over the future loss of tax revenue and the destruction of arguably histori-
cally significant buildings on the site built after the battle.9
I am not accusing the Civil War Trust of sympathizing with a white 
supremacist casus belli, but their desire to alter and restore the physical 
landscape adjacent to the Seminary landscape fits within the parameters of 
solastalgia, which in turn will support the Lost Cause mythology and also 
the argument against the Seminary’s decision to cease public displays of the 
flag on the campus. 
Solastalgia, a neologism coined by Professor Glenn Albrecht of Mur-
doch University in Western Australia, is used to describe the acute sense 
of loss or distress that occurs when one’s connection to a particular envi-
ronment is irrevocably truncated by its destruction or alteration.10 The 
Thompson property is inextricably entwined with the Lee narrative in and 
around Gettysburg, and as such becomes a Lost Cause shrine. Whether 
the Civil War Trust is using solastalgia as a pretext for contributing to the 
Lost Cause mythology is, admittedly, a matter of speculation, but it will 
undoubtedly become an even more prevalent shrine of Dixie sympathizers 
mere yards from the Seminary campus. 
Whether by accident or design, the effects of restorative and imperialist 
nostalgia coupled with solastalgia in a locale such as Gettysburg are more 
than enough to give people courage to sustain a countervailing narrative to 
the original meaning behind the Confederate flag. Attempts to co-opt and 
replace the flag’s meaning with a narrative of heritage is tantamount to say-
ing the lynching noose is only a symbol of Southern agriculture. Ta-Nehisi 
Coates does not equivocate in his June 22 article in The Atlantic, stating:
The Confederate flag should not come down because it is offensive to 
African Americans. The Confederate flag should come down because 
it is embarrassing to all Americans. The embarrassment is not lim-
ited to the flag, itself. The fact that it still flies, that one must debate 
its meaning in 2015, reflects an incredible ignorance. A century and 
a half after Lincoln was killed, after 750,000 of our ancestors died, 
Americans still aren’t quite sure why.11
In the case of the aforementioned forms of nostalgia and their effects 
on historical discourse, one can possibly understand why Americans are still 
negotiating the meaning of the flag in its historical sense. I also understand 
why, from the vantage point in my living room in North Hall, I sometimes see 
re-enactors in Southern garb standing outside the Thompson house, as if they 
expect Robert E. Lee to part the curtains and give them a grandfatherly wave.
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as the common landmarks of everyday life. They constitute shared social 
frameworks of individual recollections. They are folds in the fan of memory, 
not prescriptions for a model tale.”16 It is within this context that the  
Seminary administration is given the task of stewarding the “folds in the  
fan” in order that the public persona of the institution is a rightful elucida-
tion of the moral precepts in keeping with the theology of the cross. As 
Cooper-White writes,
As we approached the days in which many were coming to Gettysburg 
to reenact the great events that caused so much suffering a century and 
a half ago, my colleagues and I who bear responsibility to steward the 
hallowed grounds on Seminary Ridge determined we could no longer 
allow public display on our campus of Confederate flag versions that 
have been used as a form of “hate speech” by various groups. While 
meanings differ among various groups in our society, these symbols’ 
impact among most African Americans in particular is overwhelm-
ingly negative. To allow their public display in the aftermath of the 
Charleston murders would signal gross insensitivity and a lack of 
empathy for the families of those gunned down, for our own students, 
staff and alumni of color, and for millions of our fellow citizens. In a 
time when those wearied by the ongoing wars of racism are groping 
for signs of hope, it’s time to take down symbols that wound rather 
than heal. 
The Seminary administration are stewards of the campus. Moreover, 
they are stewards of the historical discourse emanating from the campus. As 
such, the establishment of the Seminary Ridge Museum in 2013 is a long 
overdue effort to show how Old Dorm was used both as a hospital and a 
place where the exchange of ideas fomented a yearning to understand the 
moral and ethical implications of human bondage on this continent. The 
building has been retrofitted with 20,000 square feet of interactive displays 
and is home to “Citizens at Crossroads,” a dramatic presentation that pro-
vokes thought and conversation by audience participants.17 
The stated purpose of the museum is to challenge the assumptive nar-
rative of the romanticized Battle of Gettysburg and replace it with a more 
nuanced narrative revealing the horrific consequences of slavery, war, and 
the unfinished business of reconciliation in our national conversations about 
race and ethnicity. By experiencing the permanent exhibit, one can have a 
better understanding of the intersection between faith and history. 
The average non-battlefield park-affiliated tourist stop in Gettysburg 
does not invoke reflective nostalgia. Sadly, tourism in Gettysburg runs the 
received a permit from the National Park Service to have a public rally on 
the battlefield near Meade’s headquarters on June 29, 2014.14 Subsequent 
displays by encampments were met by growing apprehension from students 
and faculty; the administration enacted a flag-banning policy in the Fall 
of that year. This Summer’s public reiteration of the policy following the 
Charleston murders was an appropriate gesture of solidarity with those in 
mourning.
In terms of nostalgia, the decision to ban the flag is an exercise of the 
reflective variety, imbued with religious and white racial melancholia – those 
affective valences which permeate the structure of largely homogenous faith-
based organizations. To acknowledge the presence of the flag on the campus 
as problematic also speaks to the unseen presence of the systemic racism 
that created and sustains an overwhelmingly patriarchal white institution 
within a majority white Christian denomination.15 In essence, banning the 
presence of the flag is necessary because the homogeneity on the campus 
and the organization with which it is affiliated could possibly be perceived 
by outsiders as a deliberate act on the part of its constituency – a tacit if not 
overt endorsement of the worst possible interpretation of the flag’s meaning. 
By banning the flag, the Seminary administration is being not only appro-
priately reflective, but also prophetic. 
This seminary campus is a nexus of nostalgias. For many, it is the place 
where they answered God’s vocatio, giving them a sense of meaning and pur-
pose within the context of a theological education. For most, it is the place 
where the crucial moments of the first day’s fight between Union and Con-
federate soldiers determined the eventual outcome of the Civil War. These 
overlapping nostalgias exist in tandem and in tension. It is a very Lutheran 
understanding – the two kingdoms coexisting on the same ground, issu-
ing different yet eerily connected demands on the individual and collective 
memories of those who choose to ponder it. 
The reflective nostalgic recognizes these multiple contexts and seeks to 
understand the multivalent outcomes of historical and narrative discourse. 
While those living history re-enactors wish to display the flag as a means of 
accentuating historical accuracy, they must recognize that this symbol is also 
a weapon in the arsenal of active racists who seek to reify an overt and pub-
lic white supremacy the likes of which gave us slavery, the Black Codes, Jim 
Crow, and Dylann Roof. One hopes that Confederate re-enactors can not 
only accept the Seminary’s new policy with understanding, but also exercise 
prudence and sensitivity if and when they choose to display the flag in  
any locale. 
Memory of this kind is not personal. Rather, it is subject to a public 
interpretation, as Boym contends, “Collective memory will be understood … 
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students, visitors, and families who have spent time on the ridge form the 
narrative of the seminary campus body. The emotional valence felt by any-
one who spends time on this hallowed ground is an inscription upon the 
campus corpus. It is a living and ongoing history, replete with narratives of 
Samuel Simon Schmucker, those of the graduating members of the class 
of 2015, and everyone in between. This body also bears the scars of battle 
– extant buildings are pockmarked. The ground contains fragments of pro-
jectiles and bones, similar to the bodies of wounded veterans. The museum’s 
halls are haunted by echoes of broken men, sparked in the imagination 
by the startling tableaux in its rooms. This ground compels the Seminary 
students, faculty, and staff to reflect and bear witness to the suffering and 
resilience of humanity. In order to do so properly, one must proceed with 
utmost caution and sensitivity. 
As Michael Cooper-White has rightfully lifted up Bishop Frenz as a 
model for compassion, we must carefully deconstruct the meaning of Frenz’s 
statement wherein he strives to “identify with those who are suffering” in 
order to find a Christological response to this world’s warring madness. 
Like Frenz, most of us associated with the current main embodiment of the 
Lutheran Church in America (the ELCA) and this seminary operate from a 
place of privilege within the confines of a postcolonial/postmodern context. 
Many of us passively accept the white supremacist patriarchy from which 
we have benefitted in myriad ways without even knowing it. Most of us do 
not spend much time thinking about our status as a largely homogenous 
denomination or the reasons why.
While Bishop Frenz raises the bar for Christians seeking to be in soli-
darity with the suffering, I would caution against those who interpret the 
words “identify with” as an attempt on anyone’s part to dis-identify with 
one’s own narrative in order to gain the authentic experience of the disen-
franchised. From the place of white privilege, it cannot be done. We can 
show solidarity and acts of empathy. We can advocate for peace with justice 
and immerse ourselves in accounts of the oppressed. The painful caveat is 
this: we who are beneficiaries of white patriarchal hegemony in this culture 
can never truly identify with the suffering. We can only hope to be present 
with them in their suffering and work to end their suffering (by speaking 
and acting from our place of power), as I believe the life and witness of 
Bishop Frenz among the people of Chile testifies.
I would hasten to add that the Museum’s effort to lift the history out of 
the archive and place it in our contemporary social consciousness is laud-
able yet imperfect by virtue of reflective nostalgia’s definition. This is to say, 
no matter how well we prepare to identify with historical soldier’s bodies, 
or black bodies, or the corporate body of the seminary campus, we cannot 
banal gamut of ghost tours (also banned on the Seminary campus) to winer-
ies that tip the hat in the direction of the nineteenth century. Boym levels 
harsh criticism at this form of historical commodification: “This is an Amer-
ican way of dealing with the past – to turn history into a bunch of amusing 
and readily available souvenirs, devoid of politics. More provocative would 
be to refer to the emblems of the divided past, especially imagery of segrega-
tion.”18 Rather than giving in to the temptation of commodifying history 
for the sake of gain, the museum experience provides space for introspection 
and growth. The exhibit’s narrative challenges visitors to think about the 
unfinished business of reconciliation. 
The Seminary Ridge Museum is a member of the International Coali-
tion of Sites of Conscience, whose members include America’s Black 
Holocaust Museum, Syrians Without Borders, and the Centro Nacional de 
Memoria Histórica, to name just a few. The organization leadership defines 
itself as such: “We are sites, individuals, and initiatives activating the power 
of places of memory to engage the public in connecting past and present in 
order to envision and shape a more just and humane future.”19
Yes, the museum does have representations of the Confederate flag vis-
ible in its permanent exhibit, perhaps most noticeable in the Dale Gallon 
murals. This placement is not an endorsement of political ideology, but 
rather the proper historical context by which people can learn about the 
complexities of our past and present racial discourse in America. In similar 
fashion America’s Black Holocaust Museum displays photos of lynchings, 
the Syrian Oral History Project illustrates the horrors of chemical warfare, 
and the Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica preserves the narratives 
of victims in the Columbian armed conflict despite the graphic brutali-
ties contained therein. These displays are not endorsements, but needful 
reminders of the dreadful acts of which humanity is capable in order that 
we as a species might better ourselves and move beyond violence into a new 
and better paradigm of peaceful and just coexistence. Within the realm 
of reflective nostalgia, symbols of hate are transformed into warnings for 
future generations.
Hoc est Corpus
From a theological standpoint, we are reminded that all members of the 
church do not exist in isolation but are interconnected through the claim 
that baptism has upon us. We are the body of Christ in all times and places. 
Those people whose lives were irrevocably changed through their time 
on the Seminary campus, whether through matriculation or warfare, also 
share an inter-connectedness. Together, the collective memories of soldiers, 
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accompanying issues of mediation, puts her in a position to trade on 
her experience in a manner that authorizes her as the best person to 
speak about slavery.21
No amount of orientation, even with caveats, can elevate a present-day 
body to the value of Mary Prince’s narrative. Our efforts to comprehend 
Prince’s experience via our hearing or reading of a text falls short as well. 
Similarly, removing the Confederate flag from the campus corpus is a com-
mendable action, but this alone fails to place us in true identification with 
the collective experience of those who died on this ridge during the battle, 
or people of color who suffer pain at the sight of this racist symbol. 
At the memorial service for the Reverend Clementa Pinckney (a 
graduate of a sister ELCA seminary), President Barack Obama spoke 
prophetically about the removal of the Confederate flag from the South 
Carolina Capitol grounds. Those remarks bear repeating, as they are appli-
cable to this moment in the Seminary’s collective narrative:
By taking down that flag, we express God’s grace. But I don’t think 
God wants us to stop there. For too long, we’ve been blind to the 
way past injustices continue to shape the present. Perhaps we see that 
now. Perhaps this tragedy causes us to ask some tough questions about 
how we can permit so many of our children to languish in poverty, or 
attend dilapidated schools, or grow up without prospects for a job or 
for a career. Perhaps it causes us to examine what we’re doing to cause 
some of our children to hate. Perhaps it softens hearts towards those 
lost young men, tens and tens of thousands caught up in the criminal 
justice system and leads us to make sure that that system is not in-
fected with bias; that we embrace changes in how we train and equip 
our police so that the bonds of trust between law enforcement and the 
communities they serve make us all safer and more secure.22
In these remarks, the President issues a challenge to move beyond 
banning the flag and re-shaping our cultural narrative in order to abandon 
the romantic and mythological notions of history. This moment calls for 
the Seminary to redouble efforts to raise awareness of privilege and sys-
temic racism. Courses on ethnic and gender awareness and sensitivity can 
be added to the curriculum. Worship practices can continue to celebrate 
and lift up diversity and prophetic witness of the marginalized. Most 
importantly, the Seminary can propose a benchmark for diversity within 
the ranks of the faculty and the student body, setting a precedent for 
this denomination. These are not sui generis challenges or ideas, but the 
accurately imbibe the abject feelings of terror and agony that warfare, slav-
ery, or the emotional valence of a landscape entail. At best we can only have 
a momentary encounter with something akin to the anxiety felt by the orig-
inal bodies, but then resume our daily lives once the momentary suspension 
of disbelief is over. Nostalgia is always longing for that which never can be 
realized, not that which is objectively true. 
Some would argue that this sort of logic is reductionist and that it is 
better to attempt solidarity via melancholia in its various permutations than 
simply shrugging off the burden of history and blithely consuming our way 
through the “Gettysburg experience.” However, we cannot ask people to 
identify with historical bodies and not prepare to be disappointed by their 
own cognitive dissonance. The body cannot possibly replace the archive or 
become a totally accurate “site of knowledge production” because it cannot 
know what a soldier, a slave, or the seminary corpus experienced over time. 
One could argue that nothing in the archive or repertoire could pos-
sibly achieve this sense of gnosis in the site of production. This is a given. 
Perhaps it is the immersion of one’s self into the physical presence of the 
campus or the museum that evokes more than a reading of W.E.B. DuBois 
or a viewing of Twelve Years a Slave. When a person attempts to identify 
with the narrative of the subjugated other, certain assumptions are made – 
this is what it might have felt like. This is how a wounded soldier felt. This is 
how the slaves made their way north. This is the experience of hallowed ground. 
Such assumptions are erroneous and do a disservice to the memory of the 
suffering. Grief is appropriate. Reverence and respect emanate from the bet-
ter angels of our nature.
If we are to be in solidarity with the suffering of those past and present, 
then preparation must take place with some fundamental caveats in orienta-
tion, namely, by stating that imagined experience is a shallow facsimile of 
the horrific reality. We can never hope to achieve the authenticity of what 
African American Studies Professor Dwight McBride describes as former 
slave Mary Prince’s “politics of experience,” or author Ta-Nehisi Coates’ ter-
ror while being pulled over by the police in Prince Georges County.20 Our 
attempts at dis-identification cannot hold currency with the actual narrative 
or martyria of one who lived the experience. McBride references Karl Marx’s 
discussion of commodity fetishism in order to further elucidate these con-
trasting accounts of the living bodies superimposed as the racial other versus 
the actual accounts of former slaves such as Mary Prince:
Marx’s remarks are useful in accounting for the “value” of Prince’s real 
slave experience, represented by the “social hieroglyphic” that is her 
narrative. Prince’s very awareness of the process of witnessing, with its 
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segregation among churches that plagues us even still. We can no longer be 
complacent or complicit in the disenfranchisement of those who are dis-
proportionately prosecuted under the law by virtue of skin color and gross 
assumptions. We must move beyond fragility and fear into tentative steps  
of dialogue, reparation, and reconciliation, for this is the will of God in 
Christ Jesus. 
We will know we have arrived at that place of healing and wholeness 
when the Faulkner quote of Southern yearning will be a relic of an archaic 
culture. We will know that the church is unified under a banner of complete 
racial inclusivity when people of color like Ta-Nehisi Coates can visit this 
campus and the surrounding battlefield and no longer feel insulted by the 
occlusion of truth by a romanticized notion of a just Southern cause for self-
determination. Rather, the narrative of the battlefield will show that Union 
soldiers fought and died here to truncate the Southern narrative of white 
supremacy and violence perpetrated on black bodies. This campus, museum, 
chapel, and classrooms bear witness to the truth. Banning the Confederate 
flag is the first step – an expression of God’s grace. But as President Obama 
rightly prophesied, God does not want us to stop there. 
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O Taste and See that God is Good
Michael Allwein
This noteworthy homily was offered by Pastor Michael Allwein at the memorial 
service for Salud Galapia Nieting, widow of the late Professor of Old Testa-
ment, Lorenz Nieting on May 9, 2015. Texts for the memorial service, which 
took place at St. James Lutheran Church in Gettysburg, included 2 Corinthians 
4:1-7 and John 3:14-21, but Salud’s wishes were for her pastor to preach on a 
single text, Psalm 34:8. 
Thirteen days before Salud Nieting died on December 28, 2014, I sat with 
her for lunch. We sat together at that small table in front of the windows 
over-looking her yard, the table so many of you may have sat at for a meal, 
or actually, more often that table was filled with food, for larger meals she 
was having at her home.
The main reason we were having lunch together that day was to discuss 
her funeral service. Basically, everything we are doing here today is what she 
had written on the papers I walked out of her house with that day. She was 
clear. She was resolute. She was determined, and one of the very last things 
she said to me before I left her home that day was this: “Don’t allow my 
funeral to turn into a circus!” And I knew what she meant: “no people getting 
up and saying all kinds of nice things about her. I want a worship service,” she 
said, “not a circus!”
Of course, she had written down clear music selections and specific 
scripture readings; but she also included what she called “the sermon text,” 
the scripture from which I “must” preach this morning. And so, the “sermon 
text” for today is this: Psalm 34, verse 8. Here is the one verse: “O taste and 
see that God is good; happy are those who take refuge in God.”
So this morning, I will entrust you with the Corinthians text, to bask 
in the image of God’s mercy we carry within us as a treasure in clay jars, all 
because of God’s love. 
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We also need to know that God does not love us because we are good. 
God loves us because God is good. Let’s taste God’s goodness together 
today, truly knowing that nothing we do will inhibit, direct, decrease, or 
increase God’s eagerness to love. 
Finally, a final word of liturgical trivia. Every three years we use Psalm 
34 in worship on a Sunday morning … on All Saints’ Day, the day we 
remember those saints who have gone before us. I’d like to conclude my 
message with a prayer we use on that same All Saints’ Day. The prayer is this: 
Almighty God, you have knit your people together in one communion in the 
mystical body of your Son, Jesus Christ … grant us the grace to follow your 
blessed saints in lives of faith and commitment … grant us the grace to follow 
your blessed saints in lives of faith and commitment. … 
I think I hear an invitation! Amen.
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model of spiritual direction training through Oasis Ministries for Spiritual Development. 
And I likewise entrust you with the Gospel text, which includes the 
profound John 3:16 verse, “For God so loved the world that he gave his only 
Son, so that everyone who lives in him may not perish but may have eternal life” 
[John 3:16].
So … a word about Psalm 34. It is a psalm of thanksgiving to God for 
God’s protection at times of illness and other dangers. Perhaps we are hear-
ing the ultimate word of hope to those who are in need, trusting God to be 
there, especially in oppressive situations.
So it is within that context that we hear verse 8: “O taste and see that 
God is good; happy are those who take refuge in God.” This one verse is simply 
jam-packed with images. The word translated as “taste” means “to try some-
thing by experiencing it.” It is almost as if the psalmist is daring the hearers 
to try God’s goodness for themselves and experience it as one would taste 
a new food. You know what it is like if someone dares you to try sushi or 
squid or those Harry Potter jelly beans with those strange flavors. 
Here, we are being dared to experience God for ourselves and to let our 
taste buds savor the goodness of God! What an exciting and thought-filled 
image!
Verse 8 then ends with the words, “Happy are those who take refuge in 
God.” “Take refuge” can also be translated “to hide oneself.” I easily picture 
my grandson who when he gets out of the bathtub, all he wants is to be 
wrapped in a big, soft towel and held close – protected, warm and loved. 
The word “happy” is found 25 times in the psalms. Sometimes, it is 
translated “blessed,” other times as “happy.” Again, the image is exciting and 
profound! Take refuge in God, allow yourself to be wrapped in God, feeling 
protected, blessed, happy, contented and loved – not only in this world but 
in the life to come! 
In this one verse from Psalm 34, what I hear is this: I hear blessing and I 
hear praise for God. But above all, I hear an invitation!  
Now I really do not know exactly why Salud picked this one tiny verse 
for today, but if I can be presumptuous, I will say because in some way it 
defined her spiritual journey. And now, I will be really presumptuous and 
suggest that it defines the spiritual journey for each one of us. 
Taking refuge in God in today’s world is fraught with danger, especially 
in a world where it can seem like utter foolishness to even sometimes believe 
that God is good. 
And if, indeed, this was Salud’s journey, might there be an invitation 
today to recognize this is our journey as well – to want to taste God in the 
very depth of our being; to wish to be wrapped, and content, and protected 
by God.  
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I am the Younger Son
Mark Oldenburg
The Rev. Dr. Mark Oldenburg preached this noteworthy sermon on the first part 
of the parable of the Prodigal Son (Luke 15:11-24) September 9, 2015, in the 
Church of the Abiding Presence, the campus chapel. It was one response to an 
ELCA wide emphasis to observe a “Day of Confession, Repentance, and Com-
mitment to End Racism,” and reflects the broader discussions of the symbols and 
manifestations of racism in the United States. 
I know, I know. That’s only half of the parable, and we’re missing the pay-off 
and punchline. But on this day we, or at least I, need to hear this half of the 
parable. It’s very easy for me to identify with the elder son – dutiful, sullen, 
and joyless. It’s very easy, then, for me to think that it’s someone else’s job to 
repent and convert, and mine simply to welcome them home. But today we 
are, or at least I am, the younger brother. 
The bishops of the African Methodist Episcopal (AME) church, echoed 
by the ELCA’s Bishop Eaton have called on worshiping communities in 
America to set aside this week for “confession, repentance, and commitment 
to end racism,” in response to the murders this summer in Charleston. That 
is not an activity I need to stand by and celebrate when others (finally) do. It 
is one I need wholly to enter into myself.
I know that I am a person of unclean lips and that I belong to a people 
of unclean lips. I am a part of many “we’s” who are guilty of racism. If I 
share in the pride at American ideals of “liberty and justice for all,” I must 
also share in the guilt when that liberty and that justice are systematically 
denied to some. If I bask in my connection with the ELCA youth who 
performed tireless service at the Gathering this summer in Detroit, then I 
also bask in my connection with Dylann Storm Roof, the ELCA youth who 
apparently committed the Charleston murders. For being part of corporate 
sin, I need to confess and repent. But wait, there’s more.
I know that, along with my delight in friends from other cultures, is a 
suspicion and fear of others as well that is all the more powerful for being 
involuntary. I know that when walking alone on the streets of my Baltimore 
neighborhood, I react differently upon seeing a white man coming toward 
me than a man of color. It doesn’t lessen my sin or my shame to know that 
that reaction is shared by almost all Americans of every race. That knowl-
edge simply gives me company; it does not make our sin any the less. And I 
know that the involuntary racism of others gives me privileges not shared by 
others. So I am called to confess and repent. But wait, there’s more.
I know that Dylann Roof spent his formative years in an ELCA con-
gregation, and I know that I did not do all that I could, as a pastor and a 
catechist, to fortify those in my charge against the demonic lures of racism, 
resentment and hate. Roof was not one of my catechumens, but he well 
might have been; I have failed others as I might have failed him. So I am 
called to repent and confess. But wait, there’s more. But you get the idea.
I am the younger son in the parable, taking my patrimony – the 
inheritance of the prodigal love of the Father, who made of one blood all 
humanity. I am the younger son, wasting that patrimony in riotous living of 
racism and sloth (I always thought riotous living would be more fun than 
this). I am the younger son.
And when disaster strikes, when the fruits of my wasting become 
mature and apparent, I (we?) come back, not demanding forgiveness as a 
right, not saying others were worse, not trusting in formulas, although I 
may use them, simply telling the truth: I have sinned against heaven and 
you, my Father; I do not deserve to be called your son. We come telling the 
truth, and hoping against hope for open arms.
And getting them.
Spoiler alert! In a few minutes we will take part in a service of confes-
sion, and that confession will include forgiveness and absolution. We will be 
welcomed back, although we do not deserve it. The ministry of Christ, the 
love of the Father, the community of the Holy Spirit cover and welcome us. 
We – even we – are reconciled with God and with one another. The One 
whose clothes at the cross were confiscated and divided among his enemies 
puts a robe around our sinking shoulders. The One who thirsted on the 
cross brings us barbecue.
And we are home.
We will be absolved, reconciled with God and with one another. 
But we can fairly predict that that absolution will not eliminate our 
involuntary prejudice. It will not erase the systemic racism that pervades our 
world, and it won’t stop us from going back into that world.
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It may, however, keep reminding us that that world, controlled by rac-
ism and all its sibling hatreds, is not our home – it is a foreign land. Our 
home is with the God who made of one blood all the nations of the earth. 
It is with the God who shows no partiality toward human divisions. We go 
into that foreign land with the values, the character, the loyalties of home. 
{It was perhaps the younger son’s most serious offense that he made himself 
at home in the foreign land and, when his neighbors needed his patrimony 
to see them through the famine, he had nothing to share with them.)
We don’t belong in that land of separation from our God. We’ve been 
claimed and re-identified, even if we forget it, even if we don’t believe it. 
In a few minutes as well, we’ll be singing the Black National Anthem, 
“Lift Every Voice and Sing.” The first time I ever sang that song was in a 
congregation on Long Island, where the only white faces in the congrega-
tion belonged to me and the pastor’s family. The congregation joined hands 
to sing the song; I was the only one in the room who needed to read the 
words, but that didn’t lessen the warmth of the congregation’s welcome and 
inclusion of me. I reveled in the experience and the words, until we came 
to the phrase, “Haven’t our weary feet come to the place for which our par-
ents sighed?” And I thought, “No! Being the only white face in the room? 
Holding hands with African Americans they didn’t even know? My parents 
worked their whole life to avoid being in this place!” And then I realized 
that I was wrong. Every time my parents affirmed the creed, and declared 
that they believed in the communion of saints, they sighed to be where I 
was. Every time they communed, they sighed to be where I was. They did 
not know it, they might have denied it if asked, but that room was for them 
a home longed for during their exile in a foreign land.
And bringing the values and character of our Father’s home into the 
foreign land in which we lead our lives is what we’re called to do. The AME 
bishops called on religious communities not simply to repent and confess, 
but to commit to end racism. Welcomed by God, we can recognize and 
fight against involuntary prejudice in ourselves and others. We can speak 
with credibility against the powers of racism as those who, but for the grace 
of God, would be in unrecognized bondage to them. 
No one whose life began in the font, dying and rising with Christ, can 
be held forever a prisoner of racism, not as a victim, and not as a perpetra-
tor. Our home and our dignity are with the God who made of one blood all 
humanity. Purified, commissioned, empowered, we venture into the strange 
and foreign land, where God is already at work setting creation free. 
And there we ask, joyfully and humbly, “How can I help?”
Mark Oldenburg is Dean of the Chapel and Steck-Miller Professor of the Art of Worship at 
Lutheran Theological Seminary at Gettysburg. He teaches in the areas of worship, spirituality, 
preaching, and history and serves as the Center for Diaconal Ministry team leader. His B.A. is 
from Gettysburg College, his M.Div. is from Lutheran Theological Seminary at Philadelphia and 
his Ph.D. is from Drew University. Oldenburg is chair of the concert series Music, Gettysburg! 
Visit www.musicgettysburg.org.
BOOK REVIEW Peaceful Neighbor: Discovering the 
Countercultural Mister Rogers
Michael L. Long (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox 
Press, 2015)
Reviewed by Kathy Vitalis Hoffman
When I taught Kindergarten in the early 80’s, my colleagues and I would 
jokingly describe our students as either a Mister Rogers kid or a Sesame 
Street kid. The Mister Rogers child would portray calmer behaviors and 
reflect the characteristics of the more soft spoken Mister Rogers. Mister 
Rogers may have been soft spoken and portrayed a kind demeanor but this 
by no means indicates that he was shallow or lacked convictions. On the 
contrary, and as Michael Long claims in his book, Peaceful Neighbor:  
Discovering the Countercultural Mister Rogers, Fred Rogers had strong beliefs 
as they relate to nonviolence and practices of peace and justice. 
Long demonstrates a thorough understanding of Fred Rogers and docu-
ments his description of him with many examples from Rogers’ program, 
Mister Rogers’ Neighborhood, as well as speeches, books, letters and sermons. 
In this portrait of Rogers, Long provides an evenhanded look at Rogers, 
shedding light on the seeming silence Rogers took on issues such as homo-
sexuality and to some degree race. Rogers was no “wild-eyed Abbie Hoffman 
during the Vietnam War” nor did he march for peace. (7) On the other 
hand, in reference to the Vietnam War and the first season of Mister Rogers’ 
Neighborhood, Long wrote that ‘in the quiet of a television studio, behind 
the staring eye of a camera, Rogers was a leading peace activist in his own 
right, intent on showing the beauty and power of peacemaking to children 
and adults mired in a war with no end in sight.” (7)
The beauty and power of peacemaking was especially evident in the 
Neighborhood of Make-Believe, and it is there, I believe, that the  
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countercultural Mister Rogers made the most impact. This Neighborhood 
of Make-Believe is an excellent example of the way followers of Jesus can 
enact peaceable behaviors that are relevant and possible in a violent culture. 
Long reminds his readers of the historical context that countered the 
neighborhood of make-believe. For example, Rogers’ program hit the 
national market in the midst of the Viet Nam War as the antiwar movement 
was growing. In February of 1968, the theme for this first week related to 
war and peace. In the Neighborhood of Make-Believe, Lady Elaine Fair-
childe causes unwanted changes to the landscape causing conflict with the 
head of Make-Believe, King Friday XIII. As the conflict grows it is refer-
enced as war and even leads to attempts to draft characters to take sides and 
use force. Fortunately Lady Aberlin introduces a plan to bring peace and 
with the help of others works to carry it out. As Long indicates, this episode 
demonstrates the effectiveness of creative strategies and how they can be 
worked into peaceful outcomes to conflict. 
Long introduces his readers to Rogers’ psychology of peace with a look 
at a week’s theme, “mad feelings.” These episodes aired in 1995 shortly after 
O.J. Simpson was found not guilty of murder. We learn from Mister Rog-
ers that it’s “okay to be angry, but it’s not okay to hurt ourselves or others.” 
(46) In the Neighborhood of Make-Believe anger is normalized through 
the characters actions so that the television audience learns the difference 
between the right and wrong ways to respond to anger. Lady Elaine is per-
suaded by her longtime friend Betty Okonak Templeton to stop her violent 
actions by returning to the activities she enjoys, which is playing music on 
steel pans and making clay sculptures. (54) An adult viewer of these epi-
sodes may not immediately recognize the countercultural  impact of this 
message. Upon further reflection, however, one may remember that most 
children’s programs follow the narrative of violence so that good wins over 
evil. The enemy is pursued and conquered. In the Neighborhood of Make-
Believe the story explores ways to function in the midst of challenges and 
feelings of anger.
Through the characters in the neighborhood of make-believe we are 
introduced to the possibility of personal transformation. Unlike Sesame 
Street’s Oscar the Grouch who stays a grouch, King Friday can be persuaded 
to change his mind and his actions. We meet the once-wild-but-now-
tamed Daniel Striped Tiger realizing that even make-believe characters have 
baggage and the potential to change. In addition, in Mister Rogers’ Neigh-
borhood, the characters are more nuanced and the good and bad are in the 
mix. Yes, we have Lady Elaine being simultaneously a saint and a sinner.
This book is worth reading for any Christian. As we claim to be follow-
ers of the Prince of Peace, we also seek ways to practice peace in our daily 
lives. A visit to the Neighborhood of Make-Believe has the potential to 
“Make what we Believe” a reality. 
Kathy Vitalis Hoffman is Senior Pastor of Zion Lutheran Church in Middletown, Maryland. 
She has served congregations in Fargo, North Dakota, Spicer, Minnesota and Gettysburg, Penn-
sylvania. Vitalis Hoffman holds an M.Div. from Luther Seminary and a D.Min. from Drew 
University. 
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Reclaiming Pietism: Retrieving an  
Evangelical Tradition 
Roger E. Olson and Christin T. Collins Winn (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2015)
Reviewed by Kelsey L. Fitting-Snyder
What is Pietism? This question has haunted me since my first semester of 
seminary because there is no good answer. What I have learned is that this 
question means different things to different people in different time periods 
throughout church history. Yet, throughout this book, Olson and Collins 
Winn argue that while Pietism has developed a negative connotation over 
the years, it would be possible by reclaiming its originally intended ethos 
and hallmarks for Pietism to have a great impact on Christian theology and 
living today.  
Olson and Collins Winn argue that within our 21st century context 
Pietism has taken on a life of its own, and over the years has been placed 
into very specific boxes described as: individualistic, introverted, emotional, 
quietist, and holier-than-thou. But Olson and Collins Winn tackle these 
misconceptions in the first chapter, “Defining and Redefining Pietism,” 
where they explore the criticisms of Albrecht Ritschl and Karl Barth. Olson 
and Collins Winn write, “Pietism is not what many people think it is,” 
claiming that the criticisms of Ritschl and Barth have driven many of the 
misconceptions of Pietism today, while the criticisms themselves actually fail 
to address Pietism’s core ethos. 
In order to understand fully how Pietism has been wrongly defined, 
Olson and Collins Winn offer its complex history in four chapters: “2. 
Pietist Backgrounds”; “3. Reforming the Reformation: Part I”; “4. Reform-
ing the Reformation: Part 2”; and, “5. A Portrait of Pietism.” Olson and 
Collins Winn offer in chapter two “precursors” and “cousins” to pietism 
noting, for example, the works of Johann Arndt, and Jakob Böhme. To gen-
eralize, these early catalysts of Pietism were craving a deeper devotion and 
relationship with God, and a more radical love of neighbor. 
One cannot talk about the history of Pietism without key players 
Philipp Jakob Spener, and August Hermann Francke. Much of the Pietism 
that Olson and Collins Winn draw from is that of Spener and Francke. They 
recount Spener’s emphasis on the “priesthood of all believers” and his work 
Pia Desideria, which they claim laid the groundwork for the key hallmarks 
of Pietism. Olson and Collins Winn then develop Francke’s understanding 
of a “true inward conversion,” outline his education work, and his work at 
Halle. One important aspect to note is that these two key figures were not 
interested in leaving the church like some of the radicals, which Olson and 
Collins Winn address in chapter four. 
One of the biggest takeaways from this middle section of historical 
development is what Olson and Collins Winn name as the “authentic hall-
marks” of Pietism that include: the embrace and acceptance of orthodox 
Protestant Christian doctrine, experiential transformative Christianity, 
conversion (the regeneration of the “inner person’), conversional piety 
(strong devotional life and personal relationship with God through Jesus 
Christ crucified and risen), visible Christianity (holy living and transformed 
character), love of the Bible, Christian life lived in community, world trans-
formation toward the kingdom of God, ecumenical, irenic Christianity, 
and the common priesthood of true believers. (85) A key aspect of these 
hallmarks is that many movements in Christianity embrace these very pil-
lars, but Olson and Collins Winn demonstrate that within Pietism these 
hallmarks are emphasized and connected to one another in distinct ways. 
To bring pietism into the 21st century Olson and Collins Winn first 
identify in chapter six, “Where Pietism flourished on New Soil,” the impact 
the movement had on Christianity in Great Britain and North America. 
They then spend time in chapter seven, “Pietism for a New Era,” describing 
the reinvention and rethinking of pietism by theologians such as Friedrich 
Schleiermacher and Søren Kierkegaard. Within the 19th century there were 
conflicting reinventions of Pietism, but Olson and Collins Winn make 
it clear that despite these conflicts, some of the key hallmarks remained. 
Chapter eight, “Contemporary Appropriations of the Pietist’s Impulse,” 
highlights the work of four theologians, Donald G. Bloesch (United Church 
of Christ, Essentials of Evangelical Theology), Richard Foster (Quaker, 
Celebration of Discipline: The Path to Spiritual Growth), Stanley J. Grenz 
(Evangelical Theologian, The Matrix of Christian Theology), and Jürgen 
Moltmann(German Reformed Theologian, Theology of Hope). While not 
all of these theologians are thought of as Pietists, what Olson and Collins 
Winn demonstrate is that the hallmarks of Pietism are present within their 
work, and thus have made an impact on contemporary Christianity.
The final argument of this book brings together the hallmarks of 
Pietism, and how they are linked with Evangelical Christianity. It is impor-
tant for Olson and Collins Winn to let the evangelical reader understand 
that part of the tradition is rooted in Pietism and it is an aspect that should 
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not be neglected and over looked. Olson and Collins Winn identify that 
Evangelical Theology is rooted in “head belief ” and “heart experience.” The 
culmination of doctrine and devotion is a hallmark of both Evangelical 
thought and Pietism, in which the “heart experience of God in Jesus Christ 
through the Holy Spirit… informs belief.” (182) As a non-evangelical 
Christian, I would argue that this book also speaks to Christianity as a 
whole. Pietism has deep roots within many Protestant traditions (as noted 
throughout the book), and by claiming that, we (non-evangelicals) open 
ourselves up to a deeper relationship with God, a deeper understanding of 
our neighbor, and ultimately a deeper understanding of what it means to be 
in ministry with one another. By recognizing its Pietist roots, Evangelical 
Christianity, and I would argue Christianity as a whole, is offered a chance 
at renewal; a strengthening of the church both spiritually and theologically. 
I would recommend this book to anyone, like myself, who is afraid of 
the word Pietism. If anything, this book offers an appreciation, and new 
understanding for what it means to be searching for an authentic Christian-
ity, which lies at the heart of Pietism.  
Kelsey Fitting-Snyder is a third year M.Div. student at Gettysburg Seminary. She is currently 
serving as Vicar at First Lutheran Church in Lincoln, Nebraska for her internship year. Fitting-
Snyder graduated from Susquehanna University in 2013 with a double major in Psychology and 
Religion. 
POETRY + THEOLOGY Up to Our Armpits 
Katy Giebenhain
In the movie theater, in the midst of the sensory-charge that is Mission: 
Impossible Rogue Nation, I couldn’t help but think of a ballet I had seen 
the week before. Two men in t-shirts and cargo pants executed a choreo-
graphed response to wounded warriors – soldiers returning from experiences 
they are not prepared to process – physically, mentally or spiritually. “Exit 
Wounds… and Then They Come Home”1 was performed by the Wash-
ington D.C.-based Chamber Dance Project. We were near the stage and 
the German next to me commented on the dancers’ Körperbeherrschung. 
The performance impressed me more than the airplane scene or the series 
of feats Tom Cruise and his colleagues pull off in the latest MI offering. It 
was live. Physically improbable yet possible. And instead of a soundtrack, a 
string quartet played pieces by Philip Glass on the edge of the stage. 
Körperbeherrschung means physical control or discipline. A Körper is a 
body. Beherrschung is control, mastery, restraint, governing. You get the pic-
ture. I did not expect to find “Exit Wounds” so effective, or contemporary 
ballet such a perfect choice to convey the theme. Another thing I did not 
expect but found utterly compelling was the company’s structured improv 
piece. Directly before curtain, the founder and artistic director Diane 
Coburn Bruning gives the dancers directions for a structured improvisa-
tion, and she hands the musicians a score they have never played together. 
Coming off of “Exit Wounds” I couldn’t help but think of the inherent 
“structured improvisation” of war, of the tension between rules and chaos, 
hierarchy and ingenuity. And despite being fresh and elegantly-fun, and 
involving more dancers and musicians (they were good sports – imagine 
playing the violin and a dancer picks up your music stand, so you have to 
follow across the stage and continue playing in the middle of the perfor-
mance), there is plenty of Körperbeherrschung going on here, too, balancing 
control with spontaneity.
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Both performances opened up the ordinary in a way that reminded me 
of strong sermons and poems. And all of this reminded me of something 
I heard at a creative writing conference, during an editorial panel on “the 
slushpile.” 2 One of the journal editors was answering a question about work 
that “rises to the top,” the kind of prose and poems they are on the lookout 
to publish when sorting through massive amounts of submissions. What do 
they want? She said “… an observation about the world that I wouldn’t have 
made myself but I know to be true when I hear it.” As soon as she said this I 
thought about how true it is for good preaching. We recognize the genuine 
in all forms and styles. 
This recognition can be hearing something familiar from a direction 
you did not expect, especially when it is a well-executed example of that bal-
ance between control and energy/spontaneity. I did not reckon with cargo 
pants and war-zone content at a summer ballet festival. When someone 
nudges us in a direction we weren’t looking – and we come to conclusions 
ourselves, it can be more memorable, and it can take us deeper. 
The late Jim Wayne Miller described what he sought to evoke when 
dealing with ordinary things in poems:
“Growing up in North Carolina, I was often amused, along with other 
natives, at tourists who fished the trout streams. The pools, so perfectly 
clear, had a deceptive depth. Fishermen unacquainted with them were for-
ever stepping into what they thought was knee-deep water and going in up 
to their waists or even their armpits, sometimes being floated right off their 
feet. I try to make poems like those pools, so simple and clear their depth 
is deceiving. I want the writing to be so transparent that the reader forgets 
he is reading and is aware only that he is having an experience. He is sud-
denly plunged deeper than he expected and comes up shivering.” 3
When I listen to a good sermon, this is how I feel. Show me that pool. 
Take me to it. Float me off my feet.
Notes 
1  “Exit Wounds… and Then They Come Home” August 7, 2015. Chamber Dance 
Project. Performed by Davit Hovhannisyan and Jacob Bush at The Joyce Theater  
2015 Ballet Festival, New York, NY. Music: Philip Glass. Choreography:  
Diane Coburn Bruning. 
2  Panel “Slush Pile Standouts: Thoughts from the Editor’s Desk,” 2015 Association of 
Writers and Writing Programs Conference and Bookfair in Minneapolis, MN,  
April 11, 2015.
3  Jim Wayne Miller, on his poetry accessed September 1, 2015. www.jimwaynemiller.net.
We Welcome Our Poets
This issue includes poems by Pamela Wynn (Minnesota), Mark Burrows 
(Germany), Thomas Alan Holmes (Tennessee), David Axelrod (Oregon), 
Maryanne Hannan (New York), Lynette Leini-Grandell (Minnesota), 
Jim Wayne Miller (Kentucky), Kate Peper (California) and Eric Stenman 
(Pennsylvania). Book Recommendations are for Out of the Depths: Poetry 
of Poverty, Courage and Resilience edited by Susan Deborah King, Turn Me 
Loose: The Unghosting of Medgar Evers by Frank X. Walker, Old and Lost  
Rivers by J.T. Ledbetter and Telling the Bees by Faith Shearin.
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Book Recommendations 
Out of the Depths: Poetry of Poverty, Courage and Resilience 
Taking its title from Psalm 130, Out of the Depths is edited by Susan Debo-
rah King in cooperation with the Poverty Initiative at Union Theological 
Seminary in New York. The Poverty Initiative is the core program of the 
Kairos Center for Religions, Rights, and Social Justice at Union. 
Poverty makes the simplest acts in the course of the day a relentless 
struggle. This anthology calls out struggle. It names barriers these writers 
show us and struggle against – seen and invisible, rural and urban, from 
children and adult perspectives with contributions from emerging and well-
known poets. Out of the Depths is a book of memory and energy. Poetry is 
an apt form to turn to for the repetitions and realities of struggle. Check out 
“Washboard Wizard Highland, Kansas 1888 by Marilyn Nelson, “Polenta” 
by Marsha Mentzer, “Faces” by Michael Glaser, “A Dozen Reasons to Give 
up Haggling over the Price of Weavings” by Roseann Lloyd, “A Little Bit of 
Timely Advice” by Mekeel McBride and “Food Drive” by Scott Hutchison. 
The group poem “What Helps” is a good choice of a final poem. Here is an 
evocative poem by Mary Krane Derr:
Broke 
Over the burst yellowed futon
the shutoff fan of 4 blades
perennially minus 1
give the bold outstretching shadow
of that giant Jesus in Rio. (45)
In the business world there is much talk of glass ceilings – of who may not 
climb to the top. Poverty is about being surrounded by glass walls. This is a 
different kind of transparency. The poems collected here show us what it is 
to live in sight of, but utterly out of reach of things. This is old-school vir-
tual reality. 
Visit Duluth-based Holy Cow! Press for more information, or to order 
at www.holycowpress.org. Visit The Poverty Initiative at http://kairoscenter.
org/invoking-the-spirit-of-struggle-dignity-out-of-the-depths/ or poverty-
initiativ.org. “Broke” is reprinted from Out of the Depths: Poetry of Poverty, 
Courage and Resilience with the permission of Holy Cow! Press. 
Turn Me Loose: The Unghosting of Medgar Evers
Civil rights leader Medgar Evers was murdered in 1963. It took 31 years 
for his assassin to be convicted. Nearly 50 years later, his widow, Myrlie 
Evers delivered the invocation at President Barack Obama’s second inau-
guration. Frank X. Walker, the 2013-14 poet laureate of Kentucky, has 
written persona poems in the voices of Myrlie Evers, of the killer, Byron De 
La Beckwith, his brother Charles, and Beckwith’s wife and ex-wife. These 
poems split the stitches of a huge wound. By venturing into these identities 
Walker takes us back in a way that takes us forward, into the hard recogni-
tion of what we have allowed to be done in this country and a reluctance to 
call it domestic terrorism. He leads us where we are long overdue in a way 
that only a poet can. 
With points-of-view from each of these voices, each intimately con-
nected to the murder, the aftermath of the trials, and the backdrop of 
Mississippi, the structure of this book reminds me of figure drawing class. A 
model is positioned in the center of a room, surrounded by a tangle of easels 
and horses and oversized clipboards. The light source matters, the position 
of artists in the room matters. Everyone is drawing a certain view of the 
elbow, of the hair falling behind the right ear, of shadows on the drop cloth. 
Reading this book is like walking with Walker around the room, seeing all 
of the drawings. Each one is powerful.    
“Sorority Meeting” opens with Myrlie Evers speaking to Willie and 
Thelma de la Beckwith: “My faith urges me to love you. / My stomach begs 
me to not. / All I know is that day / made us sisters, somehow…” (45). If 
we live in the United States we are bound, somehow. This is a book that is 
difficult to quote from, or pull fragments from because it really settles in 
when read in its entirety. It is hard to choose.
Walker’s tone is matter-of-fact. Clear. It does not need to exaggerate. 
The writing in multiple voices is a step of empathy and unapologetic show-
ing. Like Jim Wayne Miller’s pools this book will take you deeper than you 
expect.   
Turn Me Loose: The Unghosting of Medgar Evers is published by The Uni-
versity of Georgia Press in Athens. Visit www.ugpress.org. Frank X. Walker 
is Associate Professor of English at the University of Kentucky and editor of 
Pluck! The Journal of Affrilachian Arts & Culture. 
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Telling the Bees
Telling the Bees is not, overtly, a book of spiritual poetry. Faith Shearin is not 
someone you would immediately categorize as a writer of spiritual poetry. 
But if you preach and write, I recommend that you read her. 
Shearin is a stalwart of Garrison Keillor’s Writers’ Almanac on Minne-
sota Public Radio. It is the way she writes about everyday things that makes 
me want to bring her poems to your attention. How do we see the world? 
How we see ourselves in the world? How do we capture significance in rou-
tine details? Shearin does this especially well.
She has written quite a few dog poems. They are wonderfully disarm-
ing, but speak the truth of other things. “Strangers” is an example:
Strangers
The dog barks at us sometimes, if she cannot
see us properly. She points her thin head
and makes her most vicious sounds 
and, for a moment, we are strangers:
thieves, thugs, muggers. We are not
ourselves until her nose finds us beneath
our coats and perfume; we are not ourselves
until she licks away our disguises. (58)
It is human nature and animal nature to defend ourselves when caught 
off-guard. That is when we make “our most vicious sounds.” Are we not 
strangers, sometimes, even to the people we know best and longest? There’s 
enough here to parse for a long time. This little poem gets at the root of our 
“isms” to what we perceive as strange, foreign, or other. Don’t you love the 
way we become ourselves through the signals of smell and touch and taste?
A kind of transfiguration poem, the title poem “Telling the Bees” 
(about the secrets spoken to the hive and news turns to honey) opens “In 
Europe’s towns, two hundred years ago, bees / were believed to be little 
emissaries to God.” (33)
Shearin makes marvelous, meaning-packed poems from the ordinary stuff 
of tarantulas, wedding dresses, routines of island life, rewinding movies, a very 
steep driveway and the aging process. Telling the Bees could be read – among 
other places – on those late nights when the sermon is stubborn as a toddler 
and just! won’t! be! written! Dip in and read several. This is a prescription. It 
will help. I can’t say how, just that it will, if you let her writing rub off on you. 
Visit Nacogdoches, TX-based Stephen F. Austin State University Press 
www.sfasu.edu/sfapress. “Strangers” is reprinted from Telling the Bees with 
permission of Stephen F. Austin State University Press.
Old and Lost Rivers
J.T. Ledbetter is a fine storyteller. He’s the real thing, and this book is 
like a well-built house. You never feel like you’re touching a hollow core 
door. Everything is solid, the work of a craftsman. The subjects in Old and 
Lost Rivers often relate to farming in the Midwest. He picks up on how 
interdependent people and places are – not simply in the descriptive chores-
and-nature-and-family-history-way, but by what happens inside ourselves in 
relationship to work and our environment. These poems are not provincial. 
They are interesting and wise. They give us a sense of a reliable narrator. 
There’s no such thing, of course, but good writers make us feel like there is. 
Old and Lost Rivers is expansive even though it is specific, as in “in the last 
green light:” (Greenville Lake) “There was only the snap and pop / of heavy 
curtains billowing into the room / and geese sailing across the pond / trail-
ing their pink legs (68). 
Hearty and beautiful, the poems in this book are full of detail without 
feeling dense. He never overdoes it. Ledbetter knows exactly what tell and 
what to leave out. I’d especially like to lift up “Wild Grapes,” “The Merits of 
Cows,” “How Grief Works,” “Firing the Gardener” and “Sunday Music.”
Here is the opening stanza of the first poem. The title is taken from a 
composition of the same name by the American Composer Tobias Picker.
Old and Lost Rivers
Old and Lost Rivers flow quietly over older rocks 
and tangled roots, 
past empty houses leaning against each other 
where an old man standing where the two rivers come together  
watches a barrel and a Methodist Hymn Book swimming for  
their lives down to the Houston Marshes to the sea … (1)
Don’t you just want to keep reading? Old Lost Rivers won the 2011 Idaho 
Prize for Poetry. It is published by Lost Horse Press in Sandpoint, Idaho. 
Visit www.losthorsepress.org. J.T. Ledbetter is Professor Emeritus at Califor-
nia Lutheran University. 
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In the Church of the Holy Sepulcher
David Axelrod
Centuries have not redeemed us
from commerce, disputes enough 
to fill archives – receipts, claims
and counterclaims – the only evidence 
we existed. So we kneel, full of rural 
longing, god somehow accumulating 
in touched stone, in kissed icons, 
tossed coins, wishes, sympathetic 
magic. God who cannot be driven out 
by chanting men or militant songs, 
but goes on, abiding here in the dark
like names we gave empty houses 
once inhabited by our displaced 
neighbors. People who could not 
endure local sorrows, dullness of lives 
lived in provinces never visited, 
far from trade or pilgrimage routes. 
Nothing there but fields, puddled 
roads, fouled wells and moldy bread, 
sick livestock. Our whole lifetimes 
misspent, bowing to the violent 
insurgencies mustered by a priest, 
the manor or oligarch, those living
in splendors unattainable as long 
nights we dreamed of when young, 
asleep in the arms of local beauty –
a cobbler’s daughter with flaxen hair,
the baker’s handsome son, a young
widow, the tinker, the winter traveler.
Thou Preparest a Table Before Me
During the truce, I knock at his door
and my neighbor, my enemy, 
seems neither shocked nor relieved, 
but does as duty demands, pulls me inside, 
kisses my cheeks, leads me through dark rooms, 
and out across a threshing floor 
where finches scavenge barley for weevils. 
My neighbor, my enemy 
serves me at his table, his sons 
addressing me as uncle, his women 
bringing platters of lamb, roasted eggplant, 
fried onions and feta, salted lemons, 
a pillow of bread we tear open 
to sop up tomato juice. 
And raise glasses of plum wine, 
toast this day of reprieves, fugitive mercies,
toast our parents who fled to Aleppo, 
leaving behind this harvest –
orchards and fields burned to ash, 
artillery batteries arrayed 
to punch our city again at dawn.
At the door at dusk we pledge
to meet in summer in a pasture 
or on a beach, a future that disavows 
no one, the living or dead, and there 
we will toss grandchildren into the air, 
and catch them in our arms, as we once 
were caught by our young parents
full of laughter, past and future restored.
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Where Does the Joy Come From?
It’s demoralizing to fast in our bitterness
dusk to dusk on the seventeenth of Tammuz 
as Babylon breaches the city walls, 
razes the temple, ruins our daughters.
Zealots avenge us, burning alive a child.
Our enemies retaliate, sons go missing,
and soon we discover their bodies buried 
in the hills under piles of broken limestones, 
holes drilled through shining foreheads.
But there are other days in summer, 
when fresh strawberries arrives at our table 
and taste so good we cry with gratitude 
for all the flavors soil entrusts to what is 
tender. The rain returns empty of guile,
then the sun, and soon, the milk of lactating mares
fermented and distilled spirits of horses.
At night, together, our faces glowing softly 
in the shade of cypresses in the wilderness.
David Axelrod’s newest collections of poetry are Folly and What Next, Old Knife? both from 
Lost Horse Press. Individual poems and essays have appeared most recently in High Desert 
Journal, Fogged Clarity, Miramar, Serving House Journal, Stringtown, Talking River, Terrain 
and elsewhere. Axelrod is Co-Director of the Eastern Oregon University low-residency M.F.A. 
program in creative writing. Visit www.eou.edu/mfa.  
Names
Jim Wayne Miller
Preachers and professors came into the mountains, 
brought Bibles, volumes of calf-bound classics,
Stately Latin and Greek hexameters, 
memories stacked to the rafters with chapter and verse.
Often they were the namers. Creaking west 
through mountain gaps and passes, they scattered old-world
names over the new – the kings and prophets, 
gods and goddesses of Greece, Rome, and the Holy Land.
Names set like marble monuments in wilderness
made muddy roads and newgrounds numinous.
History, like a river out of banks,  
set temples alongside shake-roofed barns.
So Mars Hill, where a Roman war god
had his temple, appeared a Baptist town
in North Carolina. The heathen goddess, Juno,
lives locally over a county line in Buncombe. 
Though no blind Greek poet, Homer Hawkins,
who farmed for shares, had a thousand stories.
The Brier’s grandfather, Hezekiah, fell tipsy
at baptizing, into the pool, but clambered
out, unregenerate still, though like his namesake,
the Judean king, he detested idolatry.
Nobody was named Jesus in the mountains,
but Marys and Marthas, Matthews, Marks, Lukes 
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and Johns filled church and schoolroom benches.
Plato taught the Brick Church Sunday School
while Jupiter and Socrates lived as slaves,
their graves unmarked in Brick Church Cemetery.
Hebrew kings ruled sixty-acre farms.
Isaiahs in overalls prophesied dry weather.
Vergil ran the mill and cleared newground.
Horace rived shakes and bottomed rocking chairs.
Other names grew up, rooted in local life
and wry reflection on it: Sandy Mush,
Hogeye, Rabbitham, Bearwallow, grittily
concrete, though close to abstract Luck and Trust.
Then came those names, concessions to overwhelming
obviousness of numbers: Meadowstown, Surrett Cove.
And those taken from the Cherokee:
Cullowhee, Ocanaluftee, Nantahala. 
But if the lofty and the grand were humbled 
in the homemade frames and faces of sang diggers,
farmers and squirrel hunters, the homely and the low
discovered their own dignity and beauty 
on Sugar Creek, at Snow Hill Gap, in Piney Grove. 
Jim Wayne Miller (1936–1996) was a pioneer in the field of Appalachian studies, a prolific 
writer (poetry, essays, fiction), scholar and teacher. “Names” is reprinted from his book The Brier 
Poems by permission of Gnomon Press. Miller was a graduate of Berea College with a Ph.D. 
in German and American Literature from Vanderbilt University. He was a professor of Ger-
man language and literature at Western Kentucky University for 33 years. His honors include 
the Thomas Wolfe Literary Award and the Zoe Kincaid Brockman Memorial Award. Books 
by Miller include Copperhead Cane, Dialogue With A Dead Man, The Mountains Have 
Come Closer, Vein Of Words, Nostalgia for 70, Brier: His Book, and Newfound. Visit 
www.gnomonpress.com, www.kentuckypress.com or www.jimwaynemiller.net.  
The Coming Dark
Mark Burrows
This morning a line
of geese drifts slowly out across
the silky mannered sky,
all blue and vast and 
beckoning, their November flight 
a sign of the coming cold.
In their wide arc 
they hesitate for a moment and then 
turn slowly north again
as if remembering 
something they’d left behind, 
the lure of distances.
My eyes wander with 
them to the far places I’ve also known,
strange and rich and kind –
a stillness beyond 
the burden of the day’s work, a song
that carries through
the coming dark, 
a hope despite the all of it that 
still keeps the heart.
Mark Burrows is professor of religion and literature at the University of Applied Sciences in  
Bochum, Germany. His poems and translations have recently appeared in Poetry, 91st Merid-
ian, The Anglican Theological Review, Southern Quartlerly, Eremos, Weavings, Meta-
morphoses, and Almost Island, among others. His recent publications include two volumes of 
German poetry in translation: Rainer Maria Rilke’s Prayers of a Young Poet and the German-
Iranian poet SAID’s 99 Psalms, both published by Paraclete Press. A forthcoming volume of his 
recent poems, The Chance of Home, will be published in 2016. Visit www.paracletepress.com.
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Inclining
Maryanne Hannan
I have inclined mine heart to perform thy statutes alway
Psalm 119: 112
How good does it feel
to put one foot in front
of the other? 
Depends
on so many things:
the leg attached to the foot,
the gear, the foot itself;
the ground under the foot,
the slope, the terrain;
even the weather that day.
So many stats
that never touch
the decision to walk.
Maryanne Hannan has recent or forthcoming work from her Psalm series in journals including 
Anglican Theological Review, Christianity and Literature, Cresset, The Christian Century, 
ARTS, Spiritus, and Windhover. A former Latin teacher, she lives in upstate New York. Her 
website is www.mhannan.com. Psalm 119: 112 in the epigraph is from the King James version.
Tystnaden 
Eric Stenman
Existerar tystnaden faktiskt? 
Alltid stöter 
 Och  brummar
 Och  knackar det sig
I världen omkring oss
 Och inom oss
Isynnerhet kärleken
Eller längtan efter kärleken
Silence (from the Swedish)
Is there truly silence?
Always there’s pushing
 And whirling 
 And knocking
In the world around us
 And in us
Especially love
Or longing for love
Eric Stenman is a 1974 graduate of Lutheran Theological Seminary at Gettysburg. He is a 
Board Certified Chaplain and serves at Hanover Hospital in Hanover, Pennsylvania. His love 
for poetry started in high school when his 10th grade English Literature teacher introduced him 
to Alfred Lord Tennyson’s “Idylls of the King.” He has been reading and writing poetry ever since. 
It was at Gustavus Adolphus College in St. Peter, Minnesota that Stenman discovered Swedish 
poetry, especially the 20th century authors. At Gettysburg Seminary he met his friend and men-
tor Professor Bengt Hoffman and was greatly influenced by Hoffman’s poetry in Swedish.
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A Search for Things That Have Nothing 
to do with Grief
Pamela Wynn
. 
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In His Dementia, Death Is Nothing 
Now
Thomas Alan Holmes
In his dementia, death is nothing now.
Three times these past two days, he’s named
a gone one, asked if gone, but never how
each may have passed. His mind will not allow
his grief to reoccur; that part is tamed.
In his dementia, death is nothing now.
On Ambien, I’ve heard him weep, then vow
to stop whatever action might have shamed
a gone one, asked if gone, but never how
he might make recompense. Why disavow
forgotten wrongs for which he might be blamed?
In his dementia, death is nothing now.
He’s looked for ended time, when heads will bow
and knees will bend for Christ returned, proclaimed.
A gone one, asked if gone, but never how,
he’ll see in a new body. His white brow
will glow, with promised knowledge newly framed.
In his dementia, death is nothing now,
a gone one, asked if gone, but never how.
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Translation
The nesting ants below the bees have bored
into the rot, and bark has fallen; gray
and riddled phloem lies exposed. Midway
between this scar and few green leaves, the hoard
of honey, hid where heartwood held, is stored;
the trunk has swelled, the sapwood burst. Someday,
I wonder, honey, sealed in cells that may
expand and break, will run. The sweet, ignored
until the hive’s capacity has failed
in productivity, exceeding all
constraints of physicality, congealed
then breaking free from bee-made waxen wall
then cambium and outer bark, revealed
at last, will force its fragile fortress’ fall.
Thomas Alan Holmes, a member of the East Tennessee State University English faculty, lives 
and writes in Johnson City. Some of his work has appeared in Louisiana Literature, Valparaiso 
Poetry Review, Appalachian Heritage, The Connecticut Review, The Appalachian Journal, 
North American Review, The Florida Review, Blue Mesa Review, Pine Mountain Sand & 
Gravel, Still: The Journal, The Southern Poetry Anthology Volume VI: Tennessee, Iodine 
and Cherry Tree.
It is Called a Tracery
Lynette Reini-Grandell
1.
Twining the top of a window,
branching beyond and above, 
carved in stone, in wood,
splaying like shadows of tree limbs in winter,
it casts a pattern,
a shadow, on promises, plans, spirit blessings,
work that still threads my thoughts
into a thicket, benedictions and creeds,
chant and enchantment sung in slow notes under pillars like trees,
weaving regrets and forsaking, querulous barbs,
the dimness of days that darken my thoughts, noise of hymns sung 
with eyes full of tears so heavy the pages were blurred,
and the infinite number of thoughts twigging forward.
It shades a sung word daring imperious to breathe,
the sung word, the stem of an oak,
each multiplied branch making it taller and stronger,
drawing me closer, before the escape flows past me,
a woman, who glimpsed lakes over treetops,
who dreamed a dark horse could waft her away.
I fling myself at the roots of this tree, my face in the soil,
consumed by words and the study of signs, 
scouring for one common atom uniting it all,
loving the unseen, invisible world,
holding fast to the blossoming tree limbs.
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2.
In the cathedral, 
when sun shifts north melting the ice and the snow, 
in the chancel with carved wooden choir stalls,
the choir sounds warm, a capella.
Soprano and tenor float above alto and bass,
each part beginning, then picked up by another,
a marvelous fabric of sound mixed with words,
yet no words for the sound they create.
I in my bench imagine my song with them,
throat opening full, lungs filling with air, expelling again and again;
the air comes in from the space, nourishing,
then a part escapes to join other breaths, the invisible body.
Creating God, your fingers trace …  
Seven whole days, not one in seven, I will praise thee …  
I bind unto myself today … 
3.
Then swift, the magic breaks,
the promise of blended voices building together proves false,
harmony an illusion when shouting shows strength,
all my words taken away.
Christ be with me, Christ within me, Christ behind me, Christ before me,
Christ beside me, Christ to win me, Christ to comfort and restore me … 
There is no comfort here 
as we perch on our velvet benches, listening, straining, 
the melodies circling in unstable harmonies,
the suspended fourth tone that defies resolution.
The note leads me out, 
into the vibrant wood grain of the bench,
the image of lapping waves and eddies 
each moment the tree grew still taller.
It draws me out like the dark horse that danced in my dreams,
beside me always, leaping the ditches and road signs,
its long, tangled mane that turned in its wake 
like leaves in a sudden, strong wind.
4.
 … by invocation of the same, the Three in One, and One in Three,
Of whom all nature hath creation … 
The sound washes wonder over me
as light glints through windows,
the metal and stonework pointed and curving,
dividing the segments of light like the horse’s dark legs
that carry the child where her heart must lead,
to the boll of the oak, a bundle of dappling twigs and boughs,
planting itself even as it rots inside,
replenishing even as it is cut down.
You branches, 
your echoes and turns that I follow 
alone with my tiny bract off the main shoot,
I long for your lift and your shelter.
5.
The leaves make a sound, a washing, a river of breath.
They answer each other without hesitation 
as they turn in the wind and grow against gravity, murmuring,
break, break, break, break,
like a plainchant the horse hears and stands still for,
and the choir sings to the light,
break, break, break, break,
and I open my mouth to echo the sound
and see as I finger the grain of wood making its river,
a thousand dark horses next to the stream,
each dipping its long head to drink from the water,
each one coming out from a thicket of sharp stems like thorns.
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IKEA
Kate Peper
Wake up sleeper, rise from the dead…
Ephesians 5:14
No clocks. All the windowless walls 
gleam with their own light.
Rooms within rooms at first 
frightened then lulled her –
Lord, I came here only for a faucet.
How could I have lost You?
She buys a miniature watering can and an indoor-
outdoor rug before hearing the loudspeaker
call her name. I’m here, Lord, on the 3rd floor
with the cabinets. The blandness of veneer
is comforting. She wanders to the Malm Queen Size,
stretches out face down, yields to its softness,
dreaming of meatballs simmering at the Bistro.
Christ lifts up the sno-globe
and shakes it, flakes falling on the blue
and yellow building inside. Wake up! Wake up!
He says to His flannelled doll on her bed.
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“Let Us Cross Over the River and Rest 
Under the Trees”
 – Stonewall Jackson’s last words.
But first, I’ll stand on the shore
and prepare:
I’ll twine-tie the pages
of daily regrets I’ve been lugging,
heave them into the current’s mercy.
I’ll unshoulder my bags loaded
with worry’s fruit, each soft piece 
falling apart as they’re hurled.
I’ll unwrap the cord of guilt from my neck,
fling its length into the river’s deepest heart,
and look up to see the crowns of trees.
I’ll empty my pockets of fear.
Flimsy as string tied end to end,
it first floats, then unknots itself and sinks.
Unburdened, I’ll swim with strong strokes to the far shore.
I’ll walk out lighter, full of light, unmade 
in His likeness and singing under the trees.
Kate Peper is a freelance designer and award-winning watercolor painter living in Marin 
County, California. Her poems have been nominated three times for a Pushcart Prize and have 
appeared in, or are forthcoming in The Baltimore Review, Cimarron Review, Gargoyle, Poet 
Lore, Quiddity, Rattle, Tar River Review and elsewhere.
GETTYSBURG SEMINARY FINE ARTS The Powers of a Flag 
John Spangler
What happens when a valued symbol becomes so tainted that it can no longer be 
used in public or another sacred space? See what one artist thinks. 
Earlier this summer, it was my privilege to assist in a wedding ceremony of 
close friends in a New England congregational church. In its traditionally 
spare, clean architectural lines, flags popped out noticeably to each side of the 
chancel area in the mostly white painted background. There were no fewer 
than four flags: the United States flag, flanked by the United Nations, the 
protestant Christian flag and the flag of the United Church of Christ. This 
collection is probably the largest I’ve seen in worship spaces, but reflected a 
conscientious decision to broaden and diversify the symbolism that comes with 
flags in general. They reminded me of an earlier era in which the flags were 
contentious symbols in the worship spaces, when Vietnam protests were in full 
flower and a generation chaffed at an often labelled “imperial presidency.” 
In those days, pastors occasionally saw their ministries crash and burn 
when taking controversial opposition to the war, or an unpopular president, 
or on the threats of growing nuclear arsenals. A very difficult conflict pre-
ceded me in the congregation I first served, also in New England, where a 
pastor resisted a parade of flags and Veterans carrying them in a very small 
worship space on a Sunday of Memorial Day weekend. This pastor made 
the right decision but paid dearly in relationships with local veterans who 
were deprived of their opportunity to have a special procession with the 
military colors. One could conclude that the flags were displayed in spaces 
where art belonged, but the critical issue would have been the relationship 
of the church to the state. The trend and proper thing to do was to elimi-
nate all flags from sacred spaces, or perhaps to dilute their effect by adding 
more flags. But there was no question as to whether or not flags carried  
symbolic powers, and church leaders knew better than most. 
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The presence of the national flag was debated in many congregations 
back then, not usually around aesthetics or liturgical reform, but because of 
the idolatry of flags in uncomfortably close proximity to the furnishings of 
worship. Lutherans might have had even more focused debates than other 
protestant groups due to the history of the German Nationalsozialismus 
undue influence on the churches of Germany leading up to World War II. 
So prohibited is the primary Nazi symbol (swastika) in my lifetime, that 
the fact that it was taken from a version of the Christian cross is not widely 
understood. One congregation on the upper west side of Manhattan suf-
fered patiently into the 1980’s until it could afford to remodel and replace 
it’s beautiful craftsman era floor tile that included the occasional use of the 
long condemned symbol in its entrance area. Outside of historical and art 
exhibitions, that symbol and its flags are universally and completely taboo in 
our time. 
The U.S. flag spent a lot of time in the chancels of American congre-
gations in the 20th century, but flags were making a comeback on another 
front. Ken Burns, creator of the PBS documentary on the Civil War, said 
recently in an interview with the Associate Press that 
The Confederate flag came into [re]use after 1954. It went into state 
flags, Southern state flags and in other places, and the only thing that 
happened in 1954 that I recall was Brown vs Board of Education. 
What that means is that the use of the Confederate flag, on the back 
of pickup trucks, flying in the yard of the state capitol in Columbia, 
South Carolina, is resistance to Civil Rights (and) saying actually we 
don’t believe what the Americans were founded on, that all men are 
created equal.1
The Confederate battle flag had been reintroduced much earlier, and was 
part of the original concept (ca. 1915) for Gutzon Borglum’s bas-relief 
design to be carved as a Confederate Memorial on Stone Mountain, Georgia 
(see illustration). The original design included both the Confederate battle 
flag and nine Confederate leaders; only three were carved into the moun-
tain, beginning in 1923. 
But it was installation artist John Sims who created one of the stron-
gest statements about this favorite symbolism of the Confederacy in a 2004 
exhibit at Gettysburg College entitled “The Proper Way to Hang a Con-
federate Flag,” part of a larger art show entitled Recoloration Proclamation: 
The Gettysburg Redress. The exhibit ridiculed the Confederate Battle flag by 
dressing it up, colorizing and accessorizing it and treating it as if it were a 
mere stylized garment or a decoration. The installation entitled “The Proper 
Way to Hang a Confederate Flag” gained most of the attention, however, 
consisting of an unaltered confederate flag held by a rope on a 13-foot gal-
lows. Anxiety spread throughout the town and the college campus, public 
leaders worried aloud about security, and the Sons of the Confederate Vet-
erans flew a banner from an airplane in protest as the exhibit opened. Some 
concluded that the exhibit was never seen the proper ‘framework’ due to a 
press release that employed the phrase “lynching” in connection to roped 
flag. But much of the media coverage used the same language to describe 
this particular installation. Critics labelled the work “contentious art.” 
For John Sims, it appears that in order to remove the sting of the Con-
federate flag’s power, one can treat the symbols without the seriousness 
and respect that they might be granted in other contexts. The flag lost its 
dignity in the hands of the artist, and through its mocking and mimicking 
of a lynching, Sims undercut the symbolic power of the flag. What came 
to mind at the time was the mocking of the Nazi regime in Mel Brooks’ 
movie and musical play, The Producers. Brooks savaged the Nazi leaders 
with satirical musical send ups, undercutting the power of the regime with 
a more powerful humor. Comedy Central comedian Larry Wilmore raised 
the obvious questions as the Governor of South Carolina called the state 
legislature back into special session to act to remove the flag from the state 
house grounds. “Take the flag down, and debate putting it back up,” he said 
in exasperation. “It’s decoration; we are not talking about an official flag. We 
are talking about a relic that has no purpose anymore. It’s decorative. You 
Gutzon Borglum’s original bas-relief design for the Confederate memorial on Stone Moun-
tain, Georgia.
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shorten its length, and boycotted the opening in the end. The anger of local, 
regional and national interest groups appeared to be out of proportion to a 
flag which I thought at the time had been long drained of its power. Spend-
ing 20 years in ministry in New England had sheltered me from some of 
the resurgent, if latent, racial undertones still at work in our society. Eleven 
years later, the power of this desire to undercut the power of Confederate 
symbolism became clearer. 
A decision by the Seminary leadership to prohibit unfurled Confeder-
ate Battle flags during an encampment on the campus this summer at the 
end of June created a storm of opposition in social media circles, calls to 
boycott the Seminary Ridge Museum, charges of censorship, and more. The 
reactions earned the Seminary a link on one of the larger white supremacist 
websites as well. Voices from both South and North, both men and women, 
vigorously defended the need to allow them on the campus, even though 
contemporary supremacist groups had met in town during the previous 
encampment in 2014, creating potential confusion surrounding the flag’s 
don’t need a declaration to remove a decoration.” 
A member of the Sons of Confederate Veterans and a critic quoted 
by The New York Times said that Sims’ work wasn’t art, but a “gimmick.”2 
At the time, the exhibit seemed to reflect the bitterness of the artist, who 
was also angered by the college’s decision to move the exhibit inside and 
John Sims “The Proper Way to Hang a Confederate Flag,” from the exhibit Recoloration 
Proclamation: The Gettysburg Redress. 
Detail of a street photograph in downtown Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.
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appearance. The mass shootings at Mother Emanuel Church in Charleston, 
SC didn’t dent the wave of negative responses in the backlash. The fact that 
the flag remained in place within the historical exhibit of the Seminary 
Ridge Museum didn’t satisfy the charges of historical apostasy. Social media 
postings showed cross burnings and U.S. flags carried by rallies of the KKK, 
asking why the Seminary allows the cross and the U.S. flag to be displayed 
at the Seminary. To be fair, hundreds of quieter “likes” continued to support 
the Seminary Ridge Museum and Seminary in the mist of this controversy. 
And a good number of living historians among the encamped groups under-
stood, even if they did not agree with the Seminary’s decision. 
So while the flag hasn’t quite lost all of its power, at least among a cer-
tain slice of American society, the context in which John Sims created his 
installation of artistic mistreatment for the flag and the “recoloration” and 
“redress” at Gettysburg has become much clearer to me. The Director of the 
Schmucker Art Gallery at the time, Molly Hutton, said she recruited Sims 
exhibit because she “thought it was very provocative, that it would get a 
good dialogue going about the presence of the Confederate flag at Gettys-
burg,” she said.3 It certainly started dialogue if not a shouting match, both 
locally and nationally. The flag controversy as experienced by the Seminary 
this summer revealed one more time how valuable it was to have John 
Sims provocative exhibition at our sister institution across town in 2004. It 
reminded me again how easy it is to tune out the appearance of this flag, to 
assume that its power has waned, and that there is a continued need to chal-
lenge the notion that there can be heritage without hatred. 
Notes
1  Ken Burns in an interview with Associate Press, appearing in The Gettysburg Times, 
September 8, 2015, marking the 25th anniversary of the PBS documentary “The Civil 
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2  Christine Jordan Sexton, “Southern Group Protests a Depiction of the Confederate 
Flag,” The New York Times, March 17, 2007. 
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